dissenting:
¶1 The.sweeping conclusions and far-reaching effects of the Majority Opinion, however well intentioned, strike a serious blow to the legitimate actions of law enforcement drug interdiction teams. Indeed, the Majority Opinion essentially opens the doors of public transportation to drug traffickers, removing any fear that law enforcement officers will be allowed to engage in even a constitutional mere encounter with passengers.
¶ 2 Instead of hindering law enforcement and rendering Pennsylvania’s highway system a drug freeway, I would find that an analysis of the facts of record and the applicable case law show that the actions of the law enforcement officers here did not rise above the level of a mere encounter, and were, at all times, professional, appropriate, and consistent with constitutional principles. Moreover, I would find that the location of the mere encounter, i.e. a bus, did not render the interaction a “seizure,” and I would conclude that Appellant’s abandonment of the bag containing the cocaine was voluntary.
¶ 3 I would specifically find that under the circumstances of this case, the drug interdiction investigation performed on the bus in which Appellant rode did not constitute a seizure of Appellant, either within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
¶ 4 My examination of the facts of this case reveals the following course of events:
¶ 5 Appellant, Marcus A. Wilmington, was convicted of possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance 17 and possession of a small amount of marijuana,18 stemming from a December II, 1996 narcotics interdiction investigation. On that date, Appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus travelling from New York to Cleveland on Interstate 80. Agent Ronald Paret, of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office, and Detective Kirk Schwartz, of the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office, were conducting a narcotics interdiction operation at the Delaware Water Gap toll bridge with the permission of the superintendent of the Delaware River Toll Bridge Commission. N.T. 5/14/97 at 42. Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz were dressed in plain clothes, but wore jackets which identified them as law enforcement officers. N.T. 5/14/97 at 47. Both carried weapons concealed by their jackets. N.T. 5/14/97 at 47.
¶ 6 While Appellant’s bus was stopped at a toll booth, Detective Schwartz asked its driver, Nat Prather, if he had a few minutes to allow a routine check. N.T. 5/14/97 at 12. Detective Schwartz did not order Mr. Prather to pull over, and Greyhound company policy gives its drivers discretion whether to pull over under such circumstances. N.T. 5/14/97 at 12. Mr. Prather testified before the lower court that if he was running late he could tell the police officers that he didn’t have time to stop, but he was not running late that day and agreed to the check. N.T. 5/14/97 at 12, 13, 16. Mr. Prather then moved the bus out of the lane of travel to let traffic pass, parking it in the pull-off immediately be*1178yond the toll plaza, next to the public telephones. N.T. 5/14/97 at 20. Mr. Prather exited the bus, and Detective Schwartz and Agent Paret asked him to see the tickets which were collected as the passengers boarded the bus. N.T. 5/14/97 at 20. An examination of the tickets revealed that Appellant, travelling under the name “Smith,” had made a cash ticket purchase at 1:35 p.m. for a 2:15 p.m. trip from New York City to Cleveland. N.T. 5/14/97 at 37, 44-45. Agent Paret testified before the lower court that certain indicators raised his suspicions, including the name “Smith,” which is frequently used by those travelling under an assumed name; the departure from New York City, a source city for narcotics; the cash ticket purchase; and the purchase of the ticket in close proximity to the beginning of a nine (9) to ten (10) hour trip. N.T. 5/14/97 at 44-46.
¶ 7 Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz boarded the bus and Agent Paret identified himself and Detective Schwartz over its public address system, explaining that they were on the bus to conduct a brief drug investigation, and thanking the passengers in advance for their cooperation. N.T. 5/14/97 at 47, 53. Detective Schwartz proceeded to the restroom to check for contraband, and, starting at the back of the bus, Agent Paret began speaking with the passengers, examining their tickets, and attempting to match passengers with their carry-on baggage. N.T. 5/14/97 at 27. Appellant was sitting in a window seat several rows from the rear of the bus, with another passenger occupying the aisle seat next to him. N.T. 5/14/97 at 45, 48. When Agent Paret asked Appellant to see his ticket receipt and some form of identification, Appellant produced the ticket receipt, but told the Agent he had no identification. N.T. 5/14/97 at 45-46. Agent Paret examined the ticket receipt, then returned it to Appellant. N.T. 5/14/97 at 49. Agent Par-et also asked Appellant if he had any baggage, and Appellant identified a small white plastic bag underneath his seat. N.T. 5/14/97 at 46, 50. Agent Paret’s suspicions were heightened by Appellant’s lack of identification and limited amount of luggage, in light of the nine (9) to ten (10) hour trip from New York City to Cleveland on which Appellant had embarked. N.T. 5/14/97 at 46.
