OPINION
TOM GRAY, Justice.The City of Fort Worth terminated the employment of Emmitt Johnson. After an appeals board recommendation to reinstate him was overruled by the City manager, Johnson filed a lawsuit under the Whistleblower Act. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.001 et seq. (Vernon Supp.2003). A bench trial on the issue took place. Johnson obtained a favorable judgment, and the City appealed. We reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
Johnson was allegedly terminated from employment with the City over the use of a City tractor and the dumping of rough material on another employee’s private property located outside the city limits. Cast of Characters
Those involved in Johnson’s road to termination are listed below in descending order of rank within the City.
Bob Terrell- — City manager. He had the ultimate authority to terminate or reinstate Johnson once Johnson filed an appeal.
Ramon Guajardo — assistant City manager. Terrell assigned him the duty to review the appeals board recommendation to reinstate Johnson and conduct his own investigation into the tractor/dumping incident.
Pete Nelson — a Human Resources manager over personnel. He sat in on Johnson’s pre-termination hearing.
Stanley Scott — Street Services superintendent. He was in charge of the street department. He had the initial authority to terminate Johnson’s employment.
Harold Jolly — assistant Street Services superintendent. He was the immediate supervisor of Willis Stafford. Jolly was also initially terminated in the tractor/dumping incident but was reinstated after his first appeal.
Willis Stafford — General Foreman, Street Services. At one time, he had been Johnson’s immediate supervisor. He was not Johnson’s immediate supervisor at the time Johnson’s employment was initially terminated. Stafford was also terminated as a result of the tractor/dumping incident. It was Stafford’s property on which the materials were dumped and where the tractor was left for his use.
Emmitt Johnson — assistant field operations supervisor, Street Services. Johnson was also an employee representative. An employee representative assists employees who have been disciplined by the City *158investigate the charges against them or file and pursue an appeal of the action taken by the City. Johnson was terminated in the tractor/dumping issue and is the subject of this appeal.
Roscoe Dixson — equipment operator, Street Services. Johnson was his immediate supervisor. He was terminated, but ultimately reinstated, in the tractor/dumping incident.
The Incident
Willis Stafford was eligible for retirement and bought some property. The mailing address for the property listed the city as Fort Worth. But Stafford admitted that part of it was not in the city limits and that he was not a resident of Fort Worth. Stafford knew of the City’s practice of dumping material on private property. Doing so saved time for the City.
Roscoe Dixson also knew of City crews dumping material on private property outside the city limits as long as a “dump release” was obtained. A dump release had to be signed by the property owner, management, and a witness.
According to Johnson, Stafford informed Johnson that he had requested to have dirt dumped by the City on his property. Stafford said he obtained a dump release from Harold Jolly, Stafford’s supervisor. The dump release was admitted into evidence. The release did not give Stafford permission to use the City tractor. Johnson believed Stafford had permission from the City to dump dirt on his property once the release had been signed. The City had done this before for private citizens. This type of dumping benefitted the City because it would be near the work site and would save time. The trucks would not have to go out of their way to the landfills or other dump sites.
Harold Jolly said he signed the dump release because Stanley Scott instructed him to do so. Stafford came to Jolly requesting rough material to be dumped on his property outside the city limits. Jolly refused since Stafford was an employee. Stafford requested Jolly to ask Scott for his permission. Jolly agreed and relayed the same information to Scott that Stafford had relayed to him. Jolly told Scott why he was reluctant to give his permission for the dumping. Scott said he would ask someone at city hall. After lunch, Stafford and Scott discussed the request. Stafford told Jolly that Scott approved the dumping. Scott then also told Jolly he approved the dumping. Jolly ultimately signed the release.
According to Scott, he authorized the dumping on Stafford’s property, but only if the property was in Fort Worth. He did not know Stafford’s property was outside the city limits. It was against City policy to dump outside the city limits.
