concurring.
In this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding plaintiff’s right to bring an unlawful gender-discrimination complaint against the University of Medicine and Dentistry (UMDNJ) unemcumbered by the restrictions of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
I join in this determination of the Court, but write separately to express more emphatically the view that the result reached by the Court not only accommodates the legislative intent underlying both the Law Against Discrimination and the Tort Claims Act, but further, this result clearly advances our strong public policy in maximizing protections against invidious discrimination.
I.
A convenient point of embarkation for an analysis of this issue is the language of the Tort Claims Act. The primary focus of the Act is on negligence and similar tortious conduct impliedly involving fault. The legislative declaration of the Act *339states that “it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act ...” N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 (emphasis added). Elsewhere the Act refers to a “negligent or wrongful act.” N.J.S.A. 59:3-9; 59:4-2a. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2b, for example, provides that “[n]o judgment shall be granted against a public entity or public employee on the basis of strict liability, implied warranty, or products liability.”1 The notion that the Act is concerned essentially with tortious conduct involving fault in the sense of a want of reasonable care is also indicated by the Act’s exclusion of public entity liability for certain kinds of intentional torts. N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 provides that public entities are not liable for the acts or omissions of employees “constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.”
In light of these provisions, I have little doubt — perhaps less than the Court — that the Legislature did not intend to include unlawful discrimination violative of the Law Against Discrimination as an “injury” to be governed by the Act. Fault or lack of reasonable care, which are the basis of “negligence,” are generally not essential in determining whether conduct constitutes invidious discrimination that is unlawful under the Law *340Against Discrimination. Moreover, such unlawful discrimination frequently entails purposeful, willful, or intentional conduct. As noted, a claim brought under the Act that is based on intentionally tortious conduct of an employee would not render the public entity vicariously liable, N.J.S.A. 59:2-10, this notwithstanding the offending employee would be personally liable, N.J.S.A. 59:3-14. As the Appellate Division observed:
We note also, that the Tort Claims Act provides no immunity for willful or malicious acts caused either by the employee or the entity itself. The Tort Claims Act in N.J.S.A. 59:3-14a and b permits personal liability and full recovery against a public employee for the results of actual malice or willful misconduct. N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 forbids only vicarious liability for such conduct on the part of a public entity. Discriminatory conduct actionable under the Law Against Discriminatory is more akin to the malicious or willful acts exempted from the Tort Claims Act than the negligently or similarly inflicted injuries covered thereby. [Fuchilla v. Layman, 210 N.J.Super. 574, 579 (App.Div. 1986).]
Moreover, if the Act were to apply, it would preclude the imposition of vicarious liability on public entity employers for unlawful discrimination under the Law. Cf. N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 (a public entity is not exonerated for injury resulting from its own negligence or intentional misconduct.). A result that would immunize the public entity and stigmatize only the public employee for invidious discrimination would clearly be at variance with the Law Against Discrimination. To the extent public entities would be immunized under the Act from the consequences of discriminatory conduct of its employees, it is clearly out of sync with prevailing law. Under Title VII, the analogous federal statute, compare 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a) with N.J.S.A. 10:5-12a, which is often looked to in interpreting the Law Against Discrimination, see Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 81 (1978), the doctrine of respondeat superior is an integral part of the protection provided by the statutory scheme. Employers are held strictly liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of their supervisory personnel. See, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir.1977); E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985) (employer liable for sexual harassment by supervisory employees regardless of *341whether the employer knew or should have known of its occurrence).2 In fact, awards on the grounds of respondeat superi- or or vicarious or derivative liability against employers whose employees’ actions violate the Law have long been recognized. See, e.g., Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 405 (1973). A result that drastically reduces responsibility for discrimination and so restricts the protection otherwise afforded its victims is strongly indicative of a legislative intent to exclude under the definition of the term “injury” in the Act unlawful discriminatory conduct. See Firestone v. Fritz, 119 Ill.App.3d 685, 75 Ill.Dec. 83, 87, 456 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1983) (the Illinois Tort Immunity Act applies only to tort actions, not civil rights actions); cf. Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 380-81, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139, 145, 320 N.E.2d 859, 862-63 (1974), reh. den., 36 N.Y.2d 807, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 330 N.E.2d 657 (1975) (notice of claim was not required for action based on sex discrimination because of public interest exception to notice requirement).