¶ 8 Agent Paret asked Appellant for permission to search the plastic bag. N.T. 5/14/97 at 50. Appellant responded, “Go ahead,” and handed Agent Paret the bag. N.T. 5/14/97 at 50. Agent Paret handed the bag to Detective Schwartz, and, with Appellant’s permission, Detective Schwartz searched the bag. N.T. 5/14/97 at 29. The bag contained several articles of clothing, a pair of new Asics sneakers, and a sales receipt from the department store “Saks Fifth Avenue.” N.T. 5/14/97 at 29. During their initial interaction with Appellant, Agent Paret stood in the aisle to the rear of Appellant’s seat, and Detective Schwartz stood behind Agent Paret. N.T. 5/14/97 at 39, 48, 50. Agent Paret did not touch Appellant during their initial conversation, the aisle of the bus was unobstructed, and the bus door was open. N.T. 5/14/97 at 48-49.
¶ 9 During the investigation, other passengers were requested to identify their baggage, but one bag which had been placed in the overhead compartment remained unclaimed. N.T. 5/14/97 at 27-28, 32. Detective Schwartz walked up and down the aisle of the bus twice, holding the bag aloft to allow its owner to claim it. N.T. 5/14/97 at 28, 32. When no one identified the bag, Detective Schwartz exited the bus, and requested Mr. Prather’s permission to search the bag. N.T. 5/14/97 at 32. Mr. Prather consented to the search, which revealed that the bag contained, among other things, over six (6) pounds of cocaine in an Asics shoe box, and a check summary with a social security number on it. N.T. 5/14/97 at 32, 51. Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz reboarded the bus, and discovered that Appellant had placed the small white plastic bag in the overhead compartment, and had placed the new As-ics sneakers under the seat in front of him. N.T. 5/14/97 at 34. Detective Schwartz *1179observed that the Asics sneakers matched the shoe box containing the cocaine found in the unclaimed bag. N.T. 5/14/97 at 35. Agent Paret checked the other passengers’ feet, and found that none were wearing Asics sneakers. N.T. 5/14/97 at 58. Appellant was handcuffed and removed from the bus, and during the search incident to Appellant’s arrest, a small amount of marijuana was discovered. N.T. 5/14/97 at 35. Appellant was given Miranda19 warnings and asked to provide information for a personal history form. N.T. 5/14/97 at 35-36, 54-55. The social security number which Appellant gave as part of this information was the same as the social security number found on the check summary. N.T. 5/14/97 at 36.
¶ 10 On February 27, 1997, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking suppression on the grounds that the search of his person and possessions violated the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States. On March 25, 1997, the suppression court filed an order indicating that it was going to decide the omnibus pre-trial motion based on the briefs of the parties and notes of testimony of a preliminary hearing conducted before District Justice Charles P. Eyer on December 26, 1996. The motion was subsequently denied by a March 27, 1997 order, accompanied by a five (5) page opinion. A petition to reconsider the motion to suppress was also denied. On May 6, 1997, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and, following a May 14, 1997 bench trial, he was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana. Sentencing was deferred pending a pre-sentence investigation. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice that it was going to seek a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508. Appellant objected to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence as unconstitutional, but on June 25, 1997, he was sentenced to seven (7) to fourteen (14) years imprisonment. Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court, and, on February 25, 1998, a three member panel issued a memorandum opinion which vacated the denial of Appellant’s suppression motion and remanded for trial. The Commonwealth filed an application for reargument en banc, which was granted on May 1, 1998.
¶ 11 On appeal before this Court, Appellant has raised the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in failing to grant Appellant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant.
¶ 12 Addressing the suppression issue first, the following standard of review has been enunciated:
When we review the ruling of a suppression court, we must determine whether its factual findings are supported by the record. Where the defendant challenges an adverse ruling of the suppression court, we will consider only the evidence for the prosecution and whatever evidence for the defense which is uncontradicted on the record as a whole; if there is support on the record, we are bound by the suppression court, and we may reverse that court only if the legal conclusions drawn from these facts are erroneous. Moreover, even if the suppression court did err in its conclusions, the reviewing court may nevertheless affirm its decision where there are other legitimate grounds for admissibility of the challenged evidence.
