(dissenting). As the majority states, it is important to recognize what this case is not about. It is not, as the majority notes, about the unreasonable treatment of a particular person detained at a particular checkpoint. Ante at 749-750, quoting Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444, 449-450; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990). However, contrary to the tenor of the majority opinion, this case is also not about the standard governing the seizure of a particular driver for a particular reason. Rather, this case concerns the standard governing the systematic seizure of every vehicle passing through a given point at a given time vis-á-vis a sobriety checkpoint program. Because I believe the majority relies upon an inapposite line of authority to support its conclusion that "there is no support in the constitutional history of Michigan for the proposition that the police may engage in warrantless and suspicionless seizures of automobiles for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law,” ante at 747, and because I believe that history compels a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority finds that the Nash1 "compelling reason” test is satisfied because the state’s "juris*780prudential history” compels a departure from the more narrow federal interpretation of search and seizure constraints. Even if this were true, I believe that the majority relies on the wrong line of cases in this Court’s history to support the conclusion it reaches.
While this case deals with the systematic "seizure” of every vehicle passing a given point at a given time, the majority’s "jurisprudential history” reflects cases in which individuals and their automobiles were seized and sometimes searched for individual, particular reasons. For example, the majority relies on People v Kamhout, 227 Mich 172; 198 NW 831 (1924), and, to a lesser extent, People v Krahn, 230 Mich 528; 203 NW 105 (1925), for the proposition that "reasonable grounds” are needed to seize and search an automobile. Such a standard, the majority concludes, "remains unmodified by precedent.” Ante at 766. The majority relies upon another opinion, People v Case, 220 Mich 379, 389; 190 NW 289 (1922), for the notion that what is "reasonable” depends upon the totality of the circumstances of the search and seizure.
What is not noted, however, is that these cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Case, the police officer searched an immobile truck while the owner was not present. 220 Mich 380-381. The vehicle was parked at public fairgrounds and was searched as part of police efforts to maintain order and protect fairgoers. Id. at 389. Likewise, in Kamhout, the police searched a stationary automobile parked in front of the vehicle owner’s home while the owner was seated in the front seat. 227 Mich 173-174. Without any particularized suspicion, the police officer approached the vehicle, built up to resemble a bread wagon, reached in *781through a broken window, grabbed a carton, and found two jugs containing moonshine whiskey. Id. at 174. And, in Krahn, the police stopped a horse-drawn wagon because the city marshal had notified the police that he had seen the tops of whiskey containers protruding through bales of hay the wagon carried. 230 Mich 529.
The majority also relies upon People v Roache, 237 Mich 215; 211 NW 742 (1927), and People v Stein, 265 Mich 610; 251 NW 788 (1933), for the proposition that at least reasonable grounds are needed to stop every automobile that is a part of a criminal investigation. In Roache, a police officer stopped an automobile because "the occupants of the car looked back at him after they had passed, and . . . the driver was going slower than the majority of cars driven along this highway.” 237 Mich 222. Similarly, police officers in Stein pulled over a vehicle in which the defendants were riding because
[one of the police officer’s] attention was attracted to a taxicab in which defendants were passengers because it was "traveling pretty fast,” about 32 miles per hour. He pursued it about a block and, when he was "right abreast of the back rear door” of the cab he "noticed the defendant Stein reaching into his pocket as if to take something out and place his hand behind him ... as if he was taking something out of his pocket and putting it on the seat beside him” or behind him. Stein’s motion gave [the police officer] "the idea that he was putting a gun away.” [265 Mich 612.]
In sum, the cases the majority relies upon deal with individualized vehicle stops, or at least approaches to individual stationary vehicles, to satisfy suspicions about particular vehicles. Not one case deals with the systematic seizure of all vehi*782cles passing through a given point at a given time.2 I believe, therefore, that the majority relied upon the wrong line of cases to support its conclusion that the "jurisprudential history” of the state compels a finding that some level of reasonable grounds are needed to seize vehicles pursuant to a sobriety checkpoint program.
II
The question whether art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution allows the systematic seizure of all vehicles passing through a given point at a given time for purposes of a sobriety checkpoint is one of first impression for this Court. Indeed, this Court has never considered the constitutionality of the systematic seizure of a large group of vehicles or *783individuals for any reason. Notwithstanding its Sitz opinions, however, the Court of Appeals has implicitly acknowledged the constitutionality of such systematic seizures.