Stafford also had Johnson ask Scott for authorization to use a City tractor on Stafford’s property. Stafford did not ask Scott because Johnson had a better relationship with Scott than he did. When Scott agreed, Johnson had him repeat his approval with Dixson present. Johnson told Dixson to deliver the tractor to Stafford’s property. Dixson admitted to also using the tractor on Stafford’s property to push away dirt so the trucks could dump more. He believed he was authorized to perform this work because he heard Scott tell Johnson that it was okay to take the tractor to Stafford’s property. Stafford understood that Scott authorized Stafford’s use of the tractor on his property as well. Stafford admitted he used the city tractor on evenings and weekends to spread the material dumped on his property. He did the work himself so that no one from the City would have to spread the material on City time.
*159The dumping began in January and ended in March. After a month on Stafford’s property, the tractor was returned when a supervisor asked where it was. At the time of the inquiry, Johnson could not remember where the tractor was located. Dixson interjected over the radio and said it was at Stafford’s property. Johnson had Dixson pick it up and take it back to the City.
Johnson, Stafford, and Dixson knew it was not unusual to leave equipment on the property of private citizens to level out the dirt and rough material dumped on private property. This would make room for more material to be dumped. Johnson calculated that some equipment had been left on private property for as long as eight months to a year. However, neither Stafford nor Johnson knew of an instance where a private citizen then used the equipment for their personal benefit.
Scott denied authorizing the use of the tractor.
Johnson knew Stafford wanted soil to be dumped on his personal property. Johnson recalled a previous situation where soil was dumped on an employee’s private property. He also knew Stafford intended to use the City tractor on his property on nights and weekends.
Discipline Taken
In late June, Johnson was suspended from work. After a pre-termination hearing, Johnson’s employment was terminated on July 1. Scott, along with Pete Nelson, a human resources manager, and others were present for the pre-termination hearing. Nelson agreed that it was not customary for him to be present at a pre-termination hearing. He said he was asked to fill in at Johnson’s hearing. Johnson filed a grievance and appeal alleging that he had been terminated for reporting improper employment practices as an employee representative.
The City alleged that Johnson, Stafford, and Dixson violated City policy by dumping soil on Stafford’s property outside the city limits and by using City equipment to spread the material. The City also alleged that the violated policy had been circulated only a few months before the dumping began. Stafford, Dixson, and Jolly were also terminated. At Jolly’s pre-termi-nation hearing, Scott denied giving him permission to sign the dump release for Stafford.
Stanley Scott was not disciplined by the City.
Ultimately, Johnson’s and Stafford’s terminations were upheld. Jolly and Dixson were reinstated. Johnson filed a lawsuit alleging he was retaliated against by the City for reporting violations of city ordinances as an employee representative. The City asserted that it took the action against Johnson based only on evidence not related to the alleged reports of violations of city policies. The trial court found in favor of Johnson.
Legal and Factual Sufficiency Reviews
On appeal, the City brings twelve issues challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support various findings of fact made by the trial court. When both legal and factual sufficiency issues are raised, we must first examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex.1981). When considering the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding, we only consider evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and we disregard all contrary evidence. City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex.2000); see also Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.1993). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. *160Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69; see also Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (Tex.1986).
In reviewing a factual sufficiency issue, we must weigh all of the evidence in the record. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1996); Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex.1980). Findings may be overturned only if they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772; Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). We are not a fact finder. Accordingly, we may not pass upon the witnesses’ credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if the evidence would clearly support a different result. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex.1986).
Good Faith Report op a Violation of Law
In issues one, five, and twelve, the City contends the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that: 1) Johnson reported violations of law when he represented employees in their personnel grievances and terminations (issue one); 2) Johnson’s alleged reports of violations of law were made in good faith and were subjectively and objectively reasonable (issue five); and 3) Johnson made a good faith report of a violation of law when he represented Elvis Babers (issue twelve).