Commonwealth v. Holt, 711 A.2d 1011, 1014 (Pa.Super.1998) (citations omitted).
1113 In denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, I would hold that the trial court made findings of fact consistent with those made by this Court, supra, and, based on those findings, concluded that: (1) detaining the bus on which Appellant was a passenger did not constitute a seizure of *1180Appellant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the warrantless search of the “Saks Fifth Avenue” bag [the unclaimed bag] did not constitute an unlawful search since Appellant had abandoned the bag and, therefore, had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the search. Trial court opinion filed 8/27/97 at 3-5.
¶ 14 Pursuant to the standard of review enunciated in Holt, supra, I would conclude that the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the record, and further, that the legal conclusions drawn from those findings are not erroneous in light of the evidence of record viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. Therefore, I would affirm the suppression court’s denial of Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion.
¶ 15 Despite Appellant’s assertion that both his state and federal constitutional rights have been violated, he fails to differentiate or distinguish in any way the protections granted by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,20 as compared to the protections granted by Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.21 The wording of the Fourth Amendment is nearly identical to that of Article 1, Section 8 with regard to unreasonable searches and seizures, and although the courts are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were one and the same, Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 391, 586 A.2d 887, 895-896 (1991) (citations omitted), in the case sub judice I would conclude that neither provision has been violated.
¶ 16 Attempting to determine what type of police conduct is “unreasonable” requires a balancing of the privacy rights of citizens with the legitimate needs of the police force in protecting those citizens from crime. In making such determinations, three types of police contact have been recognized by the courts of Pennsylvania:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.
In the Interest of S.J., 551 Pa. 637, 713 A.2d 45, 47 n. 3 (1998) (citations omitted).
¶ 17 “With respect to police conduct that falls short of an investigative stop, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a ‘seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.’ ” United States of America v. Yong Hyon Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). “Absent some coercive conduct by police, a request for cooperation or consent to. search does not automatically convert an undeniably permissible encounter into an illegal seizure ...” Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa.Super.1997) (citation omitted).
¶ 18 This Court explained in In the Interest of Jermaine, 399 Pa.Super. 503, 582 A.2d 1058 (1990), that the following factors are to be considered when determining if an encounter with the police rises to the level of a seizure of the person: “whether the officer makes a show of authority or exercises force, the officer’s demeanor and manner of expression, the location, and the content of any interrogatories or state*1181ments.” Jermaine, 582 A.2d at 1060 (citations omitted). Examples of circumstances which might indicate a seizure of the person include “a threatening presence of several police officers; the display of a weapon by an officer; some physical touching of the person of the citizen; or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Jermaine, 582 A.2d at 1061. In the absence of such evidence, contact between an officer and a citizen cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. Jermaine, 582 A.2d at 1061 (citation omitted).
¶ 19 In addition to the above circumstances, the courts of this state, as well as the courts of other states, have adopted the following objective standard for determining what amount of force escalates a mere encounter into an investigative detention:22 whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave. Commonwealth v. Matos, 548 Pa. 449, 457, 672 A.2d 769, 774 (1996) (citation omitted). This test was applied in cases involving police contact in airports and bus stations, but the United States Supreme Court in Bostick, supra, found that where police contact is initiated on a bus itself, the “free to leave” analysis is inapplicable, and the appropriate inquiry is “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382.
¶ 20 In Bostick, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is error for the states to adopt a per se rule that every police encounter on a bus is a seizure. In that case, as part of a drug interdiction program, two police officers wearing badges and insignia boarded a bus during a stopover from Miami to Atlanta. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382. One of the officers carried a gun in a pouch at his waist, but did not remove the gun while on the bus. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382. Without articulable suspicion, the officers asked a passenger to present his ticket and identification. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382. These items matched, and were immediately returned to the passenger. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382. The officers then explained their presence and asked the passenger if he would consent to a search of his luggage. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-432, 111 S.Ct. 2382. Although the passenger later denied that he gave consent to search the bag in which the officers found cocaine, and also denied that he was informed of his right to refuse consent, the United States Supreme Court found that this issue involved a question of fact which had been resolved by the trial court in the state’s favor, and therefore concluded that the passenger had been advised of his right to refuse consent. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432, 111 S.Ct. 2382. After his arrest, the passenger moved to suppress the cocaine, but the motion was denied and he was convicted. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432, 111 S.Ct. 2382.