I find especially significant the history of the Tort Claims Act. This further underscores the notion that the Legislature intended to govern redress only for negligence and similar tortious wrongdoing and not for unlawful discrimination. The Act was a legislative response to the Court’s abrogation of the State’s tort sovereign immunity in Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534 (1970). In Willis, the Court reviewed previous judicial limitations on the use of sovereign immunity as a defense. It is instructive to note that all of the cases cited involve claims of ordinary *342negligence. Willis, 55 N.J. at 540. The most common type of claim at issue were simple slip and fall cases, see Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541 (1964); Hayden v. Curley, 34 N.J. 420 (1961); Schwartz v. Borough of Stockton, 32 N.J. 141 (1960); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454 (1956); Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400 (1951), and most of the others involved allegations that governmental negligence created conditions that resulted in death or injury. See Miehl v. Darpino, 53 N.J. 49 (1968); Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 N.J. 478 (1968); B.W. King Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318 (1967); Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106 (1966); Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Newark, 38 N.J. 578 (1962); Cloyes v. Delaware Township, 23 N.J. 324 (1957); Kress v. City of Newark, 8 N.J. 562 (1952); Hartman v. City of Brigantine, 42 N.J.Super. 247 (App.Div.1956), aff’d, 23 N.J. 530 (1957). Other cases involved situations where negligent supervision on the part of government officials led to the injury of third persons. Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230 (1968); Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66 (1967); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172 (1960); Peer v. City of Newark, 71 N.J.Super. 12 (App.Div.1961), certif. den., 36 N.J. 300 (1962). These cases represent not only the background against which the Legislature acted when it drafted the Act, but many of them also stood for particular propositions of law, which the Legislature incorporated into the Act. See, e.g., Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:2-2, 59:2-3 (specific incorporation of the positions adopted by the Court in McAndrew, Amelchenko and Bergen); see also Miehl v. Darpino, supra, 53 N.J. 49 (acknowledging existence of common-law immunity for tortious snow removal). None of these cases involved anything more than ordinary negligence.3 *343This history sheds a clear light on the purpose of the Tort Claims Act. It was to remedy the haphazard, costly, and inconsistent approach to governmental liability. See Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 11 (1972). It bears iteration that none of the plethora of judicial decisions that form the matrix of the Tort Claims Act involved a violation of a civil right. Quite clearly the Tort Claims Act was not needed to structure liability — or immunity —for such claims.
In this case, in ascertaining legislative intent, a consideration of the purposes and goals of both statutes — the Law Against Discrimination and the Tort Claims Act — is essential. See Fuchilla v. Layman, supra, 210 N.J.Super. at 579 (App.Div.1986). The objectives of the Law Against Discrimination are markedly different from those of the Tort Claims Act. As observed by the Appellate Division: “The Law Against Discrimination is directed at ending discrimination in employment and public accommodations while the Tort Claims Act provides liability for damages for the negligence of public entities.” Id. at 578.
These contrasting legislative goals are manifest in very different statutory schemes. Awards under the Law Against *344Discrimination “are intended to serve not only the interest of the individual involved but the public interest as well.” Jackson v. Concord Co., supra, 54 N.J. at 124-25. Awards for personal mortification can be made under the Law because compensation for a victim’s humiliation is “reasonably calculated to eliminate the effects of discrimination.” Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra, 62 N.J. at 416 (quoting Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or.App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971)) (interpreting an Oregon antidiscrimination statute similar to that of New Jersey). Such awards have long been recognized in judicial actions, see, e.g., Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J.Super. 297, 317 (Ch.Div.1970), and in administrative actions under the Law, see, e.g., Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra, 62 N.J. at 413-16, and such exemplary damages have been awarded even against public entity defendants. See, e.g., Roberts v. Keansburg Bd. of Educ., 5 N.J.A.R. 208, 268 (Adm.1983).
The Act disavows any remedial purpose to vindicate societal interests or to rectify public or governmental misconduct or to protect any individual constitutional interest or civil right. It thus expressly prohibits exemplary or punitive damages under the Act. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2c. The Act eschews compensation for pain and suffering of the tort victim. N.J.S.A. 59:9-2d. This limitation on pain and suffering was intended to prevent compensation for “the intangible subjective feelings of discomfort that are associated with personal injuriesf,]” Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 571-72 (1987), reflecting a judgment that “in view of the economic burdens presently facing public entities a claimant should not be reimbursed for non-objective types of damages ...” Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, supra, at 234.