The Whistleblower Act (the Act) prohibits a state or local governmental agency from suspending or terminating “a public employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the employ[er] ... or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(a) (Vernon Supp.2003). A “law” is defined as a state or federal statute, an ordinance of a local governmental entity, or a rule adopted under a statute or ordinance. Id., § 54.001(1). The Act does not, however, define “good faith.”
The City would like us to adopt its position that the Act only provides a remedy for reports of violations of law that would have an adverse impact on the public good or society in general. The City relies on a case from the Tyler Court of Appeals for this position. See Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Terrell, 925 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no writ). In Terrell, the Tyler court concluded that the plaintiff had to prove that the “violation of law” he reported would have a probable adverse effect on the public good or society in general. The Tyler court relied on its review of the Act’s legislative background and on Justice Doggett’s concurring opinion in Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex.1990).
Justice Doggett was not conducting a review of the Whistleblower Act in his concurring opinion. The Court in Winters was asked to extend the Sabine Pilot1 exception to the at-will employment doctrine to private employees who report illegal activity. Justice Doggett was giving guidance on what a “whistleblower” in the context of a private cause of action might be.
Additionally, a statute is required to be interpreted, if possible, to give effect to its every word and phrase. Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, writ denied). No language requiring the report of a violation to be for the public good is in the Act. Terrell, and any other case following the language of Winters, adds a requirement to the Act that is simply not there and not *161required. Cf. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex.1996) (The legislature passed the Whistleblower Act for the ‘protection of public employees who report a violation of law1 and did not include language indicating that the reporting employee’s motivation in and of itself should obviate the Act’s protection.). Thus, we decline to follow Terrell and other case authority which requires the violation be reported for the public good.
This Court has held that, even in the face of a direct challenge to whether the act reported was indeed a violation of the law, the Act protects employees who in good faith believe they are reporting a violation of law, regardless of whether their belief is correct. Lastor, 810 S.W.2d at 744. The key is whether the employee is reporting what the employee believes to be a violation in good faith. Since Lastor, the Texas Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether the employee was acting in good faith. See Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1996). The first prong is subjective; that is, the employee believed the conduct reported was a violation of the law, regardless of whether the belief is correct. Id. at 784-85. The second prong is objective; that is, the employee’s belief is reasonable in light of their training and experience. Wichita County, 917 S.W.2d at 784-85.
It is in light of this test that we analyze the City’s issues one, five, and twelve. The Evidence
Emmitt Johnson was an assistant field operations supervisor in the street department for the City of Fort Worth. He attended college at Prairie View A & M for two and a half years. An employer sent him to Harvard University for a semester for a trade union program. During his career, Johnson worked about 11 years for the Laborers International Union, Local 1324. He started out as an organizer and eventually became a business manager.
In 1986, Johnson went to work for the City of Fort Worth. He was also an employee representative for the Association of City Employees, an employee group which assists other employees -with grievances and benefits. As an employee representative, Johnson would report alleged violations of the City’s policies regarding an aggrieved employee to the employee’s supervisor, the department head, the human resources department and the disciplinary appeals board because these people or entities had the authority to overturn or enforce the initial decision. He thought the appeals process was a city policy. Johnson stated that all the reports he made on behalf of employees were made in good faith. He also maintained that he strived to learn the personnel rules and regulations. Learning the rules and regulations was included in his duties as an employee representative.
Johnson would also report to the department head, human resources director, or appeals board that an employee had been punished in excess of that warranted by the infraction or that a violation of City policy had occurred. Johnson generalized his role as assisting the employee in presenting a different side of the story.
Johnson represented Roger Rodriguez in a grievance of a proposed termination. The termination arose out of the City’s policy regarding operation of a city-owned vehicle. Rodriguez had been in an accident with a city-owned vehicle. It was later shown that he was not at fault, and he was suspended instead of terminated. Johnson also represented Jake Downs who was terminated for allegedly violating the city’s leave of absence policy. Johnson stated he reported that the City was violating its own policies such as the em*162ployee work status policy, the disciplinary action policy, and the injury and illness policies. Downs was ultimately reinstated.
