dissenting.
I must dissent. The majority holds that house to house communication can for practical purposes be completely prohibited. The burden of obtaining the consent of each listener is considered of little consequence to the majority. This is the first time to my knowledge, in the history of free speech that the communicator is required to obtain the permission of the recipient before freely speaking. The whole purpose of the First Amendment is just the opposite. It intends that ideas — true or false — may be circulated freely, whether or not the listener consents. The majority has confused the issue, contorted precedent and contrived a result which cannot be reconciled with the Federal Constitution. Apparently if appellant wants relief, he will have to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The McCandless Township Ordinance facially applies to all information. As the Commonwealth Court stated:
“In any event, even a cursory examination of Ordinance No. 662 reveals that it attempts to restrict the dissemination of clearly protectable information. It applies to all advertising, both commercial and non-commercial. Moreover, while it is apparent here that the materials distribut*16ed by Sterlace are commercial in nature, even such materials, most probably, contained or were likely to contain some information which is entitled to First Amendment protections . . . ” Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 24 Pa. Cmwlth. 62, 67, 354 A.2d 27, 29 (1976).
Even assuming the ordinance applies only to commercial advertisements, commercial advertisements enjoy First Amendment protection. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (decided April 28, 1978); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). As the Supreme Court stated in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S. at 783, 98 S.Ct. at 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d at 722: “A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial information.’ ” The salient reasons for First Amendment protection of commercial speech are set forth in Bates v. State Board of Arizona, supra, 433 U.S. 350, 364, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2699, 53 L.Ed.2d 810, 823 (1977):
“[Commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in insuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” (Citations omitted)
Arrayed against these substantial interests in the free flow of commercial information are three proffered justifications for Ordinance 662. As stated in its preamble, the Ordinance was enacted because “in the judgment of the Board of Commissioners this manner of distribution of advertising materials [1] is unsightly, [2] constitutes an inva*17sion of privacy and [3], unless picked up by the property owner within a reasonable time, the presence of such advertising material would be a clear indication that the residence was unoccupied and thus increase the possibility of vandalism and/or burglary.”
Although the Supreme Court stated in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, “some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible,” 425 U.S. at 770, 96 S.Ct. at 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d at 363, the majority overlooks that ordinances that regulate commercial speech are not saved solely because enacted to achieve a legitimate government interest. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, 431 U.S. at 94, 97 S.Ct. at 1619, 52 L.Ed.2d at 163. The law must be necessary to achieve that objective and do so in a manner least restrictive of the First Amendment right asserted. Id. See also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). While a municipality has the power to regulate activities within a community in order to decrease unsightly litter, ensure residents’ privacy, and deter burglaries and vandalism. Ordinance 662 impermissibly burdens Sterlace’s First Amendment right to disseminate commercial messages.
Sterlace has structured his activity such that one phone call from a particular resident, or one post card, will in almost every case achieve precisely the three public interests allegedly served by Ordinance 662. A single phone call or post card can stop these “unsightly” materials from finding their way to the resident’s doorstep or mailbox and will vindicate any privacy interest purportedly violated by a plastic bag quietly placed on the doorstep or attached to the mailbox. As to the third proffered justification — preventing a buildup of such materials so as not to signal to potential burglars or vandals that a resident may be away from home for an extended period of time — we realize that in the limited situation where a resident had never received such advertising materials, left home for a prolonged period of time, and then had the materials delivered to the residence *18for the first time while he or she were away, the evil sought to be remedied by the ordinance might exist. In the ordinary course of events, however, this will not be the. case. A resident will have already received at least one plastic bag, and just as the resident calls to have the newspaper discontinued during an extended absence from home, he or she can easily call to ensure that materials such as “Shopper’s Savers Sacks” are likewise discontinued. We therefore cannot say that this ordinance, requiring Sterlace and others similarly situated to obtain the affirmative consent of every resident to whom they want to distribute advertising material, is “necessary,” in a First Amendment context of that word, to achieve those objectives. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, supra, 431 U.S. at 94, 97 S.Ct. at 1619, 52 L.Ed.2d at 163. A significant burden on constitutionally protected speech such as that worked by Ordinance 662 cannot be sustained when the interests sought to be achieved by the ordinance are either readily achieved by other means less restrictive of fundamental rights, or the danger sought to be remedied by the ordinance is rarely present.
I am not unmindful of the “commonsense differences between speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’ and other varieties,” and that these differences “suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, 425 U.S. at 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. at 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d at 364 n.24.
Yet I am convinced that notwithstanding the commercial nature of the speech at issue here, Ordinance 662 is unconstitutionally repressive. The effectiveness of Sterlace’s method of communication is that the information is brought to the individual attention of each resident. Ordinance 662 gives Sterlace two alternative means of achieving that desired end: obtaining in some way the prior consent of every individual resident, or sending the advertising materials via the mails. The Commonwealth does not dispute, as indeed it could not, that Ordinance 662 makes it more burdensome for *19Sterlace to exercise his First Amendment rights. There is thus no question the Ordinance abridges protected expression, and arguably does so in a way that makes it economically and practically unfeasible for Sterlace to exercise that expression which the First Amendment was designed to protect. The First Amendment does not tolerate the burden on protected speech which results from Ordinance 662 because “[t]he right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 454, 93 L.Ed. 513, 522 (1949). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945).
The Commonwealth contends that the McCandless ordinance is valid because it “especially [attempts] to protect the privacy of its residents’ homes,” and relies on Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233 (1951), which upheld an ordinance requiring solicitors of magazine subscriptions to obtain a resident’s prior consent before knocking on that resident’s door. The intrusion on personal privacy sought to be curbed by the Alexandria ordinance was much different than is present in this case, however. That ordinance found obnoxious solicitors who knocked on doors and went “in and upon private residences.” 341 U.S. at 624, 71 S.Ct. at 923, 95 L.Ed. at 1238. The residents there “did not desire any uninvited intrusion into the privacy of their home[s].” Id. at 625, 71 S.Ct. at 923, 95 L.Ed. at 1239. In contrast, any intrusion on privacy occasioned by Sterlace’s depositing a plastic bag at a residence is slight. He does not knock on doors, and it is likely that more frequently than not a resident will not know that Sterlace was even at his or her home until the time the plastic bag is discovered. Thus the adjustment made in Breard between the right of privacy and the right of expression is necessarily different from the adjustment that must be made in this case.
Not only was the privacy interest more compelling in Breard, but the Supreme Court, in balancing that interest against the First Amendment right asserted, was strongly influenced by the fact the selling of magazine subscriptions *20“[brought] into the transaction a commercial feature.” 341 U.S. at 642, 71 S.Ct. at 932, 95 L.Ed. at 1248. Indeed, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board noted that Breard might be further support, in addition to the principle case of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), for a commercial speech exception to the First Amendment. 425 U.S. at 758, 96 S.Ct. at 1823,48 L.Ed.2d at 356. That notion has now been firmly laid to rest, and recent cases holding that commercial speech is constitutionally protected cast considerable doubt on the vitality of Breard’s First Amendment analysis. Considering this recent development along with the weightier privacy interest involved there, the majority errs when it upholds the constitutionality of Ordinance 662. I therefore dissent.