¶ 21 Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mere police questioning does not rise to the level of a seizure, Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, the passenger argued on appeal that his case was different because the questioning occurred in the confines of a bus, and, under such circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the bus because there was nowhere to go and a passenger leaving the bus would run the risk of being stranded and losing whatever baggage was locked in the luggage compartment. Bos-tick, 501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382. The United States Supreme court noted that the passenger’s focus was misplaced, because “when [a] person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that *1182he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-436, 111 S.Ct. 2382. The court further explained that the fact that the passenger did not feel free to leave the bus did not mean that the police had seized him, but was instead the natural result of his decision to remain on the bus which was scheduled to depart. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382. The passenger’s freedom of movement was restricted by a factor independent of police conduct. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate inquiry in such a situation is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances of the encounter, a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.23 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382.
¶ 22 Thus, an emphasis on Appellant’s perceptions as to whether or not he felt free to leave the bus is misdirected. This Court’s focus is on whether or not the conduct of the law enforcement officers would have caused a reasonable person to feel incapable of declining the officers’ requests or otherwise terminating the encounter. The record in the instant case supports the conclusion that the behavior and conduct of Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz could in no way be construed by a reasonable person as preventing one from declining the officers’ request for information or otherwise terminating the encounter. Any perception Appellant may have had that he was “restricted” was caused by circumstances independent of the conduct of the law enforcement officers, and therefore inapplicable to a determination of whether Appellant was “seized.” Bostick, supra.
¶ 23 The Bostick standard has been applied in several cases helpful to review of the case at hand. For example, in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 535 Pa. 501, 636 A.2d 619 (1994), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the appeal of a defendant who had been approached by four police officers in a train station. When the officers asked the defendant if he would mind speaking with them, the defendant and his companion backed away, with the officers following, until the defendant was backed up to a wall. Lewis, 535 Pa. at 506, 636 A.2d at 622. After his arrest and conviction for possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance and conspiracy, the defendant’s appeal reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on allegations of Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 violations. The Supreme Court addressed the allegations by applying the Bostick standard to conclude that “under the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to leave.” Lewis, 535 Pa. at 509, 636 A.2d at 623. In concluding that a seizure occurred, the Court noted that “[i]t is not our intention to single out the fact that the Appellants were confronted by four police officers as dispositive of our inquiry, but the nature of the confrontation demonstrated a show of authority which constituted a restraint of the Appellant’s liberty.” Lewis, 535 Pa. at 509, 636 A.2d at 623.
¶ 24 In Shelly, supra, this Court followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s lead in applying Bostick. In Shelly, the appellant was a passenger in a car stopped by two Pennsylvania State Police officers for speeding. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 501. Both the driver and the appellant were asked for identification, but neither could produce any, and the appellant gave a false name to the police, in addition to giving vague and contradictory answers to their questions. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 501. A check revealed that the vehicle was not stolen, its registration card was returned to the driver, and he was given a warning for . the speeding violation. Shelly, 703 *1183A.2d at 501. The police officers then asked the driver if they could search the vehicle, and the driver consented. Shelly, 70S A.2d at 501. After the driver and the appellant stepped from the car,24 both were frisked, and a pistol was discovered in the appellant’s waistband. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 501. Later, when the appellant’s clothes were searched at the prison, narcotics were discovered. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 501. On appeal, the appellant raised two issues for review: whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a request for consent to search the car, and whether a valid Terry search for weapons was conducted. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 502. In concluding that the request to search did not violate the appellant’s rights, this Court stated:
Generally, there is no threshold of suspicion needed for a request to search; consent to a search obviates the need for any level of suspicion of the part of the police. If the driver herein voluntarily gave permission for the search, then no analysis of the information known to the troopers is necessary. The trial court found that consent was freely given, and we find no reason to dispute that finding.
In Lopez, supra, we addressed a similar situation wherein officers made a valid traffic stop and eventually asked for consent to search. This court held Lopez’s consent was requested while he was not free to leave, as the officer still held his license and registration. The court found Lopez was subject to detention that was coercive and rendered his consent less than voluntary. Here, as the trial court noted, the driver was free to go; his cards had been returned to him, he was given a warning for speeding, and the trooper had no hold on him at all at the time of the request. We decline to extend Lopez to create an absolute ban on legitimate, noncoercive roadside requests for consent.
Shelly, 703 A.2d at 502 (citing Bostick, supra; Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. 252, 609 A.2d 177 (1992)).