Johnson represented Eric Davis. Davis was charged with violating section H of the city’s policy. Johnson reported that the City violated its disciplinary and appeals policy. Davis was reinstated. Lon Hag-gerty was also represented by Johnson. Haggerty received disciplinary “write-ups” for allegedly violating City policies. After reporting that the City violated its disciplinary action policy, Johnson was able to have those “write-ups” removed from Hag-gerty’s employment record. Johnson represented Pamela Faisom. He reported that the City violated its grievance and appeal policy and its disciplinary action policy. Faisom was reinstated. Lastly, Johnson stated that he represented Elvis Babers. Johnson reported the City had violated its drug and alcohol policy in its dealings with Babers. This report was made within 90 days of the date of Johnson’s termination. Babers was reinstated.
Johnson also stated that he represented Julie Mollett and Richard Ridell in some employment issues. These two employees believed some computers that the City owned had been stolen. They thought their supervisor had arranged for the computers to be taken to a private firm in a “hush-hush” manner. Johnson also thought a law was being violated and wanted to report it. He reported the potential theft to the district attorney in Tarrant County. He also reported it to the Fort Worth Police Department.
Application
Johnson was very familiar with unions and labor related policies. He made himself familiar with the City’s personnel policies. He only represented employees when he thought policies were violated by the City. Johnson reported what he contended were violations of City policies for at least six employees. The City reinstated the employees. Johnson also reported two employees’ beliefs that a theft of computers had occurred. Thus, more than a scintilla of evidence exists that: 1) Johnson reported violations of laws when he represented City employees, including Elvis Ba-bers, in their grievance/appeal procedures; 2) Johnson reported a violation of law when he reported a possible theft of computers to the police and the district attorney; 3) Johnson subjectively believed laws, as defined by the Act, were violated when the City did not follow their own procedures and when the computers were transferred to a private firm; and 4) in light of his training and experience, Johnson’s belief that the City violated laws was objectively reasonable. Additionally, in light of the entire record, the findings by the trial court are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
Issues one, five, and twelve are overruled.
Causal Connection
In issues two, three, four, six, and seven, the City contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Johnson’s termination was caused by: 1) his representation of city employees (issues two and seven); 2) Nelson’s negative attitude toward Johnson and his representation of city employees (issue six); 3) his reporting of a violation of the city’s drug abuse policy when he represented Elvis Babers (issue three); and 4) his helping two city employees, Julie Mollett and Richard Ri-dell, to report a possible theft and misappropriation of computers (issue four).
A public employee suing under the Whistleblower Act must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suf*163fered discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by the employer that would not have occurred when it did if the employee had not reported the violation of law. City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex.2000); Department of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1995). In other words, the employee must establish a “but for” causal connection between the reported violation of law and the employer’s actions. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Comm’n v. McDill, 914 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no writ.). The employee need not establish, however, that the reported violation of law was the sole cause of the employer’s action. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 635.
The Act allows for a presumption of the causal connection if the employee is terminated or suspended not later than 90 days after the reported violation of law. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.004(a) (Vernon Supp.2003). That presumption is rebutta-ble. Id. The presumption does not shift the burden of proof and stands only in the absence of evidence to the contrary. McDill, 914 S.W.2d at 723; Garza v. City of Mission, 684 S.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ dism’d). Once sufficient evidence is produced to support a finding of the non-existence of the causal connection between the termination or suspension and the reported violation of law, the case then proceeds as if no presumption ever existed. McDill, 914 S.W.2d at 724; Garza, 684 S.W.2d at 152. There is no presumption aiding the employee after the presumption is rebutted by positive evidence to the contrary. Texas A & M University v. Chambers, 31 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
If no presumption is raised or the presumption is rebutted, the employee must produce some evidence to support a causal connection between the reports made and the retaliatory conduct by the employer. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 68. A factfinder may not infer causation without some evidence to support such a finding. Id. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish a causal connection. Id. at 69 (citing Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.1996)). Such circumstantial evidence includes: 1) knowledge of the employee having reported a violation of law; 2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s report of a violation of law; 3) failure to adhere to established company policies regarding employment decisions; 4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees; and 5) evidence that the stated reason for the adverse employment action was false. Id. But, evidence that an adverse employment action was preceded by a superior’s negative attitude toward an employee’s reported violation of law is not enough, standing alone, to show a causal connection between the two events; there must be more. Id.
