concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the trial judge had no right to grant probation before judgment in this case, and that the State had the right to appeal that disposition. I do not agree that the trial judge, upon remand, may not suspend the execution of any sentence given, or indeed, generally suspend the imposition of sentence.
It seems clear to me that the General Assembly intended to prohibit the granting of a probation before judgment to any person found guilty of a violation of § 21-902(a) or (b) when the violation occurred within five years of an earlier violation of either subsection. The General Assembly said nothing about denying “any kind of grace,” as the majority holds.
Probation before judgment differs significantly from probation after judgment. When probation before judgment is entered, thére is no judgment of conviction. The disposition cannot be considered a predicate offense for the imposition of recidivist penalties authorized by law.1 The assessment of. points that is required upon conviction2 is not made. The finding is not entered upon the defendant’s public driving record.3 When a conviction is entered, however, whether followed by a suspension of sentence or not, there *299is a judgment of conviction; the conviction triggers recidivist penalties; points are assessed; and the conviction is noted on the defendant’s public driving record. Probation before judgment is, in short, a very favorable disposition. It was this favored treatment, and nothing else, that the legislature ordered withheld from those who violated either of these subsections a second time within five years of an earlier violation.
MURPHY, C.J., joins in this opinion.
. Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.) § 27-101(k) ' of the Transportation Article.
. Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.) §§ 16-401 thru 16-407 of the Transportation Article.
. See 72 Op. Att’y Gen. 362, 366-71 (1987).