(concurring). I concur with the result but not the analysis.
Disposition of the $100,000 settlement is subject to whatever applicability sec. 102.29, Stats., may have. That is the only significance of the last provision in the stipulation that the payment "be made to the Portage County Clerk of Circuit Court [']s office for approval and distribution pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes Section 102.29."
It therefore is unnecessary to determine the intent of the parties on the basis of extrinsic evidence. If that were necessary, I would remand this matter to the trial court for its determination on the basis of that evidence. We are constitutionally prohibited from resolving disputed issues of fact. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3, 293 N.W.2d 155, 159 n.3 (1980).
Consequently, we should look to the statute, sec. 102.29(1), Stats., to determine whether it applies. It is reasonable to assume that this action was settled on the basis of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs' in their complaint. The question is the extent to which sec. 102.29(1) applies to distribution of the $100,000 among those claims. I agree that because appellants' claims for loss of their father's society and financial support do not come within sec. 102.29(1), the trial court's allocation must be reversed, and a remand is necessary for a distribution order under Brewer v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 864, 418 N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1987).