DISSENTING OPINION
BY KLEIN, J.:¶ 1 Ever since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969),15 the law has been that *28if an increase in sentence following an appeal is motivated by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge, the vindictive sentence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the claim of vindictiveness in this case is not only a claim of an unlawful sentence, but also a claim of an unconstitutional sentence. Because I believe that the claim of vindictiveness is a claim of illegality, we cannot dismiss the matter for the failure to file a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. I believe that if the claim is made out, Robinson will have proven an illegal sentence and, thus, is entitled to a remand for a third resentencing.
¶ 2 Upon reaching the merits, I believe it is clear that what was stated on the record confirms that the trial judge did what she said she would do at the initial sentencing — i.e., impermissibly punish Robinson for filing post-sentence motions and taking an appeal. The only reasons the trial judge gave for tripling Robinson’s sentence and imposing a sentence that was twice what the Commonwealth requested were that Robinson was ineligible for work release and that now, only four weeks after the initial sentencing, he could not be rehabilitated. That is not enough.
¶ 3 Moreover, when our Court remanded the matter for a second resentencing because the prior sentence was illegal for exceeding the statutory maximum, the trial judge imposed the same aggregate sentence, by simply rearranging the individual sentences for the various charges. Therefore, I believe that: (1) there is a strong appearance of vindictiveness; (2) the imposition of a sentence vindictively because a defendant challenges that sentence through post-sentence motions and an appeal is illegal and unconstitutional; and (3) the matter should be remanded for a third resentencing.16
There is Strong Evidence of Vindictiveness by the Sentencing Judge
¶ 4 I believe that the sentence ultimately imposed could be justified if it did not appear to be motivated by vindictiveness and if appropriate reasons had been stated on the record, at least at the second sentencing hearing.
¶ 5 However, it appears in this case that the trial judge acted vindictively. Case law following Pearce does not change the principle that it is illegal and unconstitutional to use vindictiveness as a basis to impose a greater sentence after an appeal. Subsequent cases by our courts hold that merely because a new sentence after an appeal is greater, that does not automatically mean that the sentence was based on vindictiveness. Rather, a presumption of vindictiveness arises, which can be rebutted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Speight, 578 Pa. 520, 854 A.2d 450 (2004); Commonwealth v. Campion, 449 Pa.Super. 9, 672 A.2d 1328 (1996). In my view, there is no way the presumption can be rebutted in this case.
¶ 6 Here, Robinson need not rely on a mere presumption of vindictiveness, where the trial judge made apparently vengeful statements on the record. See Texas v. *29McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (“Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resen-tencing.”) At the initial sentencing, the judge stated:
Mr. Robinson, you have ten days to ask me for reconsideration. It is perfectly within your right. You contact [defense counsel] and he will submit the paperwork. If you ask me for reconsideration, I am already struggling with this. I’m being candid with you. If you ask me for reconsideration, I’ll put myself at peace by sending you to the State. Because then I won’t have to sweat this anymore.
I said if he asks for reconsideration of the sentence, I will impose the sentence that I think will give me peace of mind that these children in the community are protected.
(N.T., 2/26/03, at 29, 32 (emphasis added).) Four weeks later, following post-sentence motions, the trial judge resentenced Robinson to a state prison term of three to six years, instead of the previously imposed county prison term of 11/6 to 23 months. Coupled with the trial judge’s prior statements, this indicates that she imposed the higher sentence because Robinson exercised his right to file post-sentence motions.
¶ 7 In fact, Robinson filed post-sentence motions on March 3, 2003. Perhaps remembering what the trial judge stated at the initial sentencing, on March 5, 2003, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. The facts of the resen-tencing hearing held on March 31, 2003, only four weeks after the initial sentencing, support the finding of vindictiveness. Robinson’s post-sentence motion challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. In its post-sentence motion, the Commonwealth asserted that the sentence was two weeks short of the standard range and, since Robinson was ineligible for the work release initially ordered, that he should receive a state sentence. After the hearing, the trial judge resentenced Robinson to three to six years for both counts of indecent assault and five years’ probation for each of three counts of corruption of minors.
¶ 8 Moreover, Robinson’s claim that the trial judge gave insufficient reasons to support the increased sentence at the March 31, 2003 hearing appears to have merit. The trial judge tripled the sentence to three to six years from less than one to two years. The Commonwealth, however, only asked for a standard-range sentence, which would have been one to two years or one-and-one-half to three years. (See N.T., 3/31/03, at 14.) Thus, the sentence imposed was twice what the Commonwealth requested. The Commonwealth never asked for more than a standard-range sentence; it only stated that there were no mitigating circumstances and that the previously ordered work release could not be carried out. Nonetheless, on her own volition and with no apparent support for the statement, the trial judge stated, “What [the prosecutor] wants is five to ten.” (Id. at 15.)
