dissenting:
I dissent from the Majority’s Opinion affirming the Judgment of Sentence because I believe that it misapplies or misinterprets the law regarding all three issues addressed.
My first disagreement concerns the Majority’s conclusions regarding the applicability of the tolling provision of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5554(3) to the facts of this case. The Majority concludes that Appellant, who was babysitting his granddaughter, was “a person responsible for the child’s welfare,” and therefore the period of limitations did not run during the time when the child was under 18 years of age. In support of its decision the Majority cites to Commonwealth v. Bethlehem, 391 Pa.Super. 162, 169, 570 A.2d 563, 566 (1989). The Bethlehem court refused to find that *240tolling provisions were applicable to an uncle who was visiting at the victim’s parents’ home. The court construed the phrase “person responsible for the child’s welfare” “to apply to persons under whose permanent or temporary custody and control the parent’s(s) or legal guardian(s) have placed in the child, in other words, those who stand in loco parentis to the child. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(b).” 570 A.2d at 566. With regard to the status of one “in loco parentis,” this court has in the past stated:
Pennsylvania courts recognize that a person may ‘put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption. This status, [known as ‘in loco parentis’] embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and second the discharge of parental duties.’
Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa.Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879, 881-882 (1977). citing Commonwealth ex rel. Morgan v. Smith, 429 Pa. 561, 565, 241 A.2d 531 533 (1968).
I believe the legislature in tolling the statute of limitations for those who are “responsible for the child’s welfare” was, as the Bethlehem court found, referring to those standing “in loco parentis.” In my view the legislature did not seek to extend the statute to those situations where a child was being cared for by a baby-sitter, regardless of whether the sitter was a relative. Section 5554(3) seeks to extend the statute of limitations where a child has been abused by one who occupies such a position in the child’s life that it may be impossible for the child to reveal the abuse. In the situation where abuse occurs by a parent, a paramour of the child’s parent, an individual with whom the child resides or one “responsible for the child’s welfare” the child may not have anyone to turn to in order to report the abuse. It is children in these situations which § 5554(3) seeks to protect by extending the statute of limitations. Absent specific statutory language, I do not believe the tolling provisions were meant to apply to temporary babysitters.
*241The Majority also rules that no error occurred when the Commonwealth was permitted to rebut appellant’s testimony on cross-examination that he had never shown his x-rated video tapes to any of his grandchildren, with the testimony of a granddaughter who testified that she was shown such tapes. The Majority first finds that this testimony was properly admitted as “rebuttal” since appellant “plainly ‘opened the door’ ” to its admission.” Majority slip opinion at 5. The Majority also finds that this rebuttal testimony was relevant to show “design.” To support this ruling the Majority cites only to a concurring opinion by Justice Hutchinson’s in Commonwealth v. Claypool, 508 Pa. 198, 495 A.2d 176, 181 (1985); the author, Judge Kelly’s, dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 385 Pa.Super. 317, 561 A.2d 5 (1989); and a case of questionable authority, Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348 (1949). My examination of the law in this area leads me to conclude that the granddaughter’s testimony of unrelated “bad acts” was wrongly admitted.
Evidence of other unrelated crimes or “bad acts” is generally not admissible to prove the crime charged. “One of our most fundamental and prized principles in the administration of criminal law is that a distinct crime, except under certain special circumstances, cannot be given in evidence against a defendant who is being tried for another crime. This is because the fact that a person has committed one offense is not proof that he has committed another and because the effect of such testimony upon a jury is nevertheless bound to create prejudice and an emotional reaction on their part against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 259 Pa.Super. 293, 393 A.2d 833, 836 (1978). Citing Commonwealth v. Burdell, 380 Pa. 43, 47, 110 A.2d 193, 195 (1955). Certain exceptions to this general rule have been identified. One such special circumstance exists where the evidence of the other crime tends to prove “a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others.” Id. Even where this *242exception applies, a balancing test must be employed determining whether the need for the evidence outweighs its potential prejudice. Id.
Upon review I find that the Majority errs in finding that the evidence of this unrelated bad act was evidence of “design”. I also note that the Majority neglects to take the necessary second step in analyzing this evidence to balance its need against the potential prejudice it may have caused. The Majority, relying on the authority of Kline, supra, permits the admission of this testimony because it involved sexual conduct which it found similar to the sexual abuse committed upon the victim in this case.
As the Majority states in a footnote, the Kline decision was expressly overruled in a opinion in the case of Commonwealth v. Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 424 A.2d 1257 (1981). Since the Shively decision was joined by only one justice, with two justices concurring in the result and two justices dissenting its language regarding the Kline decision may not be controlling. However, there are other cases interpreting Kline which provide guidance to its applicability. In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 243 Pa.Super. 208, 364 A.2d 944, 947 (1976), this court commented:
In Kline, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that,: The word ‘design’ implies a plan formed in the mind. That an individual who commits or attempts to commit abnormal sex offences is likely to have such a mental ‘plan’ finds recognition in the fact that when a defendant is charged with the commission of a sexual offence the law is more liberal in admitting as proof of his guilt evidence of similar sexual offences committed by him than it is in admitting evidence of similar offences when a defendant is charged with the commission of non-sexual crimes____ In Kline, however, the defendant was charged with a rape occurring on October 20, 1946, and another witness testified that defendant exposed himself to her sometime late in October. “There was thus a close relationship in time, with the probability that the events occurred within a week of each other and the possibility *243that they occurred the same day:” Commonwealth v. Boulden, [179 Pa.Super. 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955)] 179 Pa.Super. at 347, 116 A.2d at 876. We agree with Judge Woodside’s opinion in Boulden that the rule of the Kline case should not be extended beyond its facts to permit evidence of events occurring more than one year prior to the offense charged.
(emphasis added.)
In a footnote to this passage the Bradley court explained its rationale for utilizing a narrow interpretation of Kline as suggested by Boulden. The court stated: “Unless a discriminating analysis is utilized, a trial court may fall into the trap of admitting evidence of other crimes when, in fact, the only purpose of the evidence is to show depravity or propensity.” Id.
The testimony of Appellant’s viewing an X-rated video tape with his granddaughter concerned an action which occurred more than two years after the abuse which was the subject of the case. As noted by the Majority, the victim testified to a pattern of sexual abuse occurring between the years 1983 and 1986. The incident relayed by the granddaughter concerning the video tape was said to have occurred in February of 1988. I believe this two year time span alone was sufficient reason for the court to refuse the admission of this testimony. It’s relevance to the case was not clear, and when weakened even further by the time span, the inevitable prejudice it produced certainly outweighed any probative value it may have had. Thus, in my mind, an error was committed when this evidence was admitted at trial.
Finally, I must also briefly add that I believe the Majority incorrectly concludes that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury specifically that the absence of a prompt complaint by the victim is a matter to be considered in determining her credibility. Although as the Majority suggests, the absence of a prompt complaint may be common in child sexual abuse cases, it nevertheless remains a proper factor for consideration. As stated in Commonwealth v. *244Lane, 521 Pa. 390, 555 A.2d 1246, 1250 (1989), “Unquestionably, a prompt complaint is a factor which must be assessed with all of the other pertinent evidence bearing upon the question of credibility of the complaining witness.” Since Appellant requested an instruction on the correct state of the law in. this Commonwealth, I believe it was error to refuse this request.
For the above reasons I would vacate the Judgment of Sentence in this case and remand the matter for a retrial.