¶ 25 The Bostick standard has also been applied to police encounters on trains. In Kim, supra, the appellant disputed the denial of a suppression motion which arose from a drug interdiction effort which began with a police officer knocking on the door of the appellant’s train car “roomette.” When the appellant opened the door, the officer identified himself and showed his badge to the appellant and his companion. Kim, 27 F.3d at 949. Then, while kneeling in the hallway outside the door, the officer asked several questions regarding the passengers’ trip and asked to see their tickets and some identification. Kim, 27 F.3d at 949. Both passengers provided their tickets, which the officer immediately handed back to them, but the appellant’s companion was unable to provide any identification. Kim, 27 F.3d at 949-950. When the officer asked the appellant and his companion if they had any drugs in their luggage, they responded that they did not, and then consented to a search of the luggage. Kim, 27 F.3d at 950. The appellant’s bag contained cans marked “Naturade All-Natural Vegetable Protein,” which the appellant initially claimed he received as a present, then later claimed he bought from “the guy in L.A.” Kim, 27 F.3d at 950. The appellant could not identify what the cans contained, and did not respond when asked “what guy?” Kim, 27 F.3d at 950. The officer tested the substance, which turned out to be methamphetamine. Kim, 27 F.3d at 950.
¶ 26 On appeal, the appellant argued that an unconstitutional seizure occurred when the officer questioned the appellant on the train. The court, citing Bostick, found that “a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. Only *1184when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [a court] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Kim, 27 F.3d at 950. The court further concluded that “potentially incriminating questions do not by themselves make an encounter coercive.” Kim, 27 F.3d at 953. Although the appellant argued that he was seized because the contact took place in a confined area in a nonpublic setting and the officer blocked the exit of the roomette, the court concluded that the officer did not block the doorway and “an individual may decline an officer’s request without fearing prosecution, because a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure,” and further, that “the location in itself does not deprive an individual of his ability to terminate an encounter; he can reject an invitation to talk in a private, as well as a public place.” Kim, 27 F.3d at 951-952 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that a confined area in a train is not inherently coercive. Kim, 27 F.3d at 952. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that a “reasonable person would not feel free to decline to answer the officer’s question or to shut the door, because ‘it doesn’t take much intelligence for a reasonable person to believe that shutting the door in the face of such an intruder would be to invite more serious intrusion.’” Kim, 27 F.3d at 952. (quotation omitted). The court disagreed, and, citing Bostick for the proposition that an individual may decline an officer’s request without fearing prosecution, found that under the facts before it, “a reasonable person would have felt free to decline to speak or to terminate his conversation with [the officer].” Kim, 27 F.3d at 952. The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that he was “seized” because the officer failed to advise him of this right to “decline the officers’ requests or terminate the encounter,” finding that the “absence of such advise does not necessarily eliminate the consensual nature of the encounter.” Kim, 27 F.3d at 953. Noting that “a reasonable person is presumed to know of his right not to answer questions without fear of prosecution,” the court concluded that the failure to advise the appellant of his right to terminate the conversation itself did not make the encounter unconstitutional. Kim, 27 F.3d at 953.
¶ 27 In determining that no constitutional violations occurred in the instant case with regard to the contact between Appellant and the police, I would make the following findings and conclusions: The drug interdiction effort which resulted in Appellant’s arrest was conducted with the permission of the Delaware River Toll Bridge Commission; the bus was already stopped when Detective Schwartz asked the bus driver if he and Agent Paret could perform a check; and the bus driver voluntarily consented to the request to board the bus. Thus, there was no “seizure” of the bus and its passengers. Shelly, supra. Once on board, Agent Paret introduced himself and explained the reason for the officers’ presence. Moreover, he did not threaten the passengers, or make an excessive display of authority which would intimidate them or coerce compliance with his request for cooperation. Agent Paret’s actions in this regard did not elevate the encounter to an investigatory stop. Nor did the fact that Agent Paret did not specifically indicate to the passengers that they were free to not answer his questions elevate the encounter to an investigatory stop. Matos, 543 Pa. at 461, 672 A.2d at 775. (“It has long been the rule in Pennsylvania that an individual has no duty to stop or respond to an inquiry by the police. Although the police may initiate an encounter with a suspect, and request information absent any level of suspicion, that encounter ‘carries to official compulsion to stop or respond.’ ”). See Kim, supra.
