concurring and dissenting:
I join Part I of the Majority Opinion and concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s order in Commonwealth v. Lapia.
However, I am unable to agree that prison officials in Chester County lacked a “reasonable suspicion” that Billy Dugger was attempting to smuggle contraband into the prison or that the search of Billy Dugger was an unreasonable response thereto. ,On the contrary, I would hold the search lawful and would reverse the order suppressing the marijuana seized.
The Act of May 11, 1911, P.L. 274, § 4, 61 P.S. § 384, provides as follows:
The warden or superintendent of the prison is hereby authorized to search or to have searched any person coming to the prison as a visitor, or in any other capacity, who is suspected of having any weapon or other implement which may be used to injure any convict or person, or in assisting any convict to escape from imprisonment or any spirituous or fermented liquor, drug, medicine, poison, opium, morphine, or any other kind or character of narcotics, upon his person.
The statute was enacted because of the substantial interest which the state has in eliminating the smuggling of drugs, knives, guns and other contraband into state penitentiaries *311and prisons. To preserve institutional security, prison officials must have discretion to act quickly and decisively. Indeed, it has been said that the governmental interest in detecting and preventing such smuggling activities is so great that it “outweighs the individual interest in perfect justice.” Gettleman v. Werner, 377 F.Supp. 445, 452 (W.D. Pa.1974).
The statute, of course, must be interpreted consistently with Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. E.g. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977); (other citations omitted). A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1868, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The weighty nature of the governmental concern for prison security is a significant yardstick against which “reasonableness” must be measured. In making such an evaluation, moreover, it must be remembered that a potential visitor to a prison or penitentiary does not enjoy an absolute right to enter. A visitor can enter only if permission is granted1 and may be barred entirely if he or she represents a “threat to the security of the institution.” 2
Chester County Prison officials received information from a telephone caller that Billy Dugger was en route to visit his brother, an inmate at the Chester County Farms Prison. The caller warned that Dugger was carrying uninflated balloons containing marijuana which he intended to deliver *312to his brother. However, the caller refused to identify herself. For this reason the author of the lead opinion concludes that it was not “reasonable” to suspect that Dugger was engaged in smuggling marijuana into the prison. There can be no “reasonable” suspicion, the reasoning continues, unless an anonymous caller’s warning be corroborated by “circumstances or some indicia of reliability.”
“Informants’ tips may vary enormously in their value to prison authorities faced with the duty of intercepting drugs or other contraband.” Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir.1982). Thus, it may be that some “tips” are so lacking in urgency, so general, so obviously based on rumor and lacking in indicia of reliability that they can safely be ignored by prison authorities. These require no immediate response. However, their number is relatively few. Most “tips” require a response. Where prison authorities receive an anonymous warning that contraband is then on its way to the prison, they can ignore such a warning only at their peril.
If the urgency of the situation is a determining factor, so also is the specificity of the information received. Thus, the existence of reasonable suspicion may be dependent in part upon the specificity or lack thereof in the information provided. A lack of specificity was weighted heavily against the reasonableness of the suspicion generated by anonymous tips in Hunter v. Auger, supra. In the instant case, however, the information was specific. It identified the visitor, who was already en route, and also the inmate being visited. It specified the contraband being smuggled and described the means by which it was concealed, as well as the manner in which it was to be smuggled into the prison. Except for the name of the informant, the factual information imparted to prison authorities was specific, full and complete.
The information thus imparted was also corroborated in part by observations of innocent details made by prison authorities. Billy Dugger, in fact, arrived to visit his broth*313er, an inmate, a short time after the anonymous call. This observation, to be sure, did not corroborate the informant’s tip that Billy Dugger was carrying a controlled substance concealed on his person. Such corroboration, in the absence of gross carelessness by appellant, was not immediately available. Moreover, if such corroboration had been obtained, there would no longer have been merely suspicion. Factual corroboration of the type required by the lead opinion would have established probable cause for Dugger’s immediate arrest.
The corroborative facts in the instant matter, albeit innocent in nature, were, in my judgment, sufficient under the circumstances to establish reasonable suspicion. Prison officials could reasonably believe that the caller had imparted reliable information which required prompt action to prevent Billy Dugger from smuggling contraband to his incarcerated brother. See and compare: United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.1981); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981); United States v. Perez, 625 F.2d 1021 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878, 100 S.Ct. 166, 62 L.Ed.2d 108 (1979); State v. Hasenbank, 425 A.2d 1330 (Me.1981); State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981); State v. Kea, 61 Haw. 566, 606 P.2d 1329 (1980); People v. Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978); State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118, 584 P.2d 165 (1978); Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 244 S.E.2d 346 (1978); State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 523 P.2d 523 (1974); People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 229 N.E.2d 581 (1967). See also: Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 392 A.2d 1298 (1978).
When we seek to determine the reasonableness of the search conducted by prison officials we must balance the legitimate governmental interest in prison security against an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733-1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Common*314wealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 111, 307 A.2d 875, 877-878 (1973); Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 292 Pa.Super. 278, 285, 437 A.2d 44, 47 (1981), allocatur granted April 30, 1982. “Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell v. Wolfish, supra. In order to be reasonable a search of a prison visitor must be consistent with the type and circumstances of the visit, the nature of the contraband being sought, and the manner in which the contraband is believed to have been concealed. The type and scope of the search should be commensurate with the difficulty of discovery and the danger that prison security will be breached. To be reasonable, the search must be “related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 305 Pa.Super. 8, 13, 451 A.2d 4, 7 (1982) quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967).