Presumption
It is uncontested by the parties that Johnson represented Elvis Babers in a grievance/appeal proceeding not more than 90 days prior to Johnson’s termination. We have already overruled the City’s argument that Johnson did not report a violation of law when he represented Babers. Thus, Johnson has the benefit of a presumption of a causal connection between his discharge and the City’s misconduct relating to Babers. Any other reports of violations made by Johnson were not within the 90 day period for application of the presumption.
Presumption Rebutted?
The City presented evidence through Bob Terrell, the city manager, that John*164son was terminated because he improperly allowed Stafford to have “special privileges;” ie. Johnson had the City tractor delivered and left at Stafford’s property so that Stafford could use it after hours and on weekends. Thus, the City presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of a causal connection by Johnson’s termination within 90 days of representing Elvis Babers.
Proof
Once the presumption is rebutted, Johnson must produce evidence to prove a causal connection between the reported violation of law while representing Babers and his discharge by the City. Because there was no presumption of a causal connection between Johnson’s reported violation of law when he represented other employees and his discharge, Johnson must also produce evidence to prove the causal connection to those reported violations made while assisting them in the review process. Johnson need only prove a causal connection between one of the reported violations of law and his termination. We will first discuss generally the evidence in the record and then apply the law to that evidence.
In reviewing the record for evidence of this causal connection, we are limited to the evidence that Terrell, the person who ultimately made the decision to terminate Johnson, knew about the reported violations of law. The dissenting opinion takes issue with this narrow focus of our search of the record for evidence. The dissent fails to focus only on the knowledge of the person who made the decision to terminate Johnson and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from what that person knew about reported violations of “law” and not the person’s more general knowledge, if any, of Johnson’s position as an employee representative.
In recounting the evidence, it is not that we accept or reject Terrell’s denial of knowledge of such violations. Rather, we simply discuss all the evidence of relevant knowledge that is in the record, as we are required to do, and explain in the “Application” section of this opinion why we have determined that it is factually insufficient to establish the causal connection. Knowledge
The first circumstantial evidence factor involves whether the City knew of Johnson’s report regarding Babers and other employees2 when it upheld Johnson’s termination. In particular, the employee must show that the person who ultimately made the decision to fire the employee knew of the reported violation of law made by the employee. When an employee appeals a decision to terminate, the city manager, Terrell, makes the final decision to follow or overturn the appeals board recommendation. If an employee had a hearing before the disciplinary appeals board, the board would send Terrell its recommendation. Terrell testified he would not know who would have been the employee’s representative at the hearing.
Scott initially terminated Johnson’s employment, and Johnson appealed to the appeals board. The board recommended that Johnson be reinstated. Although neither the board nor Johnson requested any further investigation, Terrell asked Ramon Guajardo to conduct an investigation. Guajardo reviewed the appeals board recommendation and, in turn, recommended that Johnson’s employment should be terminated because Johnson delivered the tractor so that Stafford could use it on nights and weekends. Terrell followed *165Guajardo’s recommendation. Guajardo did not relay any information to Terrell that Johnson thought his termination was due to his representation of city employees.
