concurring:
¶ 1 The Majority states the issue as: “whether under the unique circumstances of this case the plaintiffs or the non-settling tortfeasor should bear the burden of the shortfall between the consideration paid by the Manville Trust ($30,000) and its allocated share of the damages awarded to the plaintiff ($440,000), a difference of $410,000.” (Majority Opinion at page 1144.) I believe the issue is: what is the effect of the parties’ release in the context of the Manville Trust Disposition Process (“TDP”)?
¶ 2 All of the parties here agreed to the terms of the TDP. Thus, the TDP governs the resolution of this issue. The Majority details the provisions of the TDP and concludes that Pennsylvania is a TDP, paragraph H.3(f) state, ie., a state with “multiple set-off rules.” Paragraph H.3(f) provides as follows:
In some states, different set-off rules (pro tanto, pro rata or apportionment), govern different causes of action or parts thereof or different elements of damages. In such states, applicable law shall govern which set-off rules apply to each cause of action or part thereof and each element of damages.
I agree with the Majority’s conclusion.
¶3 Paragraph H.3(f) of the TDP provides that applicable state law shall govern which set-off rules apply to each cause of action and each element of damages. Here, the cause of action is strict liability. There appears to be no statutory authority governing set-offs in a strict liability context.37 Relevant, but not controlling, case *1155law is found in Walton v. Avco Corp., 530 Pa. 568, 610 A.2d 454 (1992). There, the Supreme Court held that each strict liability co-defendant has equal responsibility for the judgment and a settling strict liability co-defendant can not seek contribution for overpayment of a judgment from other co-defendants. Id., 530 Pa. at 581, 610 A.2d at 461. See also, Ball v. Johns-Manville Corp., 425 Pa.Super. 369, 625 A.2d 650, 658 (1993). Neither Walton nor Ball addressed the issue of whether a strict liability co-defendant can be held responsible for another strictly liable co-defendant’s inability to pay its share to an undercompensated plaintiff.38 Consequently, since this is not the issue before us to resolve,39 we are left with no state statutory authority or case law controlling set-offs in this case.
¶ 4 Thus, we turn to the terms of the release to determine what happens here. Since the release is pro tanto, plaintiff has a contractual right to seek relief from the other strict liability defendants. Thus, I concur in the result.
. The Majority argues that the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8321 et seq. ("UCATA") provides guidance here. While UCATA is applicable to negligence cases, it does not apply in strict liability cases. See Ball, 625 A.2d at 658, quoted in Dissenting Opinion by Eakin, J., at 1158.
. The dissent argues logically that since strict liability co-defendants can not seek contribution for overpayment from other co-defendants, then, under state law, absent its agreement to the contrary, a strict liability co-defendant can not be held responsible for another strictly liable co-defendant’s inability to pay its share. It is suggested that the public policy controlling Walton and Ball might be different from the public policy in effect in a case like this one where a plaintiff has been underpaid.
. This issue is not directly before us as a case or controversy as a similar issue was in Walton and Ball.