¶ 28 When Agent Paret began his interaction with Appellant, he stood behind Appellant’s seat, leaving a clear path down the aisle to the open bus door. He did not threaten Appellant, touch Appellant in any way, or even accuse him of any criminal *1185activity. After Appellant produced his ticket receipt, Agent Paret did not retain it while conversing with Appellant, but instead handed it back to him. Agent Par-et’s demeanor was polite and non-eonfron-tational, and his weapon remained hidden by his jacket at all times. During the interaction between Agent Paret and Appellant, Detective Schwartz remained in a non-threatening position behind Agent Paret, where he would not block Appellant’s exit. The law enforcement officers clearly acted in a professional manner, consistent with principles of constitutional law, and their conduct did not elevate the encounter to a “seizure.” Bostick, supra; Kim, supra.
¶ 29 Based on my analysis of the circumstances presented to this Court, and the applicable case law, I find that the location of the encounter, i.e a bus, did not render the interaction here a “seizure.” I conclude that under all of the circumstances surrounding this encounter, the conduct of Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz would not have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline Agent Paret’s requests, or otherwise terminate the encounter. Bostick, supra; Lewis, supra. Moreover, I find that the interaction between Appellant, Agent Paret, and Detective Schwartz did not rise above the level of a mere encounter, and that Appellant was not “seized” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 8. As such, I conclude that his consent to search the bag at his feet was voluntary, and the constitutional claims with regard to the search of that bag must fail.
¶ 30 In light of this determination, it is clear that the suppression court’s denial of Appellant’ motion with regard to the alleged seizure of Appellant’s person was supported by the record and did not involve erroneous legal conclusions. As such, I believe that this Court is bound by the suppression court’s ruling.
¶ 31 Because Appellant’s contact with Agent Paret and Detective Schwartz was a mere encounter, I find that his argument with regard to “coerced abandonment” of the bag containing the cocaine must also fail. “It is axiomatic that a defendant has no standing to contest the search and seizure of items which he has voluntarily abandoned.” Commonwealth v. Tillman, 423 Pa.Super. 343, 621 A.2d 148, 150 (1993) (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 469 Pa. 545, 553, 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 (1976) (“[I]t is well settled that no one has standing to complain of a search or seizure of property that he has voluntarily abandoned.”). However, this Commonwealth has adopted a theory of abandonment only when it is shown that the seized evidence was not discarded because of unlawful police coercion. Shoatz, 469 Pa. at 553, 366 A.2d at 1220. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Shoatz:
The theory of abandonment is predicated upon the clear intent of an individual to relinquish control of property he possesses.
Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered. Police pursuit or the existence of a police investigation does not of itself render abandonment involuntary. The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.
Shoatz, 469 Pa. at 553, 366 A.2d at 1220. (citations omitted).
¶ 32 If a person is not subject to a seizure when an abandonment occurs, the action of abandonment is not the result unlawful police coercion, and the abandoned item may be admitted as evidence. Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Pa.Super.1998).
*1186¶ 33 In the case sub judice, a review of all relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment shows that Appellant intended to abandon the bag in which the cocaine was found, as can be inferred from Appellant’s actions, or, more precisely, inaction. When initially asked by Agent Paret if he had any baggage, Appellant identified only the bag at his feet. When the second bag remained unclaimed, and Detective Schwartz held it aloft and walked up and down the aisle two times, asking its owner to identify himself or herself, Appellant remained silent. Appellant’s failure to claim the bag under such circumstances amounts to abandonment. Further, the encounter between Appellant and the officers did not amount to unlawful police coercion and did not render the abandonment involuntary. Shoatz, 469 Pa. at 553, 366 A.2d at 1220. Having concluded that a mere encounter occurred between Appellant and the police officers and that Appellant was not “seized” during that encounter, I would further-conclude that Appellant voluntarily abandoned the bag containing the cocaine, and, as a result, I would find that it may be used for evidentiary purposes.
¶ 34 Again, in light of this determination, I believe that it is clear that the suppression court’s denial of Appellant’ motion with regard to the abandonment of the bag containing the cocaine was supported by the record and did not involve erroneous legal conclusions, and, therefore, this court is bound by the suppression court’s ruling in this regard.
¶ 35 In light of my conclusion regarding Appellant’s suppression claim, I would address his sentencing allegation thusly: Appellant initially argues that the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Ostensibly, Appellant claims that mandatory minimum sentences are unconstitutional as violative of individual due process rights and Eighth Amendment rights guaranteed under the Constitution. I disagree.