¶ 9 There were no real reasons stated on the record for the greatly enhanced sentence. All that the trial judge said about the enhanced sentence was the following:
And, based on the fact that you are ineligible for work release, and based on the fact that you ai’e not amenable to rehabilitation, again your position, I hereby impose a sentence of three to six years incarceration concurrent on the two counts of indecent assault, followed *30by sixty months reporting probation, supervised by the State on the three counts of [corruption of minors] concurrent.
(Id. at 19-20.) The fact ■ that the judge initially erred in imposing work release does not justify tripling the sentence, and a cryptic statement that now Robinson is not “amenable to rehabilitation,” when he was four weeks earlier, does not justify the sentence. In my view, to sanction this type of conduct by finding waiver will result in a successful ineffectiveness claim in a Post Conviction Relief Act petition or, if that fails, a federal habeas corpus petition. It is a waste of time and judicial resources.
¶ 10 Not only was the three — to six-year sentence illegal because it was vindictive and chilled the defendant’s right to appeal, but it also exceeded the statutory maximum for indecent assault. Therefore, on direct appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for resentencing.
¶ 11 On remand, the trial judge imposed the same three — to six-year sentence, but rearranged the sentences so that rather than sentencing beyond the statutory maximum for indecent assault, the judge gave the statutory maximum of two-and-one-half years and tacked on six months for corruption of minors, which again came out to an aggregate term of three to six years.
¶ 12 At the October 27, 2004 resentenc-ing hearing, the trial judge initially gave no reasons for the sentence, stating, “Mr. Robinson, basically bottom line what I have done is give you the same sentence that I had given you, which is three to six years incarceration, plus five years reporting probation.... So, I’m writing it differently, but nothing has changed.” (N.T., 10/27/04, at 14-15.) If nothing had changed in the 18 months that had passed since the last sentencing, when Robinson did take many steps in prison to deal with his problems, then how could it have changed in the four weeks between the first and second sentencing hearings?
¶ 13 It was only after the three — to six-year sentence was reimposed and defense counsel raised the issue of vindictiveness that the trial judge attempted to justify the sentence. The only statement at this-point that could conceivably be considered a reason for the sentence is the following:
And I don’t have to say anything more than what is said back on the record on March 31st of '03 [the first resentencing hearing following post-sentence motions].
But if you need for it to be abundantly clear ... this standard range sentence is abundantly appropriate, because it was his daughter. This is a case of incest. His daughter was highly credible. And that was what I, as factfinder, determined .... The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
Accordingly, a standard range, given his prior record score, the unique facts of the case, and the ongoing trauma that the child will suffer having been sexually assaulted by her father, and at this point in time the best science that we have tells us that these children never fully recover. The standard range sentence is appropriate, and that is what I have imposed.
(Id. at 18.)
¶ 14 As noted by the majority, if a trial court chooses to sentence a defendant outside of the sentencing guidelines, it should state on the record adequate reasons for the deviation. Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 158 (Pa.Super.2004), reversed on other grounds, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957 (2007). Likewise, if a trial judge changes a sentence after an appeal, the judge should say what has changed in the interim to justify a greater sentence. The trial judge did not do that in this case. *31Where the trial judge initially imposes a county sentence, and then later more than triples the sentence and imposes a state sentence twice as long as what the Commonwealth requested, absent a detailed statement from the judge on the record, one can only surmise that the trial judge kept her word and took revenge on Robinson for filing post-sentence motions and an appeal. This is unconstitutional. See Pearce, supra; see also Speight, 854 A.2d at 455 (sentencing court may not punish defendant for exercising his or her constitutional rights or chill exercise of those rights by resentencing defendant vindictively).
A Claim of Vindictiveness Implicates the Legality of Sentencing
¶ 15 In Pearce, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes an increased sentence on retrial when the increase is motivated solely by the sentencing judge’s vindictiveness. The Supreme Court stated:
Due process of law ... requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072; accord Speight, supra.
¶ 16 While cases have held that a lengthier sentence on remand does not necessarily mean that the motivation was vindictiveness, the trial judge must state reasons on the record to affirmatively demonstrate that there was a different motivation. See Speight, 854 A.2d at 455; Campion, 672 A.2d at 1333. Here, there is no showing of any motivation other than the trial judge’s direct threat to the defendant regarding the consequences if he were to file post-sentence motions and an appeal. Wdien the defendant did, a significantly harsher sentence was imposed.
¶ 17 The majority relies on several en banc decisions by this Court to support its conclusion that a claim of vindictiveness by the sentencing judge is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, rather than its legality. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 900 A.2d 906 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc) (claim of denial of right of allo-cution implicates discretionary aspects), app. denied, 591 Pa. 673, 916 A.2d 1102 (Pa.2007); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d 368 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc) (same), app. denied, 591 Pa. 681, 917 A.2d 313 (Pa.2007); Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479 (Pa.Super.2005) (en banc) (claim that trial court violated plea agreement by imposing consecutive sentences and by not allowing defendant to withdraw his plea implicates discretionary aspects), app. denied, 591 Pa. 688, 917 A.2d 844 (Pa.2007); Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc) (claim of improper calculation of offense gravity score implicates discretionary aspects).
