dissenting:
Appellants raise several questions in their appeal concerning the extent expert medical opinion is necessary to recover damages for personal injuries caused by negligence. Two lines of authority bear on the issue. As to recovery for permanent injuries sustained in an accident, it is settled that the testimony by a plaintiff of continuing pain and suffering is sufficient to present a jury question of the issue of permanency if there is no contrary testimony that the injuries are temporary. American Marietta Co. v. Griffin, D.C.App., 203 A.2d 710 (1964); Alamo v. Dei Rosario, 69 App.D.C. 47, 98 F.2d 328 (1938). Expert medical opinion may be required in a given case, however, if either the question of causality between the negligent act and the alleged injuries or of the permanency of the injuries is medically complicated. Jones v. Miller, D.C.App., 290 A.2d 587 (1972). And in D. C. Transit Systems, Inc. v. Simpkins, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 107 (1976), we recognized that it could be argued, in the face of a medical opinion by a qualified physician offered by the defense, that a finding for a plaintiff based only on a lay opinion was without evidentia-ry support. As to these legal principles, the majority and I agree. It is in their application to the facts of this case that we disagree.
Appellee had had extensive medical difficulties in the past. Added to these difficulties were her initial injuries in the 1973 accident and injuries in two subsequent accidents. True, there was Dr. Gunlock’s testimony that there was a good union of the tibia and fibula after the barricade accident so that appellee was full weight-bearing by February 1974. In addition, it was Dr. Am-merman’s opinion that these fractures were well healed and that appellee’s fall in the bathroom related to her various circulatory ailments rather than to the barricade accident. Clearly, however, appellee’s testimony of her pain, suffering, and weakened condition which had persisted since 1973 was sufficient to submit the issue of permanency to the jury. Alamo v. Del Rosario, supra. I believe, also, that appellee was competent to explain to the jury the simple physical facts of her fall in the bathroom two years after the accident (i. e., left-sided weakness) and that on the question of causality her testimony was sufficient to have the jury consider whether, despite Dr. Am-merman’s medical opinion, evidence of that injury could be included in assessing damages arising out the 1973 accident. Accordingly, I would affirm.