dissenting in part, filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Macgiee, J., specially assigned, concurred.
The majority of this Court has just decided that a wife, who has committed adultery, deserted her husband and broken up their home, is entitled to the custody of their minor daughter, aged nearly five years, in preference to a blameless husband, whose only fault has been that his wife became enamoured with a married man, who became her paramour. There is no contention made that the husband has done anything to forfeit his parental rights: it is conceded that he is a sober, reliable, industrious, attentive father, who maintains a nice home in one of the best residential sections of Montgomery County.
*231This ruling seems to be a wide departure in policy from an unbroken line of previous decisions of this Court. Among those decisions, see Hill v. Hill, 49 Md. 450 (wife committed adultery—custody of a daughter 5 years old awarded to the father—father died—custody awarded to child’s aunt); Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553, 566 (wife committed adultery—custody of a son and two daughters awarded to father); Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (wife committed adultery—custody of a daughter 5 years old awarded to father); Poehlman v. Poehlman, 130 Md. 695, 102 A. 1052; Swoyer v. Swoyer, 157 Md. 18, 145 A. 190 (wife committed adultery—custody of daughter 5 years of age and son 7 years old awarded to father); Townsend v. Townsend, 205 Md. 591, 109 A. 2d 765 (mother committed adultery—son 3 years old awarded to father) ; Pekar v. Pekar, 188 Md. 360, 52 A. 2d 468 (wife committed adultery—son 8 years old awarded to father); Stimis v. Stimis, 186 Md. 489, 47 A. 2d 497.
In the Pangle case, supra, this Court stated: “But in a case where the custody of a female child is sought by a mother, after a separation caused by her adultery, the evidence should be very clear as to the propriety and wisdom of such a course before the child is removed from the care of the father * * In the Swoyer case, supra, this Court recognized the right of the chancellor to award the custody of the infant children to an adulterous spouse under exceptional circumstances1 (in the case at bar, the chancellor found the wife had not committed adultery—this Court determined that she had—if the chancellor had found that she had committed adultery, it seems clear that he would not have awarded her the custody of the child), but said: “* * * so far as we know, it has not been exercised in any case found among the reported decisions of this court.” This Court then proceeded (157 Md. 33) to *232award the custody of a daughter 5 years of age and a son of 7 years, in preference to an adulterous mother, to the father who was “a man of extravagant habits, with no permanent or fixed place of abode, who is required by the nature of his business to be absent from his family a great part of his time, that he drinks steadily, and that, if he assumes the custody of the children, much of the time they will necessarily be without the care or companionship of either father or mother.”
The above reflects the general tendency of the Courts everywhere. Many such cases are cited in a note to Re Pryse (Kan.), 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601. See also 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, (2 ed.), sec. 15.06; 27 C. J. S., Divorce, sec. 309 (e). And the same general rule applies where the misconduct of one spouse is not adultery. Nelson, op. cit., sec. 15.05.
It will be noted in the Stimis case, supra, 186 Md. 489, mentioned in the majority opinion, the divorce was granted on the ground of desertion when the wife received custody of the child. When adultery was later proved, the custody was taken from her. Also, in the Trudeau case, 204 Md. 214, 103 A. 2d 563, where the conduct of the wife after divorce was bad, there was no finding that she had actually had sexual relations, and the morals and conduct of the former husband (exactly the opposite to the instant state of facts) were very low.
Usually, where a divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, the custody of the children is awarded to the innocent party, not as a matter of punishment or reward, but because it is assumed that they will be reared in a cleaner and more wholesome atmosphere. However, the natural feelings and legitimate interests of the parents are also to be duly considered. In this case, there is no contention that the father is not a fit and proper person to rear the child; nor is it claimed that he has done anything to forfeit his parental rights. He is regularly employed, has a fixed and proper abode, and is a man of good morals. The only substantial reason given by the majority for denying the father custody is that he has no “definite plan” for the child’s care. The father testified his mother lives with him and he was able *233to employ some one to care for the child while he was at work at any time his mother could not care for her; and, if the occasion arose when he would be unable to find someone to care for her when he was at work, there are many splendid local schools and kindergartens that specialize in caring for small children while their parents work, in which the child could be temporarily placed when he was at work. (It should be noted that the mother also works; so someone will be required to care for the child during working hours, whoever has her custody.) In Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A. 2d 354, this Court said: “In the instant case (custody of a child) we think the possible effect upon the ability of the wife to hold her job should not be controlling. Working mothers are commonplace in the present day and baby-sitters are a national institution. Moreover, in a year or so the younger boy will be of school, or at least kindergarten, age.” It seems that this is direct approval by this Court of the plan that the father has for caring for the child.
Of course, no one contends that a spouse who commits adultery is beyond all redemption and forever unfit to rear a child. When the erring one rectifies the immoral conduct and leads an upright life for a sufficient length of time to justify the conclusion that the uprightness will be permanent, and not merely temporary, there is every good reason to believe that such a person can properly rear a child; but this is no reason to penalize a fit parent who has committed no error and has not forfeited his right to the custody of the child. In the instant case, the father is without fault and has been granted a divorce on the grounds of adultery and desertion by the wife; nevertheless, he is required by the majority to pay for the child’s support, and, at the same time, to permit his wife, an adjudicated adulteress, to rear his child. This seems an unfortunate and unjustified lot to befall a worthy husband: he must become reconciled to the humiliation of a state of cuckoldry, and a lonely existence by himself with an unfaithful and deserting wife bringing up his daughter, while he is required to pay for the daughter’s maintenance. This result will certainly not act as a deterrent to errant mothers who are inclined with adulterous dispositions. It *234does not appear from the record that the unchaste wife had the temerity to request alimony in addition to the custody of, and support for, the child; but, perhaps, this will be the next step. See the dissenting opinion in Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 189, 129 A. 2d 917.
I agree with the majority in holding that the evidence impels a finding that the wife committed adultery; but believe that the previous decisions of this Court and others, as well as justice and reason, dictate that the blameless father should be awarded the custody of his child. The best interests of the child did not require the ruling of the majority: the mother had clearly demonstrated her unfitness by carrying on her illicit relations in the apartment where she and the child lived, and her teaching the child to call her paramour “daddy”.
Judge Macgill has authorized me to say he concurs in this dissenting opinion.
. Possible exceptional cases of this nature would be where the wife had rectified her conduct and (1) the husband was an invalid or (3) where the child was sickly, needing constant care, and the husband was required to work. In some jurisdictions, however, divorce on the ground of adultery is a conclusive adjudication of the guilty party’s unfitness to have custody. Hanby v. Hanby (Ala.), 158 So. 737.