¶ 18 The majority notes that legality of sentencing claims are generally limited to: (1) claims that the sentence was outside the statutory maximum; (2) claims involving merger or double jeopardy; and (2) claims implicating the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). See Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 372-73 & n. 6; see also Berry, 877 A.2d at 483 (“illegal sentence” is term that our courts apply to “a relatively small class of cases”).
¶ 19 The majority recognizes that while a claim of vindictiveness implicates due *32process concerns, our Supreme Court has not determined whether a constitutional violation in sentencing necessarily implicates the legality of the sentence. See Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 373 n. 6 (“[O]ur Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue ... [of] whether all sentencing errors of a constitutional dimension implicate the legality of the sentence.”) Nonetheless, the majority finds that a vindictiveness claim does not fall within the three categories of “legality” claims recognized in Jacobs and other recent en banc cases. It further finds that Robinson’s claim is, in effect, a claim that the trial judge exercised her discretion in a way that was motivated by impermissible factors. Therefore, the majority concludes that it is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing and expressly disapproves of several panel decisions suggesting otherwise.17
¶ 20 I respectfully disagree with this result. I believe that our Court’s recognition of Apprendi and double jeopardy claims, which implicate fundamental constitutional rights, as legality claims suggests that a claim of vindictiveness would fall into the same category. Even though Robinson’s sentence is technically “legal” in that it is within the statutory maximum, one cannot say that the sentence was constitutionally legal under Pearce and its progeny. Our Supreme Court in Speight held that it violates due process to punish a defendant for exercising his constitutional rights or to “chill” the exercise of such rights by sentencing vindictively. 854 A.2d at 455.
¶ 21 As the majority acknowledges, the claims that have been recognized as legality claims “implicate the fundamental legal authority of the [trial] court to impose the sentence that it did.” (Majority Op. at 8 (citing Jacobs, supra).) Here, the trial judge had no constitutional authority to impose a significantly harsher sentence merely as punishment for Robinson’s filing post-sentence motions and taking an appeal. See Pearce, supra; Speight, supra. In my view, this is the very hallmark of a legality of sentencing claim.18 Therefore, I would conclude that a vindictiveness claim is a nonwaivable challenge to the legality of sentencing.19
¶ 22 Accordingly, I believe that the harsher sentence imposed on Robinson’s second resentencing was not only unlawful, *33but unconstitutional as well. Unless we correct this fundamental error by the trial judge, there is the specter of an almost certain, and likely successful, federal habe-as corpus remedy.
¶ 23 Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
. Pearce was later overruled in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, *28109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). The Smith Court held that the presumption of vindictiveness is not applicable where the initial sentence was the result of a guilty plea, as opposed to a trial. That is not the case here, so the rule in Pearce still applies.
. Under Com. v. Whitmore, 590 Pa. 376, 912 A.2d 827 (2006), it appears that we do not have the authority to direct that the case be assigned to a new judge for resentencing sua sponte. We express no opinion as to whether under the circumstances it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to entertain a motion for recusal because of the appearance of bias.
. See Commonwealth v. McHale, 2007 PA Super 131, 924 A.2d 664 (2007); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 860 A.2d 146 (Pa.Super.2004); Commonwealth v. Walker, 390 Pa.Super. 76, 568 A.2d 201 (1989); Commonwealth v. Maly, 384 Pa.Super. 369, 558 A.2d 877 (1989); Commonwealth v. Mikesell, 371 Pa.Super. 209, 537 A.2d 1372 (1988).
. I expressed a similar view in my dissent in Berry, supra. In that case, our Court concluded that the defendant’s PCRA claim that his sentence violated the terms of his plea agreement was a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing and, thus, was waived for failure to raise it in post-sentence motions or on direct appeal. Noting my fervent dissent, I stated:
While the sentence is — as the majority reasons — numerically legal since it falls within the statutory maximum, it can hardly be said that the sentence, wrought by defective waiver colloquies and judicial error, is constitutionally legal. I cannot partake in the charade of denying relief that Due Process guarantees, on the semantic basis that a sentence is illegal only where it exceeds the statutory maximum.
A sentence woven from unconstitutional fabric, in this case entered in violation of a plea agreement and rules of court, is illegal.
877 A.2d at 486 (Klein, J., dissenting).
.Consequently, I would also uphold our Court’s prior panel decisions in McHale, Johnson, Walker, Maly, and Mikesell, to the extent that they suggest that a vindictiveness claim implicates the legality of sentencing. See n. 3, supra.