The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8301 and 8302, provide a cause of action on behalf of an eight week old fetus after an abortion has been induced to avoid the risk of fetal damage because of injuries sustained by the mother in a motor vehicle accident and/or her subsequent medical treatment. We hold that there is no cause of action on behalf of a non-viable fetus. Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial court which granted defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed the complaint on behalf of the fetus.
*411On January 3, 1986, Karen Coveleski suffered physical injuries, including a dislocated right hip, when the Jeep CJ-7 in which she was riding as a passenger plunged into a ravine on the property of Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in Zerbe Township, Northumberland County. Six days later, upon the advice of her physician, Ms. Coveleski consented to abort a fetus of approximately eight weeks gestation because of the risk that the fetus had sustained damage as a result of the accident or would be damaged by subsequent medical treatment.
Ms. Coveleski then brought actions against Vincent A. Bubnis, Jr., the driver of the Jeep; Zerbe Township; Conrail; and Raymond Bowers, Sr. t/d/b/a The Corner Tavern, which had served alcohol to the driver of the jeep prior to the accident. Coveleski not only sought recovery for her personal injuries, but she also asserted wrongful death and survival actions on behalf of the fetus. Bubnis, the driver, agreed to settle Ms. Coveleski’s claims. The remaining defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to the claim on behalf of the fetus, asserting that the demise of an eight week old fetus did not give rise to wrongful death and survival actions.
A cause of action exists under the Pennsylvania Survival Statute only if it is determined that the fetus could have been a plaintiff.1 The Wrongful Death Act provides that an action may be brought to recover for the death of an “individual.”2 The legislature defines “individual”, at 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991, as a “natural person.” This is distinguished from the broader term “person”, which includes corporations, partnerships and associations. Legal status as a *412natural person is not determined solely by the humanity of the entity in question; it is a legal concept regarding the assignment of rights and duties. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (“person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn).
Until recent times, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania had'required a live birth before the accrual of a cause of action for in útero injury. See: Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981); Marko v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964). In other jurisdictions, however, judicial recognition was given to the individuality of a fetus because of medical information regarding the separate nature of the aspects of maternal and fetal physiology.3 The existence of a unique fetal physiology, how*413ever, does not alone resolve the legal question of whether to afford to a fetus the legal status necessary to assert a cause of action.
In Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled prior case law and joined a majority of American jurisdictions in recognizing a cause of action on behalf of a fetus of 42 to 43 weeks gestation which had been delivered stillborn. Having eliminated birth as the moment at which a cause of action accrued, the Amadio court suggested viability as the moment in time when a fetus attains the status of an individual for purposes of maintaining an action for his or her death. The Court said: “ ... we conclude that the time has arrived for us to join [the majority of our] sister states and the District of Columbia and recognize that survival and wrongful death actions lie by the estates of stillborn children for fatal injuries they received while viable children en ventre sa mere.” Id., 509 Pa. at 203, 501 A.2d at 1086-1087.
Viability is that “stage of prenatal development at which the fetus would be capable of independent existence if removed from its mother’s womb, and it has often been noted that a fetus ordinarily becomes viable during the sixth or seventh month of its mother’s pregnancy.” Annot., Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 432 n. 72 (1978). In support of its decision to allow a separate cause of action on behalf of a viable fetus, the Amadio court recognized that difficulties of proof are not necessarily greater where fetal death occurs shortly before birth than where death occurs shortly after birth. However, even those advocating a cause of action from the moment of conception must acknowledge that problems of proof become more difficult with lesser periods of gestation. Scott v. Kopp, supra 494 Pa. at 496, 431 A.2d at 964 (Dissenting Opinion by Larsen, J.). Where the wrongful death and survival statutes are not explicit regarding the rights of an unborn child, it is *414sound statutory interpretation to limit the right to assert such an action to a viable fetus. Before viability, any determination of damages for death of the fetus would be entirely speculative. Whether the child would be born healthy and talented would be incapable of prediction with reasonable certainty. It is in recognition of this difficulty in proof, that a majority of jurisdictions draw the line at viability. Indeed, only Georgia and Rhode Island hold otherwise. The majority view, we conclude, is the better view.
This is also the view followed by the Superior Court in Hudak v. Georgy, 390 Pa.Super. 14, 567 A.2d 1095 (1989). In the absence of an expression of contrary intent by the legislature, the Court reasoned, it would not accord to fetuses prior to viability the same rights accorded by the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts to children who have attained viability. Our review of the statutes is in accord. The language thereof does not suggest a legislative intent to create separate causes of action in favor of non-viable fetuses.
In the instant case, Coveleski’s pregnancy was only in its eighth week when the fetus was aborted. At such an early stage of her pregnancy, plaintiff could not allege that the fetus was viable. Therefore, the wrongful death and survival actions were properly dismissed by the trial court.
Affirmed.
OLSZEWSKI, J., files a dissenting opinion.. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302 provides as follows:
All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.
. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301(a) provides as follows:
(a) General rule. — An action may be brought, under procedures prescribed by general rules, to recover damages for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another if no action for damages was brought by the injured individual during his lifetime.
. Thirty-two jurisdictions recognize a cause of action on behalf of a fetus that sustains fatal injury in útero.
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn.Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo and Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Simmons v. Howard University, 323 F.Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga.App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1972); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.1955); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O’Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974); Terrell v. Rankin, 511 So.2d 126 (Miss.1987); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo.1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hospital, 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D.1988); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okl.1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Farley v. Mount Marty Hospital Association, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D.1986); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash.2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); *413Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).