The Act thus ignores what the Law seeks to prevent. The Law Against Discrimination is solicitous of the hurt endured by a victim of discrimination. It is designed so that no citizen shall be subject to the embarrassment and humiliation of discrimination. See, e.g., Evans v. Ross, 57 N.J.Super. 223, 231 (App. *345Div.), certif. den., 31 N.J. 292 (1959). In stark and dramatic opposition to the purposes of the Tort Claims Act, the philosophy and spirit of remedial awards available under the Law Against Discrimination are “fine-tuned to the nuances of discrimination and the psychological as well as economic suffering it causes.” Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 407, 417 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Distinctive substantive standards, as well as procedural rules, have been developed in the litigation of a claim under the Law Against Discrimination to advance its special goals of combat-ting discrimination. To reduce what otherwise might be an “insuperable burden” of proving discriminatory motive or intent, see Goodman v. London Metals Exch. Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 30 (1981), courts under the Law have borrowed procedures developed in litigation under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, supra, 77 N.J. at 81 (adopting procedures formulated in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), in litigation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 203 N.J.Super. 356, 361 (App.Div.1985) (looking to application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 to § 634 (1982)). These standards aid the victims of age or sex discrimination under the Law by creating a presumption of invidious motive or intent if the claimant can show that an employment practice of the employer has a significant discriminatory impact. See, e.g., Goodman, supra, 86 N.J. at 30; Peper, 77 N.J. at 84; see also Andersen v. Exxon Co., supra, 89 N.J. 483, 499-500 (in handicap discrimination cases, motive or intent is presumed on a showing that the claimant is handicapped but capable of doing the job, thus shifting to the employer the burden of justifying his treatment of the claimant).
These substantive liability standards under the Law Against Discrimination are totally at odds with the deference to governmental discretion that serves as a cornerstone for the scheme *346of liability established by the Tort Claims Act. For example, N.J.S.A. 59:2-3 excludes most discretionary decisions from any judicial review, N.J.S.A. 59:2-3a-c, and tests the validity of the rest against a “palpably unreasonable” standard, N.J.S.A. 59:2-3d, a standard at variance with the substantive principles of law that govern a claim of unlawful discrimination. See Flanders v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 163 N.J.Super. 225, 229-31 (App.Div.1976) (an objectively reasonable decision granting tenure to the younger of two candidates could be struck down under the Law Against Discrimination); see also Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465 (1961) (claims of malicious harassment in employment under California law fall within discretionary-exception from liability of public entity).
It follows from this analysis and comparison of different goals, substantive standards, procedural rules, and remedial provisions that an interpretation of the Law that requires the superimposition of the Tort Claims Act to claims of unlawful discrimination would be wholly inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature when it provided expressly for suits under the Law to be brought in Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 was amended in 1979 expressly to authorize suits to be brought initially in Superior Court. L.1979 c. 404, § 1. This codified and strengthened the existing common-law practice of allowing judicial actions to vindicate this statutory civil right. See, e.g., Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., supra, 110 N.J.Super. at 305-11. According to the Governor’s Statement, a purpose of this amendment is to “reduce the backlog of cases and the costs in the Division of Civil Rights.” Governor’s Statement on signing S-3101 (L.1979 c. 404 § 1). There is no dispute that this amendment was intended to enhance the option of a civil suit. Consequently, any interpretation of the Law that makes the initiation of discrimination suits in Superior Court less attractive than administrative proceedings before the Division on Civil Rights must be viewed as a disincentive, frustrating the intended effect of the 1979 amendment.
*347Application of the Act’s ninety-day notice provision would certainly have the effect of making Superior Court suits a less attractive option. Under the Law, a complainant has 180 days from the time of the alleged discrimination to file an administrative complaint. N.J.S.A. 10:5-18. If the ninety-day notice provision of the Act is read to apply to suits under the Law, any complainant who, for the financial, educational, or social reasons noted in David v. Vesta Co., supra, 45 N.J. at 327 had failed to file a notice of claim within ninety days would be forced back into the same overburdened administrative system the 1979 amendment was intended to relieve. Not only is the individual claimant barred from redress, the public interest in eradicating invidious discrimination is disserved.
