dissenting. I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, for it fails to apply the appropriate due process analysis for lengthy suspensions and expulsions first recognized by the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and refined in a series of lower federal court cases, the most recent of which is Diggles v. Corsicana Independent School District, 529 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Proper application of this doctrine reveals that by neglecting to give plaintiff written notice of the specific charges against him, and further by neglecting to provide him with any of the documents relevant to the hearing, the Essex Junction Prudential Committee (hereinafter, “committee”) failed to afford him the minimum requisites of due process and, in addition, *416failed to follow its own established regulations. Given the severity of the punishment imposed, an expulsion for almost one-third of the school year, such a deprivation of procedural rights cannot be overlooked as a mere technicality. Nor should such factors as plaintiff’s admission to the underlying misconduct enter into the court’s determination of what process is due him. As the Supreme Court recently stated, “the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions . . . .” Carey v. Piphus, 485 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s application for a permanent injunction, and remand to that court for consideration of plaintiff’s damage claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Since 1975, with the high court’s ruling in Goss v. Lopez, supra, it has been beyond dispute that a student’s “legitimate entitlement to a public education is a property interest which is protected by the due process clause and which may not be taken away without adherence to the minimum procedures required thereunder.” Diggles v. Corsicana Independent School District, supra, 529 F. Supp. at 172 (citing Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 574). The question thus becomes: what are the minimum procedures due in cases of lengthy suspensions and expulsions ? In Goss, the Court held that in suspensions of not more than 10 days, the student is entitled to minimal due process consisting of “oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 581. The Court cautioned, however, that it was addressing itself “solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.” Id. at 584.
The Court did recognize, however, that the lower federal courts had long since held the Due Process Clause applicable to lengthy suspensions and expulsions, and it cited with approval the “landmark decision” in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 576 n.8. That case involved expulsion from state college, and in it the *417Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set out the minimum standards for notice and hearing required by due process:
The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. . . . [T]he student should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present to the Board, or at least to an administrative official of the college, his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.
Dixon, supra, 294 F.2d at 158-59.
Following this decision, lower federal and state courts struggled to complete the articulation of what process is due in lengthy suspension and expulsion cases. See generally, W. G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 545, 589-639 (1971); Note, Civil Rights: Inconsistent Due Process Standards Applied to Cases of Exclusion from Educational Institutions, 34 Okla. L. Rev. 291, 296 (1981). With regard to the question of what constitutes adequate notice, “[t]he courts since Dixon have expanded on [Dixon’s] general statement of principle by saying that in severe disciplinary cases, the student should be given notice in writing of the specific grounds for discipline and the nature of the evidence on which the proceeding will be based.” D. Christensen, Democracy in the Classroom: Due Process and School Discipline, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 705, 714 (1975). In fact, a review of the decisions since Dixon reveals that, of those lower federal courts facing the question of what notice is due in cases of lengthy suspensions or expulsions, most found written notice to be a constitutional minimum.
In Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff’d, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),. cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), students were suspended from college following their participation in student riots. Although they were orally notified of the charges against them and participated in an informal hearing, the court held that their procedural rights had been violated. The court ordered a *418new hearing, spelling out the requisite procedural safeguards' to be applied. First among them was the following: “a written statement of the charges [is] to be furnished each plaintiff at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing.” Id. at 651. One year after its decision in Esteban, the Missouri district court issued a General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc). In it, the court stated the following:
Three minimal requirements apply in cases of severe discipline, growing out of fundamental conceptions of fairness implicit in procedural due process. First, the student should be given adequate notice in writing of the specific ground or grounds and the nature of the evidence on which the disciplinary proceedings are based. Second, the student should be given an opportunity for a hearing .... The third requirement is that no disciplinary action be taken on grounds which are not supported by any substantial evidence.
Id. at 147.
The federal district court of New Hampshire has considered this question as well, and determined that when a high school student is suspended for more than five days, minimal standards of procedural due process require, inter alia, that the student and his parents receive written notice of the charges and evidence against him. Vail v. Board of Education of Portsmouth School District, 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H. 1973). Accord, Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Black Students of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School, ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams, 335 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Fla.), aff’d, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972); see also the following cases, finding due process met where schools provided written notice and hearing prior to lengthy suspensions or expulsions: Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722, 730 (D. Neb. 1972); Lowery v. Adams, 344 F. Supp. 446, 451-53 (W.D. Ky. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 77 (D. Conn, 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 *419(E.D. Mich. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 418 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970).
