Concurring Opinion by
Judge Palladino:I concur in the result only because I believe the majority has unnecessarily complicated the resolution of the issue before us.
Appellant contends that whether the chin-up bar, which is alleged to have been the cause of James Smiths injuries, is a fixture (and therefore real property which brings their cause of action within the real estate exception to governmental immunity, 42 Pa. C. S. §8542 *401(b)(3)) turns on the determination of the intent of the Bethlehem Area School District in placing the chin-up bar in the school. They argue that because the question of intent is one of fact, which was in dispute, the trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment.
Appellant is correct in her assertion that the question of intent is one of fact which, if present, precludes summary judgment. McClosky v. Abington School District, 101 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 515 A.2d 642 (1986) . However, the issue of intent does not arise in all instances where a chattel is used in connection with real property.
In Canon-McMillan School District v. Bioni, 110 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 584, 592, 533 A.2d 179, 182 (1987) ,1 this court noted that three categories of chattels used in connection with real estate exist: (1) those which remain personalty because they do not improve and are not peculiarly suited to the property with which they are used: (2) those which are realty, i.e. fixtures, because they are so annexed to the property that removal would result in permanent damage to either the chattel or the realty; and (3) those which are annexed in some nonpermanent manner to the realty with the intent of making them a permanent part of the realty. Only chattels which fall within categories two and three will be considered fixtures which bring a cause of action within the real estate exception to governmental immunity, 42 Pa. C. S. §8542(b)(3). See Maloney v. City of Philadelphia, 111 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 634, 535 A.2d *402209 (1987). The question of intent arises only if the chattel, involved falls within category three. The determination of which category a chattel falls in must first be made and that determination is a question of law.
It is not disputed that the chin-up bar involved in this case was not permanently affixed to the realty. The bar was situated in a doorway between the gymnasium and a storeroom. While it had not been moved for a period of time, its placement was not permanent. The bar could be moved at anytime and used in any doorway anywhere. This chin-up bar, like the springboard and vaulting horse in Brown v. Quaker Valley School District, 86 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 496, 486 A.2d 526 (1984), is an item “of movable equipment” and not a fixture because it is “not permanently placed at the school nor essential for its operation. . . . Accordingly, that equipment is not considered a part of real property. Therefore, the care, custody or control of real property exception to governmental immunity does not apply.” Id. at 488-89, 486 A.2d at 528.
The majority states that in Canon-McMillan this court “concluded that the lathe was not a part of the realty.” Majority op. at 7. This is incorrect. This court determined that a category three chattel was involved but that a new trial was necessary because the finding that the school district intended the chattel to be a part of the realty was against the weight of the evidence.