In People v Holland, 155 Mich App 419, 420-422; 399 NW2d 547 (1986), the Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine. The cocaine used to convict the defendant fell from his pocket after United States Customs officials boarded the defendant’s boat, without a warrant or probable cause, and inspected certain documents.3 The Court held that neither the state nor federal constitution prohibited such conduct because the water in which the defendant’s boat was moored at a designated port of entry serving as a boundary between the United States and Canada.
Consequently, due to the easy access the river provides to Canada, document checks of boaters thereon serve the same public interests as those present in [United States v Villamonte-Marquez, 462 US 579; 103 S Ct 2573; 77 L Ed 2d 22 (1983)]. As elaborated upon by that Court, documentation laws assist in the regulation of imports and exports and the enforcement of environmental laws and United States shipping laws. [Citation omitted.] Further, enforcement of the documentation laws requires only a brief detention, during which searches are limited to a visual inspection of only those areas within the official’s plain view. [Id. at 422.]
For present purposes, the Holland Court’s most *784important statement followed this explanation as it justified the use of what amounted to a roving patrol of customs officials checking vessel documents. The Court noted that such an asystematic procedure was necessary to achieve the state’s interests because, "[d]ue to the nature of the waterborne commerce, permanent checkpoints, such as the type utilized on main roads leading away from borders, cannot be maintained.” Id. Citing federal precedent,4 the Court implicitly stated that, had a permanent checkpoint been a feasible alternative, it would have sustained its use to allow a more systematic inspection of vessel documents.
The Court of Appeals reacknowledged the constitutionality of permanent checkpoints in NAACP v Dearborn, 173 Mich App 602; 434 NW2d 444 (1988), lv den 433 Mich 906 (1989) (Brickley, Riley and Griffin, JJ., dissenting). At issue in that case was a city ordinance restricting the use of Dearborn’s neighborhood parks to city residents and their guests only. Id. at 606-607. Aside from the race discrimination implications, the Court held that the ordinance violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures because it allowed any police officer to require a park user to stop and produce identification proving Dearborn residency. Id. at 620. The Court noted that
[absolutely no neutral criteria are set forth in the *785ordinance to ensure that the governmental intrusion is not the product of the detaining personnel’s unfettered discretion; absolutely no objective standards are provided in the ordinance to warrant that the governmental intrusion is not the product of the detaining personnel’s unlimited and unguided "wish.” [Id.]
Again, for present purposes, the Court of Appeals most important statement is its recognition that a systematic procedure for checking the identity of all park users would withstand constitutional scrutiny. In acknowledging the naacp’s concession in this regard, the Court noted that "fencing the city’s parks and requiring all users to display identification of residency at the point of entry would constitute a constitutionally acceptable method of enforcing the ordinance’s nonresident provisions.” Id. at 620, n 4.
Although this Court has never done so, on at least two occasions the Court of Appeals has implicitly acknowledged the constitutionality of the systematic seizure of individuals passing through a given place at a given time. While such authority is not binding upon this Court, I find it to be highly persuasive.
III
As noted above, this case deals only with the limited question whether a sobriety checkpoint program violates art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. In the absence of Michigan case law directly on point, I believe that federal case law is instructive on the limited question this case presents.
When the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Michigan’s sobriety *786checkpoint program, it specifically rejected the argument that the proper analysis required an assessment of whether the seizures were supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Sitz, 496 US 449-450. Instead, because of the nature of the seizure, to wit, the systematic stopping of all vehicles passing through a given point at a given time, and the fact that such a seizure was less intrusive than a traditional arrest, the Supreme Court adopted the balancing analysis espoused in Brown v Texas, 443 US 47; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979). Sitz, 496 US 450.
In Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that the reasonableness of a seizure less intrusive than an arrest depended upon "a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” 443 US 50, quoting Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 109; 98 S Ct 330; 54 L Ed 2d 331 (1977). In other words, when reviewing the constitutionality of a seizure, courts must weigh "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” 443 US 51. Moreover, the Court noted that reviewing courts should take steps "to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id. To that end,
the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. [Id.]
I believe that the balancing analysis in Brown is *787consistent with the requirements of the Michigan Constitution. In applying this analysis to the facts of this case, I believe that Michigan’s sobriety checkpoint program withstands constitutional scrutiny.