Johnson testified that in May of 1993, the president of the Association for City Employees wrote a letter to the city manager, Bob Terrell, stating that Johnson would represent city employees who requested representation at grievance meetings and pre-termination hearings. Johnson watched the president compose the letter. Later, at an Association meeting, Terrell acknowledged the receipt of that letter. Johnson was present at the meeting. In June of 1993, Terrell composed a letter concurring with the appeals board’s recommendation on an employee termination case. The letter was carbon copied to Johnson. Then, in September of 1993, Johnson composed a letter to Terrell to inform him that he had been retaliated against since becoming an employee representative. Johnson believed Terrell was aware that he was reporting violations of City laws because the Association would meet with Terrell in person and would discuss issues that were occurring at the time. He also said the Association would send copies of correspondence to Terrell.
When Terrell testified, he denied knowing that Johnson was an employee representative for the City’s employees. Terrell was shown two letters addressed to him which indicated Johnson was the employee representative for grievance matters. These letters were admitted into evidence. Terrell was also shown a letter signed by Terrell regarding the personnel commission’s findings on an employee’s appeal of termination. Terrell acknowledged that the letter indicated it was carbon copied to Johnson. That letter was also admitted into evidence. These three letters were sent to or by Terrell 5 years prior to Johnson’s employment termination. He did not recall any of the letters when he upheld Johnson’s employment termination. Terrell testified he did not know that Johnson was an employee representative for Elvis Babers when he decided to terminate Johnson’s employment. Johnson did not offer evidence to controvert this statement.
Terrell acknowledged that he may have met Johnson at an employee meeting, but did not remember Johnson when he made the decision to terminate Johnson’s employment. He did not recall ever having a discussion with Johnson. He would not have discussed certain employees’ terminations with Johnson because he was the last person to review an employee’s appeal.
Negative Attitude
The second factor involves the expression of a negative attitude toward Johnson’s report of violations by the City against Babers. Johnson testified that Stanley Scott informed him that the City, particularly Pete Nelson, a human resources personnel director, was hot pleased with Johnson’s reporting of policy violations regarding employees Johnson represented. Because Johnson was winning grievances, Scott told him that Nelson was upset and obsessed with “getting rid of’ him. The last time Scott and Johnson discussed Nelson’s feelings was in conjunction with Elvis Babers’ first grievance.3 Scott did not recall ever telling Johnson that Nelson was upset because Johnson won grievance hearings for city employees. A taped conversation between Scott and Johnson which was introduced into evidence indicated that Nelson wanted Johnson off the employee association.
*166Nelson testified that prior to 1996, he had the opportunity to meet with Johnson in his capacity as an employee representative. Nelson did not meet with Johnson in connection with Johnson’s representation of Elvis Babers. He stated he had no animosity toward Johnson about Johnson’s representation of city employees.
Terrell acknowledged that he knew Pete Nelson and worked with him on a regular basis. He denied, however, that Nelson mentioned to him that Johnson, as an employee representative, was winning too many grievance hearings. Terrell stated that he did not recall the letters sent to him regarding Johnson’s election as an employee representative when he decided to terminate Johnson’s employment. Terrell also testified that he did not know that Johnson represented Babers when Terrell decided to terminate Johnson’s employment.
Company Policy
The third factor involves the failure to adhere to established policies regarding employment decisions. Johnson stated that the City usually gave verbal warnings, then reprimands, then reductions in pay, and finally suspensions prior to termination. The City’s disciplinary policy provides that “Disciplinary action is to be administered in an equitable and consistent manner.” According to Terrell and the policy, it is possible for an employee with no discipline problems to have his employment terminated by the City. Progressive steps of discipline are applied only when deemed appropriate and reasonable. The employee’s violation of the rules can be so egregious that termination is appropriate. Terrell was not aware of Johnson’s disciplinary record prior to his decision to terminate Johnson’s employment. Based on the circumstances, he concluded that he would have terminated Johnson’s employment even if he had known that Johnson had no prior discipline sanctions within the last five years on his record.