The most recent case dealing with the procedural protections due students facing lengthy suspensions or expulsions is that of Diggles v. Corsicana Independent School District, supra, 529 F. Supp. at 172. That case involved a student expelled for the remainder of the school term, as was plaintiff. There, the court looked to the standards earlier set by the Fifth Circuit in Dixon, supra, as well as to lower state court decisions. In so doing, the court aligned itself with the other federal district courts, and adopted written notice to the student as one of the minimum due process criteria in such cases.
In 1975, this Court adopted the standards set out in Dixon as the minimum process due a student being expelled from state college. Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 229, 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975). Admittedly, in Nzuve we only paraphrased the Dixon requirements, “without extensive quotations.” Id. at 229, 335 A.2d at 324. Thus, the instant case forces us to reexamine and to clarify our holding in Nzuve, and to set out clear, constitutional standards to guide Vermont school officials in lengthy suspension and expulsion cases. In particular, we must determine whether a student facing such punishment has the right to receive written notice, clearly informing him of the charges against him and the rules which he has violated. I would follow the lead of the lower federal courts, cited with approval in Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 576 n.8, and hold that minimum due process requires such written notice.
In determining whether to adopt this procedural safeguard, this Court must engage in the interest-balancing analysis established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). There the Court identified the three factors to be considered in determining the specific dictates of due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin*420istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Id. at 335. Application of this test reveals that in severe school discipline cases, the balance must necessarily tip to accord the student the fullest possible procedure.
The private interest in balance is that of the student, and it is firmly established that a student facing even short-term expulsion from the educational process is threatened with the loss of constitutionally cognizable property and liberty interests. Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 574, 576 n.8. Although it hardly bears repeating, the risk of lengthy, and sometimes permanent deprivation of public education carries with it even more serious hardship, for “the consequences of this loss will have a life-long impact.” W. G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline, supra, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 578. A student whose record indicates such punishment risks his ability to continue his education, and further jeopardizes his access to higher education and a professional future. Id. at 578-79. Thus, the student’s interest is indeed great.
As counterweight, the second prong in the balance is the possibility of erroneous deprivation of these interests by the failure to require written notice of the specific charges of misconduct, and the probable value of receiving such .notice in writing. Notice implies giving a statement of the charges in sufficient detail, and sufficiently in advance of the hearing, to enable one to prepare a defense. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8.05 (1958); W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law: Cases & Comments 837-59 (4th ed. 1960). Where serious constitutional interests are pending, written notice is usually contemplated. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). This is true for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the need to minimize risk of error : oral notice is too often vague, difficult to understand, and incomplete. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967). Moreover, oral notice is far more vulnerable to subsequent challenge, for its sufficiency cannot be judged on its face. Finally, written notice suitably heralds the commencement of serious proceedings threatening important rights, which proceedings are not to be entered lightly. Thus, written notice is clearly the safer practice.
*421The third interest to be weighed is that of the school, and consideration must be given to the additional burdens it might bear by the requirement of written notice. In Goss, the Supreme Court acknowledged the considerable interest of public schools in retaining unfettered freedom and authority over disciplinary matters, as well as their interest in expediting such matters whenever possible. But the Court did not “believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency.” Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 581. Thus, it required “oral or written notice of the charges” in cases of short suspensions, id., and recognized that lengthier punishments might warrant even greater protections. Id. at 584. As to the additional costs and burdens presented by requiring written notice, it should be remembered that such severe sanctions as are at issue here are imposed only infrequently, in rare cases involving serious misconduct. A written notice requirement in such cases cannot legitimately be viewed as creating unmanageable burdens or prohibitive costs.
Therefore, after carefully weighing the important student interests at stake, the clear advantages of written notice, and the relative burdens to be borne by the schools, I would hold that a student facing lengthy suspension or expulsion must be accorded the minimal procedural safeguard of written notice of the charges against him.
Moreover, in this case it appears that an inquiry into the relative benefits and burdens of written notice was undertaken by the school committee itself, when it promulgated its rules governing suspensions and expulsions. Pursuant to state law, which requires all school districts to adopt and file guidelines setting forth “standards consistent with due process of law for discipline, suspension or dismissal of students,” 16 V.S.A. § 1165(c), the committee issued regulations which include the following: (1) written notice of the specific charges must bs sent both to the student and to his parents prior to hearing; (2) written notice of the hearing itself must be sent both to the student and to his parents; and (3) the student and his parents must each be provided, prior to hearing, with “fact sheets” containing all the relevant documents to be used. This Court must assume that before the committee adopted these rules it duly considered the “fiscal and administrative *422burdens” that adhering to them would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 335. We must also assume that, had experience proven these requirements to be too expensive or burdensome, the committee would have amended them. Instead, they left the requirement of written notice intact.