A
No one can seriously dispute the gravity of problems associated with drinking and driving. In 1991, the most recent year in which statistics have been compiled, drugs or alcohol played a role in forty-five percent of all fatal accidents occurring on Michigan roads. Michigan Department of State Police, Michigan Traffic Crash Facts 1991 (Lansing, Michigan: Office of Highway Safety Planning), p 22. Statistics show that a blood-alcohol level as small as 0.04 percent significantly increases the likelihood of a trafile accident. Id. at 20. At a level of 0.06, the probability of a crash is twice as likely than when no alcohol is involved; when the level reaches 0.10, the probability is six times higher; and, when it reaches 0.15, the probability of a crash is twenty-five times greater than if the driver is sober.5 Id. While the number of trafile deaths related to alcohol or drugs decreased almost six percent from 1990,6 it can hardly be disputed that the problem continues to be grave.
B
The next factor in the balancing analysis re*788quires inquiry into the "degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.” 443 US 51. The United States Supreme Court in Sitz was quick to point out that this factor was not meant to transfer from state officials to the courts the decision regarding which technique should be used to combat the drinking and driving problem. 496 US 453. The Court also noted:
Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. [Id. at 453-454.]
In other words, as long as the means chosen to promote the public’s interest is "reasonable,” the success rate of that means measured by empirical evidence need not be outstanding.
Empirical data from the one checkpoint conducted in Michigan supports the view that checkpoints reasonably advance the public interest in eradicating drunk driving. During the use of that checkpoint, 126 vehicles passed through during the span of just over one hour. Ante at 748. Of that number, two drivers were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. This means that 1.6 percent of all drivers stopped or "seized” were arrested for drunk driving. In reviewing a checkpoint designed to detect the presence of illegal aliens, the United States Supreme Court upheld a success rate of only 0.12 percent.7 On the basis of a *789comparison of these two cases, I am satisfied that Michigan’s sobriety checkpoint program reasonably advances the public’s interest in discouraging drunk driving.8
C
The final factor requires analysis of "the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” 443 US 51. During the checkpoint conducted, the average delay to motorists was twenty-five seconds or less. Again, comparing this case to the United States Supreme Court’s review of illegal alien checkpoints, intrusion on motorists is slight.9 In reviewing such checkpoints, the Supreme Court noted:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude ... on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both ap*790pear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review. [United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 559; 96 S Ct 3074; 49 L Ed 2d 1116 (1976).]
Moreover, in distinguishing checkpoints from roving-patrol stops, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. [United States v Ortiz, 422 US 891, 894-895; 95 S Ct 2585; 45 L Ed 2d 623 (1975).]
It is clear that the more permanent types of checkpoints impose only minimal intrusions on the motoring public.
*791Likewise, Michigan’s sobriety checkpoint program does not intrude upon the motoring public. According to the checkpoint guidelines, the existence of the program will be widely publicized; motorists should not, therefore, be taken by surprise when coming upon a checkpoint. Motorists will not be frightened by the checkpoints because they can see that every other vehicle is stopped and that all the officers present are in uniform. The location of the checkpoints will not be chosen by officers in the field, but is to be based on certain criteria approved by the Director of the Department of State Police, the person responsible for determining the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. Necessarily, then, field officers have no discretion in picking and choosing whom to investigate; rather, they may stop only those cars passing through the checkpoint.10 In other words, seizures resulting from the checkpoints are carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Moreover, the guidelines also address concerns such as safety considerations, equipment, motorist contact, and briefing and debriefing checkpoint officers. On the basis of this information, I agree with the United States Supreme Court that the intrusion on motorists caused by sobriety checkpoints is minimal. On balance, I am convinced that the state’s interest in eradicating the drunk driving problem and the reasonable manner in which sobriety checkpoints further that goal outweighs the minimal intrusion the checkpoints visit upon Michigan motorists who are only momentarily stopped._
*792IV
I conclude that not only is there no compelling reason to embark on a more restrictive interpretation of search and seizure under our art 1, § 11, but there are strong reasons not to do so.
Contrary to the thrust of "new federalism” as described by the majority, there are distinct advantages to uniformity in the interpretation of search and seizure constitutional provisions. The interstate flow of traffic on our intrastate and interstate highway system argues for uniformity in highway safety enforcement. This uniformity is not enhanced by our Court’s departure today from the Nash approach to search and seizure interpretation under the Michigan Constitution.
Furthermore, despite the criticism of the Brown analysis for its disavowal of an articulable suspicion standard as an indispensable minimum requirement in limited seizures under the circumstances of this case, it does, in my judgment, recognize the reality of the times in which we live.
Technological advances in miniaturization and the concomitant development of easily concealed destructive devices (not to mention the lethal force of an automobile driven by an intoxicated person), coupled with increasing levels of violence and the threat of international terrorism, are going to continue to prompt the need for and the public acceptance of surveillance-inspection techniques that involve minimum inconveniences and intrusions as a necessary trade-off for the personal safety and security of the population at large. Such systematic and evenly enforced measures need not erode the traditional and accepted standards of probable cause and articulable suspicion when employed in the customary criminal investigation context.