It has been argued by appellee that a strip search was not reasonable because the Commonwealth failed to prove (1) that appellee intended to have a contact visit with his brother or (2) that a strip search was the least intrusive means to insure that institutional security would be preserved. These contentions do not withstand the light of close examination and analysis. In the first place, Pennsylvania prison regulations provide that all visits shall be contact visits except in exceptional circumstances.3 With *315respect to the intrusiveness of the search, the Fourth Amendment does not require a total absence of intrusion or perfect inoffensiveness. Governmental interest in preventing smuggling into penal institutions, as we have already observed, outweighs the visitor’s interest in total, unrestrained freedom. How, then, shall prison authorities respond when there is reasonable suspicion that a visitor is presently engaged in smuggling marijuana into the prison by concealing it in deflated balloons hidden on his person? What type of search will disclose such contraband and yet constitute the least intrusive search? Having considered the relatively few alternatives available, I am persuaded that the strip search conducted by the Chester County Prison officials was reasonable and consistent with Fourth Amendment principles.4
(Emphasis supplied.)
*316When appellee arrived at the Chester County Prison, he was requested to move from the visitor’s area to a more private part of the prison. There he was told that he was suspected of carrying contraband and would not be allowed to visit his brother unless he submitted to a strip search. Not only did he express no objection to being searched but he actually began to empty his pockets and remove his shoes. If he had wished to avoid the search, he had only to voice his objection and withdraw his request to see his brother. In fact, he did not at any time evidence a desire to terminate his visit or leave the prison without seeing his brother. Under these circumstances, I would hold that appellee consented to be searched. Consent can readily be implied from appellee’s failure to object or withdraw his request for a contact visit with his brother. See and compare: United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1977); State v. Custodio, 62 Hawaii 1, 607 P.2d 1048 (1980); State v. Martinez, 59 Hawaii 366, 580 P.2d 1282 (1978); People v. Whisnant, 103 Mich.App. 772, 303 N.W.2d 887 (1981).
Still, wé must review the procedure followed by prison officials which resulted in appellant’s consent to be searched. Was the search procedure reasonable under the circumstances? In order to be reasonable was it necessary that the search be announced and conducted in the visitor’s • area? I think not. Was it unreasonable that other, more private portions of the prison were secured by steel doors which were kept locked? The answer is obvious. Would it have been more reasonable to post signs giving advance warning that visitors to the prison were subject to strip searches? Perhaps. However, where a visitor suspected of smuggling marijuana into the prison is told that he cannot visit unless he submits to a strip search, the absence of posted warnings seems a wholly inadequate basis on which to declare the procedure constitutionally unreasonable.
The Act of May 11, 1911, supra, as limited by Fourth Amendment guarantees, authorizes prison officials to conduct a reasonable search of any visitor reasonably suspect*317ed of attempting to smuggle contraband into the prison. The Chester County Prison authorities possessed reasonable suspicion that appellee was smuggling marijuana to his brother in the prison. Therefore, they were authorized to conduct a reasonable search of appellee’s person to protect and preserve the security of the prison. The only realistically effective search calculated to disclose a small amount of drugs was a strip search. To hold that prison authorities may not conduct a strip search of a visitor reasonably suspected of concealing drugs upon his person would, in effect, prevent prison authorities from intercepting any small, easily concealed contraband that a visitor wished to introduce into the prison. The Constitution does not require such a result. I would hold that the strip search of Billy Dugger was lawful. It was a reasonable response to a reasonable suspicion that he was smuggling marijuana into the prison.
In the Dugger case, therefore, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
McEWEN and CIRILLO, JJ., join in this opinion.. Act of April 4, 1835, P.L. 232, § 8, 61 P.S. § 630.
. 37 Pa.Code § 93.74(a).
. 37 Pa.Code § 93.73 provides:
§ 93.73. Number, time, and place of visits.
Inmates shall be permitted to have visits as often as the situation at the institution will allow. Visits shall be of sufficient duration to be of value to both the inmate and visitor. Each inmate and visitor shall be provided a copy of internal visiting rules in accordance with the following:
(1) Visiting days. Visits shall be permitted every day of the year.
(2) Visiting hours. Morning and afternoon visiting hours shall be maintained. Evening visits may be maintained.
(3) Length of visits. Visits shall be of no less than one hour in duration. Longer periods may be allowed depending on inmate’s program status and available space.
*315(4) Frequency of visits. One visit per inmate per week shall be permitted. Additional visits may be permitted unless the inmate’s program status makes it impractical.
(5) Number of visitors at one time. The number of visitors an inmate may have at any one time shall be limited to five. A larger number may be permitted depending upon available space.
(6) Special visit. Provisions shall be made for the approval of a special visit at infrequent intervals of persons who may not be on approved list who have come a substantial distance and for a family visit to a seriously ill or injured inmate. Special visits shall be approved only by the Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent.
(7) Setting for visits. The setting for visits shall conform with the following provisions:
(i) Visits shall be held in a relaxed manner under official observation.
(ii) Visiting rooms shall be set with living room type furnishings.
(iii) An appropriate outdoor area furnished with picnic tables should also be provided.
(iv) The inmate and visitors may embrace when meeting and departing and may sit side-by-side. The inmate may hold small children on his lap.
(v) The inmate and visitors may eat or drink items sold at the institution.
(vi) Family-day visits are encouraged whereby the visitors will be permitted to bring a basket lunch and share it with the inmate.
. In Wool v. Hogan, 505 F.Supp. 928 (D.Vt.1981), the United States District Court for Vermont upheld the reasonableness of a policy of a state correctional facility which required strip searches of anyone wishing to exercise a contact visit with an inmate.