concurring:
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority in the instant case, I reach that result by a different analysis.
First, I do not believe that an in-depth analysis of the Double Jeopardy aspects of this case is warranted. As our result does not involve either a new trial or an affirmance of a valid acquittal, Double Jeopardy is not at issue. This follows from a determination that the court of common pleas was in error in entering the “not guilty” verdict when reviewing the Philadelphia Municipal Court convictions on certiorari.1
Secondly, if we are to hold that the reviewing court in this case exceeded its scope of authority or review, it is incumbent on this court to set forth the proper scope. It is far from clear what the scope of review of the court of common pleas is, on review pursuant to an acceptance of *484certiorari to the Philadelphia Municipal Court. No case law exists on this precise point.2
Prior to the suspension of 42 P.S. § 3006, which permitted an appeal from a summary conviction by means of writ of certiorari,3 the scope of review by a court of common pleas upon appeal to it by writ of certiorari from a minor court was clear: the writ of certiorari was merely a remedy to bring before a court of record asserted procedural defects in the proceedings before a justice of the peace or magistrate. See Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 485 Pa. 247, 401 A.2d 1129 (1978). The writ afforded but a limited scope of review, not embracing substantive errors such as sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Quinn, 215 Pa.Super. 78, 257 A.2d 266 (1969). Where there exists a statutory right of appeal, questions of fact may not be reviewed on certiorari, nor issues related to sufficiency, admissibility, competency or relevancy of evidence presented to a justice of the peace. Commonwealth v. Cook, 226 Pa.Super. 273, 308 A.2d 151 (1973). The judgment on writs of certiorari from a summary conviction before an alderman or justice of the peace was limited to (1) sustaining or (2) setting aside the judgment. Commonwealth ex rel. Burton v. Baldi, 147 Pa.Super. 193, 24 A.2d 76 (1942), quoting Commonwealth v. Benson, 94 Pa.Super. 10 (1928). An appeal on the merits from a summary conviction before a minor court could be taken only to the court of quarter sessions, to be heard de novo. See Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Poindexter, supra, the defendant appealed from the orders of the court of common pleas, after that court issued a writ of certiorari to the Philadelphia Municipal Court, on the defendant’s petition. How*485ever, neither the superior nor the supreme court opinions in that case discuss the applicable scope of review, either for the common pleas court on certiorari or on further review. The court of common pleas, on certiorari, in Poindexter did review the sufficiency of the evidence, in terms of the Commonwealth’s proof of the elements of the crimes charged.
Therefore, the scope of review in the instant case remains unclear. Pursuant to a review of the cases cited supra, I believe the scope of review of the court of common pleas on certiorari from the Philadelphia Municipal Court on non-summary charges to now include (1) review of procedural defects in the proceedings before the Philadelphia Municipal Court and (2) review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. By use of this standard, the court of common pleas will be able to correct those procedural errors which appear from the record, thereby protecting the due process rights of the defendant. Also, by permitting review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, those prosecutions involving legally insufficient evidence can be corrected directly, instead of requiring a trial de novo. Finally, I do not consider the setting forth of this scope of review as necessarily changing the law in this area, therefore, it will be applied to my review of the actions of the court of common pleas in the discussion following.
In the instant case, the reviewing judge of the common pleas court, after a review of all the evidence presented, reversed Appellee’s conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731, and entered the verdict of not guilty. The judge, sitting as an appellate court, clearly had no authority to enter such a verdict; only the fact finder has such authority.
The majority has come to the same conclusion regarding the entry of the not guilty verdict. However, I disagree with the majority opinion in regard to its classification of the reviewing court’s review and determination as based on *486insufficient evidence. My review of the reviewing court’s opinion indicates that it, in essence, reviewed the record of the municipal court proceeding as a fact finder.
As stated in Commonwealth v. Council, 491 Pa. 434, 437, 421 A.2d 623, 624 (1980):
It is essential to the fair administration of justice that appellate tribunals not sit as second fact-finders. Rather, on appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner with all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 344 A.2d 824 (1975).
See also Commonwealth v. Parker, 494 Pa. 196, 431 A.2d 216 (1981).
Upon reviewing the testimony of the witnesses, the reviewing court determined that the alleged conflict in the witnesses’ testimony suggested the invocation of reasonable doubt. The reviewing court, weighing the evidence of the witnesses differently than the Municipal Court, then made its determination. This was error.
Credibility is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact and only when the evidence is so inconsistent and unreliable that the verdict is based upon conjecture, will the reviewing court overturn the conviction. Commonwealth v. King, 287 Pa.Super. 105, 429 A.2d 1121 (1981). The reviewing court reviewed the evidence as would a trial court in reviewing a motion in arrest of judgment following trial. This was improper, as the reviewing court in the instant case had the status of an appellate court when reviewing a conviction on writ of certiorari and therefore was bound by the appellate scope of review as set forth supra.
Finally, I join in the majority’s determination that on proper review of the evidence, both convictions must be sustained. Hence, I join in the result vacating the order of the court of common pleas and reinstating the Municipal Court judgment of sentence.
. Those cases holding that the Commonwealth may not appeal from an erroneously entered acquittal are distinguishable from the instant case. In those cases, it was the trial court who, having authority to enter an acquittal, did so improperly. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Wimberly, 488 Pa. 169, 411 A.2d 1193 (1979). In the instant case, the court of common pleas, sitting as an appellate court of review, did not have the authority to enter the not guilty verdict.
. I agree with the majority that certiorari is an available method of appeal in the instant case. See Pa. Const.Sched. Art. 5, § 26; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 932, 934. See also Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 248 Pa.Super. 564, 375 A.2d 384 (1977), rev’d on other gds., 484 Pa. 472, 399 A.2d 390 (1979).
. 42 P.S. § 3006 was suspended by Pa.R.Crim.P. 159(e) as of January 1, 1974.