Yet in this case the school authorities inexplicably ignored their own regulations. They imposed the severest of sanctions, an expulsion for almost one third of the school year, and yet failed to afford plaintiff even one of the prehearing protections enumerated above: plaintiff received neither written notice of the charges against him, nor written notice of the hearing, nor any of the “fact sheet” documents to be used at the hearing. Moreover, in what was perhaps a last minute effort to fulfill its obligations, the school did send written notice of the charges to plaintiff’s parents; however, even this did not reach them until two days after the expulsion hearing.
The majority relies heavily on two factors in their determination that in this case there was substantial compliance with the regulations, and thus no resulting prejudice: first, that plaintiff admitted the underlying misconduct, and second, that he and his parents had actual notice. As to the first point, it is clear that admission of guilt in no way lessens the importance of safeguarding proper procedure.
Even in that situation wherein a student unequivocally admits the conduct charged at an expulsion hearing, and procedural protections thus serve a more limited function . . . , the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will look to the existence of adequate notice of the charges and sufficient opportunity to prepare for the hearing on review of alleged due process violations.
Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262, 265 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (holding constitutionally inadequate written notice of expulsion which failed to state charges with the specificity required by Dixon) (citing Linwood v. Board of Education, supra). The Eighth Circuit concurred:
[A]dequate notice and the opportunity to be heard . . . is no less important when, as here, there is not a serious dispute over the factual basis of the charge, for “things are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at *423least have the opportunity to characterize the conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context.”
Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1975), on remand from Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 584).
As to the second point, the Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘[k]nowledge’ of the charge . . . does not excuse the lack of adequate notice.” In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at 34 n.54. Moreover, it bears repeating that plaintiff himself received none of the written notices or documents required. Nor can notice to the parents, however adequate, be substituted for notice to the student, either under the school’s regulations or the Diggles-Dixon line of cases. While it may in fact be laudable that the parents had “a frank and open interchange” with the school officials, plaintiff was the one facing the loss, and thus was the one to whom the requisite notice was warranted. See Buss, Procedural Due Process, supra, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 588.
Nor can it fairly be said that plaintiff suffered no prejudice by the committee’s arbitrary departure from its own regulations and the constitutional requisites. Plaintiff’s father testified below that he and his wife determined not to bring an attorney to the hearing because of their understanding that the hearing would be a “family-type affair,” where they could discuss the “problem” with the teachers and administrators. In addition, they were led to believe that the school would not bring its attorney unless they were going to bring theirs; nevertheless, the school’s attorney was present. Had plaintiff and his parents received all the notice and prehearing documentation due them, they might have more properly anticipated the adversarial nature of the proceedings, and prepared accordingly. Moreover, without the counsel of an attorney, the Rutz’ had no reason to know the importance of objecting to the procedural violations of the committee at the hearing level. Indeed, until the imposition of the expulsion order and their subsequent consultation with counsel, they had no way of knowing that the committee had in fact committed any procedural violations.
The appropriate remedy in cases of this nature is to grant the plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction, reinstate the student in good standing, and remand to the trial court for *424the determination of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Carey v. Piphus, supra; Goss v. Lopez, supra; Strickland v. Inlow, supra, 519 F.2d at 747; Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School District, 468 F. Supp. 54, 58-59 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff’d, 594 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1979). On remand, the trial court would of course be bound by the rule of Carey v. Piphus, supra, which was adopted by this Court in Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 138 Vt. 73, 411 A.2d 1366 (1980). If the committee could prove that the expulsion would have occurred even had all procedural regulations been complied with, then plaintiff would not be entitled to recover damages for injuries caused by the expulsion. Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 260; Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, supra, 138 Vt. at 76-77, 411 A.2d at 1367-68.
However, even if the student’s suspension were justified, and even if he did not suffer actual injury, the fact remains that he was deprived of his right to procedural due process. “It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing . . . .” Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972)). Thus, the Court went on to hold that “the denial of procedural due process [is] actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Id. Under the rule of Carey, plaintiff would therefore be entitled to nominal damages. Id. at 267; Dillon v. Pulaski, supra; Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, supra, 138 Vt. at 76, 411 A.2d at 1367-68.