(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
There is no question that the conduct of Martin in his business dealings with Meyers evinces the pursuit of the American dream, to be successful in pursuing the almighty dollar. This certainly is a pursuit which can become infected by a devouring appetite for success, sometimes commonly referred to as plain and simple greed.
Notwithstanding a record with this flavor, the Referee in this case found credible evidence regarding the manner in which Martin had conducted his life and law practice in the community of Brookings since his admission to the Bar in 1965. For more than twenty-five years, he has gained a good reputation in and around the community regarding his work ethic, personal life, and for providing legal services to those who could not afford them.
The Referee probably placed too much emphasis on the fact that in the bevy of business transactions between Martin and Meyers, Meyers suffered no monetary loss and, in fact, made money on these deals. The mere fact that a client suffers no monetary loss in a transaction involving an attorney has been described by the Minnesota Su*107preme Court as a fortuity which does not absolve one from disciplinary sanctions. Matter of Discipline of Ray, 368 N.W.2d 924 (Minn.1985). If an attorney has an interest which adversely affects his judgment or loyalty to a client, that interest will certainly amount to a conflict.
The real blunder in this case is that Martin drafted Meyers’ will while he stood to gain as executor of the will and as manager of a major portion of the Meyers estate assets for twenty years. Having placed himself in a position to receive these benefits, Martin still neglected to advise Meyers to seek independent counsel in regards to the will.
The management provision gave Martin sole discretion to invest these estate assets as he saw fit. Martin would have performed these duties while he was substantially indebted to the estate on the real estate contract. A possible scenario in this situation would be negotiating with himself on amending the contract for reduced annual payments, reduced interest, or whatever had not been agreed to by Meyers prior to his demise. A review of the contract and its proposed amendments almost leads one to the conclusion that the legal documents could have been appropriately captioned “adoption papers.”
In reviewing disciplinary proceedings, this court determines what is an appropriate discipline from “the whole evidence as submitted^]” In re Discipline of Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452, 455 (S.D.1977). Further, attorneys should be disciplined when they have conducted their practice of law in a manner which fails to comply with the standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In re Discipline of Strange, 366 N.W.2d 495 (S.D.1985).
This court also attempts to maintain some semblance of consistency in meting out discipline so that the practicing bar is aware of what the consequences will be in the event an attorney violates the standards of the profession. In Matter of Discipline of Bleeker, 466 N.W.2d 858 (S.D.1991), the attorney was suspended from the practice of law for six months along with other terms and conditions for: Violating Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (failing to act competently); Rule 1.1 of the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct (SDCL 16-18 appx.) (competence); commingling client funds "with those of his own and failing to keep his client’s funds safe and identifiable, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-102 (preserving identity of funds and property of a client); Rule 1.15 (fees); was guilty of constructive fraud as found by Davison County’s circuit court in violation of .Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) (misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations); and Rule 8.4(c).
After reviewing all of the evidence in this case, I cannot find the conduct of Martin more egregious or more exemplary than the conduct in Bleeker. Therefore, I conclude that the appropriate discipline in this case is a six-month suspension from the practice of law. This certainly would seem to be a sufficient time for reflection on his past practices and ample time to renew an acquaintance with the rales of professional ethics. As to the other conditions imposed by the majority, I concur.