It cannot be overstated that under the Law the Legislature has provided a wide assortment of remedial weapons to combat discrimination. A complainant has the option of either filing an administrative complaint with the Director of the Division on Civil Rights or filing a civil action with the Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13,10:5-27; see Sprague v. Glassboro State College, 161 N.J.Super. 218, 225 (App.Div.1978). These several remedies are not antithetical but complementary. While a claimant may pursue only one remedial route at a time, he or she may seek alternative or successive vindication. See, e.g., Hermann v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 183 N.J.Super. 500, 504-05 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 573 (1982).
Judicial actions to enforce the civil right to be free from discrimination are created to provide something in addition to what is provided by the administrative remedy. Christian Bros. Inst. v. Northern New Jersey Interscholastic League, 86 N.J. 409, 415 (1981) (discrimination claims have alternative state statutory and constitutional and federal statutory and constitutional remedies); see also Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 672 (1981) (penal and administrative remedies based on retaliatory firing for the filing of workers compensation claims augmented by judicial remedy for retaliatory discharge). The prevailing assumption is that the relief provided *348in the civil action will at least be as great as, or comparable to, available administrative remedies. See Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, supra, 62 N.J. at 417 n. 1 (Hall, J., dissenting); Peper v. Princeton University, supra, 151 N.J.Super. 15, 23 rev’d, 77 N.J. 55 and Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., supra, 110 N.J.Super. at 306-07.
II.
Any interpretation of the current statutory scheme that en-grafts upon the Law the Tort Claims Act, with its shorter notice filing period, higher standards of liability, heavier burdens of proof, reduced damages, and broad immunity provisions would substantially weaken the relief that could be obtained in a judicial civil rights action for unlawful discrimination under the Law. I do not for a moment believe that it was legislative inadvertence or carelessness that accounts for the possible failure to include invidious discrimination cases under the Tort Claims Act. It is to me inconceivable that the Legislature contemplated such inclusion or indeed might even be sympathetic to such an approach in view of its own distinguished history in giving great vigor and maximum protection to these civil rights.
For the foregoing reasons I concur with the result reached by the majority. Justice CLIFFORD joins in this opinion.
For example, the treatment of nuisance actions against the state under the Act supports the view that the Legislature was primarily concerned with addressing negligence actions when it drafted the Tort Claims Act. The Court has held that public entity liability for nuisance is recognized under the Tort Claims Act, see Birchwood Lakes Colony Club v. Medford Lakes, 90 N.J. 582, 593 (1982). Its decision in that case was strongly influenced by N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, the section concerning liability for the condition of public property. This section, with its "palpably unreasonable” standard, noted by the Court, see id. at 594, in effect immunizes a public entity from nuisance damages unless the public entity was "negligent" — that is, "palpably unreasonable" — in failing to correct the dangerous condition. It should also be noted that the Comment to NJ.S.A. 59:4-2 indicates that the section “comports generally with the principles of liability established by the New Jersey courts for local public entities in their capacity as landowners,” and pre-Tort Claims Act authority indicates that nuisance actions against local entities were dependent on negligence. Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 406, 409-12 (1951).
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt this standard and impose absolute liability in all cases of supervisor sexual harassment, it has also rejected the notion that absence of notice is an absolute defense for the employer, and has called for the determination of employer liability to be governed by general agency principles. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed.2d 49, 63 (1986). (A four justice concurrence would have adopted the E.E.O.C. guidelines. See id. at 74, 106 S.Ct. at 2409, 91 L.Ed.2d at 64 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
The Legislature also looked to California, which had also judicially abrogated sovereign immunity, when it drafted New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), in which the California Supreme Court abrogated that state’s sovereign immu*343nity, involved a suit by a patient injured due to the negligence of hospital employees. The only other California case discussed by the Attorney General's Report is Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465 (1961), decided on the same day as Muskopf, in which the California Court refused to impose liability. Lipman thus was available to both the California and (later) New Jersey legislatures as a guide to how the scope of a tort claims act could be limited. Lipman involved a case in which a school district superintendent alleged that members of the school board, while acting in their official capacity, maliciously engaged in conduct for the purpose of discrediting her reputation and forcing her out of her job. It is thus the closest analog to a discrimination/harassment suit that is discussed in the Attorney General’s Report. In Lipman the court ruled that the alleged acts of the board fell within a discriminatory exception to the general rule of liability. Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, 81-82 (1972). The case, I emphasize, did not involve a claim of constitutional or statutory discrimination and does not in the slightest suggest that such a claim could not be brought against a public entity.