(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because the contract at issue was for the sale of goods, not services. Compare Minn.Stat. § 336.2-725 (1992) (four-year statute of limitations in contracts for sale) with Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1992) (six-year statute of limitations). The record demonstrates: (a) Vesta purchased the lessor’s interest in agricultural equipment; (b) the lessee had the option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease; (c) if the lessee elected not to buy the equipment, Vesta owned or could release the equipment; (d) when the lessee defaulted, Vesta went to California to replevin the property; (e) Vesta enjoyed tax investment credits and depreciation benefits from ownership of the goods; (f) all services rendered under the contract were related to completion of the sales transaction; and (g) none of the alleged services was priced separately. Under these facts, the transaction’s dominant purpose was the sale of goods. See Embryo Progeny Assocs. v. Lovana Farms, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 447, 416 S.E.2d 833, 834 (even *313though services are a substantial part of and essential to the agreement, where the contract’s dominant purpose is the sale of goods, it is a contract for the sale of goods), cert. denied (Ga. July 16, 1992). The transaction thus is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the four-year statute of limitations provided in Minn.Stat. § 336.2-725 bars Vesta’s claims. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.1981) (the U.C.C. clarifies the rights and remedies of parties to commercial transactions), overruled on other grounds by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.1990). I would affirm the trial court.