*793Accordingly, this is not, in my view, the time, nor does this case present the circumstances, to have the Michigan Constitution digress from the evolving Fourth Amendment standards as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
For the above-stated reasons, I believe that the Michigan Constitution is satisfied by the balancing analysis set forth in Brown and applied to this case by the United States Supreme Court, and not a determination of articulable suspicion or probable cause. I would hold that Michigan’s sobriety checkpoint program withstands Michigan constitutional scrutiny. I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Griffin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214; 341 NW2d 439 (1983).
According to the majority, People ex rel Attorney General v Lansing Municipal Judge, 327 Mich 410; 42 NW2d 120 (1950), is most analogous to the case at bench. There, this Court struck down a public act that, inter alia, allowed a conservation officer to stop and search automobiles without a warrant where the officer had reason to believe that the automobile’s occupants were engaged in or about to engage in illegal hunting practices. 327 Mich 435. This Court held that such a search could be sustained only when supported by probable cause. Id. at 425-426.
Other than its characterization of Lansing Municipal Judge as being "most analogous” to the case at bench, I agree with the majority’s analysis of that case. I submit, however, that the facts in Lansing Municipal Judge are more closely analogous to roving checkpoint cases than to the more permanent type at issue in the case at bench. The seizures at issue in Lansing Municipal Judge are not the result of a systematic seizure of every hunter in a given area at a given time. On the contrary, individual conservation officers were given enormous discretion to seize any person they wished. Id. at 425. Similarly, the problem with roving checkpoints is the unfettered discretion officers have in stopping individual motorists. See, generally, United States v Ortiz, 422 US 891; 95 S Ct 2585; 45 L Ed 2d 623 (1975). Just as probable cause is needed to seize a motorist pursuant to a roving checkpoint, id. at 896-897, I believe that probable cause is the proper standard for the type of seizure at issue in Lansing Municipal Judge. However, because I believe that the factors that distinguish more permanent checkpoints from roving checkpoints also distinguish the Lansing Municipal Judge seizures, I am not convinced that Lansing Municipal Judge compels a requirement of probable cause in the case at bench.
Section 1581(a) of the Tariff Act provides in pertinent part:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on hoard of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States . . . and examine the manifest and other documents and papers ....
[19 USC 1581(a).]
In- acknowledging the constitutionality of permanent checkpoints, the Holland Court noted that
[i]n United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543; 96 S Ct 3074; 49 L Ed 2d 1116 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the authority of federal border patrols to maintain permanent checkpoints at major roadways leading away from international borders, at which vehicles may be stopped for brief questioning even though officials have no reason to believe that such vehicles contain illegal aliens. [155 Mich App 422, n 1.]
On average, a traffic accident was reported in Michigan once every 1 minute and 26 seconds and caused over $3 billion in economic losses in 1991. See Crash Facts, p 5.
Crash Facts, p 7. Indeed, 1991 saw a decrease in every category in which statistics were compiled (i.e., total number of crashes, number of fatal crashes, number of persons killed, number of persons injured, etc.).
See United States v Martinez-Fuerte, n 4 supra at 554 (the Court upheld illegal alien checkpoints, notwithstanding the fact that in one of the consolidated cases considered on appeal, illegal aliens were *789found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint).
The fact that sobriety checkpoints act as a short-term deterrent against drunk driving makes them an even more reasonable means of combating the drunk driving problem. This fact, as testified to below by an expert witness, offers some explanation for the low number of intoxicated drivers seized at the checkpoint. Aware of the increased risk of detection, drinking motorists have a new incentive to avoid Michigan roadways.
During the initial inspection of cars, a border patrol officer would stand between the line of cars brought virtually to a halt and visually inspect the occupants of the vehicle. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 546. Most motorists were allowed to continue on their way without any oral examination or close visual inspection. Id. A small number of cars, however, were directed to a secondary area where the occupants were questioned for as long as five minutes concerning their citizenship and immigration status. Id. at 546-547. Notwithstanding this lengthy detention, the Supreme Court found that the intrusion visited upon those subject to either area of the checkpoint was minimal. Id. at 557-558.
Of course, it is these factors that eliminate the unfettered discretion of individual police officers that distinguish the case at bench from cases such as Lansing Municipal Judge, n 2 supra, and NAACP, supra.