(dissenting). The jury found that an employee of Snap-On made four intentional misrepresentations to Arnold Loula in order to persuade him to buy one of its dealerships. Snap-On told Loula during the recruitment process that (1) as a Snap-On dealer, *57Loula would make as much money as doctors and lawyers, (2) the dealer does not have to be a good salesman because the tools sell themselves, (3) all Snap-On territories are the same and (4) the dealership was a no-risk proposition. The majority concludes these representations were mere puffery and therefore not actionable. I disagree. I would also conclude that the trial court did not err by exercising its discretion to admit such evidence, and the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict except for the punitive damages award. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court.
Essentially, Snap-On asserts that these statements constitute nonactionable opinions or representations about future events. Generally, in actions for fraudulent misrepresentations, the representations must relate to present or pre- existing fact. Alropa Corp. v. Flatley, 226 Wis. 561, 565-66, 277 N.W. 108, 110 (1938). Also, the general rule is that a prediction as to events to occur in the future is to be regarded as a statement of opinion only and the adverse party has no right to rely on such statements. Hartwig v. Bitter, 29 Wis. 2d 653, 657, 139 N.W.2d 644, 647 (1966). However, an exception to these general rules is that statements of opinion are actionablé if the speaker knows of facts incompatible with the stated opinion. Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 192, 368 N.W.2d 676, 684 (1985).
In Lundin, the supreme court concluded that the defendant's misrepresentations that there would be no problem in obtaining the necessary conditional use permits from the city were actionable. The court recognized that although the defendant's representations were statements of opinion concerning how the city would handle the permit application, which under the "preexisting fact" rule would be nonactionable, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant knew of facts *58incompatible with his opinion. It concluded that the Lundins had a right to rely on the defendant's assertions, and the claim was therefore actionable. See also Zingale v. Mills Novelty Co., 244 Wis. 144, 149-50, 11 N.W.2d 644, 647 (1943), where the supreme court held that the defendant's misrepresentation that the small stockroom "would be an ideal location to manufacture ice cream" was actionable because the defendant knew at the time of the sale the room was objectionable.
In our case, there was evidence that at the time of these representations, the corporate employee knew they were untrue. Loula, as the plaintiffs in Lundin and Zin-gale, relied on these representations as they were important to him in making his decision to purchase the dealership. I would therefore conclude that these misrepresentations are actionable because the employee knew these representations were false and Loula had a right to rely on these assertions in making his business decision.
Next, I agree with the trial court that the jury's punitive damages award cannot be sustained. Here, the misrepresentations were committed by a corporate employee. To recover punitive damages from Snap-On, Loula must prove one of three things: (1) The corporation directed the employee to engage in the outrageous behavior, Marlatt v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 167 Wis. 176, 179-80, 167 N.W. 263, 264-65 (1918), (2) the corporation ratified the employee's outrageous behavior after learning of the behavior, id. at 180, 167 N.W. at 265, or (3) considering the factors in Walter v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 121 Wis. 2d 221, 228-29, 358 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Ct. App. 1984), the corporation was recklessly indifferent to, and took conscious action in deliberate disregard of Loula's rights. Zeller v. Northrup King Co., 125 Wis. 2d 31, 35-36, 370 N.W.2d 809, 812-13 (Ct. App. *591985). Loula failed to present evidence that Snap-On would be liable under any of these theories, and the trial court correctly disallowed the award for punitive damages.