¶36 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently held that enactments of the General Assembly enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 304, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1983)). All doubts are to be resolved in favor of sustaining the constitutionality of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 463, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (1988), affirmed, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) (citing Hayes v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 493 Pa. 150, 155, 425 A.2d 419, 421 (1981)). “[Nothing but a clear violation of the Constitution — a clear usurpation of power prohibited — will justify the judicial department in pronouncing an act of the legislative department unconstitutional and void.” Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 88, 288 A.2d 812, 818 (1972) (quoting Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 449, 128 A. 80 (1925)). In other words, “we are obliged to exercise every reasonable attempt to vindicate the constitutionality of a statute and uphold its provisions.” Commonwealth v. Chilcote, 396 Pa.Super. 106, 578 A.2d 429, 435 (1990) (citing Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa.Super. 549, 543 A.2d 1106, 1116 (1988)). “The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void, and to arrest its execution, is one which, in the opinion of all courts, is coupled with responsibilities so grave that it is never to be exercised except in very clear cases.” Erie & North-East Railroad Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, 300 (1856). Moreover, one of the most firmly established principles of our law is that the challenging party has a heavy burden of proving an act unconstitutional. Barud, 545 Pa. at 304, 681 A.2d at 165. In order for an act to be declared unconstitutional, the challenging party must prove the act “clearly, palpably and plainly” violates the constitution. Barud, 545 Pa. at 304, 681 A.2d at 165. See Blystone, supra. Finally, I note that:
The power of judicial review must not be used as a means by which the courts might substitute its judgment as to public policy for that of the legislature. The role of the judiciary is not to question *1187the wisdom of the action of [the] legislative body, but only to see that it passes constitutional muster.
Finucane v. Pennsylvania Marketing Bd., 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 272, 582 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1990) (citations omitted).
¶ 37 Appellant’s policy arguments against mandatory sentencing are not shared by either the legislature or the courts of this Commonwealth. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held, mandatory sentencing provisions do not violate a person’s Constitutional rights. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334, 342, 516 A.2d 1172, 1176 (1986). More specifically, the Supreme Court has found that mandatory minimum sentencing provisions do not violate due process rights. See Commonwealth v. Sargent, 349 Pa.Super. 289, 503 A.2d 3, 5 (1986). In Sargent, a panel of this Court found that the only issue in regard to due process and application of the mandatory sentencing provision, is whether a defendant receives notice by the Commonwealth that they will be seeking imposition of a mandatory sentence.
¶ 38 Instantly, I fail to see how Appellant has been denied due process. In fact, Appellant has failed to specifically discuss how his due process rights have been violated. Appellant was informed that the Commonwealth would be seeking a sentence under the mandatory sentencing guidelines. Thus, Appellant’s claim is meritless.
¶ 39 Appellant next argues- that mandatory sentencing provisions violate his Eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment because his punishment is disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted. In Commonwealth v. Green, 406 Pa.Super. 120, 593 A.2d 899 (1991), this Court found that application of 18 P.S. § 7508 was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and that its application was not disproportionate to a defendant’s crime. The defendant in Green reasoned that due to his advanced age and poor physical health, imposing a mandatory sentence was tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment. As this court found in Green, “the legislature, by enacting Section 7508, has announced that drug offenses are serious crimes from which the public needs to be protected.” Green, 593 A.2d at 902. Therefore, we held that the mandatory sentencing provided for by Section 7508 serves as a suitable deterrent and was not a violation of an Appellant’s Eighth Amendment rights.
¶ 40 In the instant case, I would find that the sentence which Appellant received is constitutional and not violative of either Appellant’s due process rights or Eighth Amendment rights.
¶ 41 For the reasons discussed above, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
¶ 42 EAKIN and LALLY-GREEN, JJ. join the Dissenting Opinion by STEVENS, J.
. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
. 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(a)(31).
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. "[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
. "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures.... ” Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 8.
. An investigative detention is also known as a "Terry stop," after the United States Supreme Court decision of that name which permitted police officers to effect a precautionary seizure where the police have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
. Noting that the trial court denied the passenger’s suppression motion without making express findings of fact, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the case.
. The appellant did not contest that to mitigate danger in traffic stops, no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is necessary for police to request the occupants of a lawfully stopped car to get out. Commonwealth v. Brown, 439 Pa.Super. 516, 654 A.2d 1096, 1102 (1995).