Discriminatory Treatment
The fourth factor involves discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees. Originally, Johnson, Stafford, Jolly and Dixson were terminated for the dumping/tractor incident. Jolly was reinstated after the first level appeal. Dixson was reinstated by Terrell at the last level of appeal. Johnson and Stafford were terminated. There was conflicting testimony about whether Scott gave permission to dump the material on Stafford’s property which was outside the city limits or to use the tractor on Stafford’s property. Jolly said Scott authorized the dumping of the rough material. Scott agreed that he gave permission to dump the material but did not know the property was outside the city limits and would not have given his permission if he had known the property was outside the city limits. Stafford, Johnson and Dixson stated that Scott authorized the use of the tractor by Stafford on his property. Scott denied he gave his permission. Scott was never disciplined. Dixson also testified, and the appeals board found, that other city employees transported, dumped and spread material on Stafford’s property. None were disciplined.
Stated Reason — False
The last factor involves whether evidence exists that the stated reason for the adverse employment action was false. Stanley Scott testified that he fired Johnson for theft and misuse of City property. In an interoffice memo from Scott, Johnson was informed that he would be on administrative leave with pay following allegations of inappropriate behavior. In his notice of pre-termination hearing, Scott informed Johnson that he was charged with violating written departmental regulations *167regarding performance of duties. Specifically, Scott charged Johnson with violating a written policy dated November 4, 1996, regarding the prohibition of work being performed outside the city limits. Several supervisors in the street department testified that at the time of the dumping/tractor incident, they had not seen the new policy.
In its support of the initial determination to terminate Johnson, the City Attorney’s office summarized the allegations against Johnson as follows:
The three employees violated Department procedure by dumping soil on Mr. Stafford’s private property, which was located about three miles outside City limits, and using City equipment to spread the soil. The soil dumping and spreading occurred over a period of at least four months. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Dixon (sic) assisted Mr. Stafford as he personally benefited (sic) from the soil and the unauthorized use of the City equipment. This practice was in direct violation of a department policy that had been circulated only two months prior to the initial dumping and spreading of the soil.
The appeals board found: 1) the department policy in question was not circulated to everyone who needed to know; 2) it was not reasonable to expect anyone other than Stafford to know his property was outside the city limits; 3) testimony did not support the City’s assertion that Stafford received top-grade soil; 4) if the act of dumping is, by itself, grounds for termination, others who also transported and dumped material on Stafford’s property should be terminated; 5) since some type of permission was granted for the use of the tractor, discipline of those who requested permission is not reasonable unless those who gave permission were also disciplined; and 6) the City has been inconsistent in handling the issue when one employee is reinstated due to the questionable veracity of Scott and others are not. The board discounted Johnson’s claim that previous allegations of “loan sharking” played into the determination of termination. The board recommended that Johnson be reinstated.
Bob Terrell had an assistant review the board’s findings and make a recommendation. The assistant recommended that Johnson be terminated because Johnson had the tractor delivered to Stafford to use on weekends and after work. Having control of the tractor, the assistant concluded that Johnson allowed Stafford to have special privileges. The recommendation was that Johnson’s termination be upheld. Terrell followed that recommendation. Even though city equipment had been left on private property for crews to use the next day, neither Johnson nor Stafford could recall a situation where an employee or a private citizen used the equipment after hours or on weekends.
Application
Because Johnson elected to appeal the initial determination by Scott to terminate his employment, Terrell had the final say in deciding whether to uphold the termination or reinstate Johnson. Thus, we must focus on what the evidence is that may be used to infer a causal connection between a report of a violation of law by Johnson, not just his general work as an employee representative, and his termination.
Babers
Terrell did not know that Johnson was the employee representative of Babers when he made the decision to uphold Johnson’s termination. Further, Terrell harbored no negative attitude toward Johnson due to his representation of Babers. The City’s disciplinary policy allowed for the non-application of progressive discipline *168when appropriate and reasonable, and Terrell decided to terminate Johnson. He would have done so even if he had known Johnson had no disciplinary actions taken against him within the last five years. Terrell based his decision of termination on the fact that Johnson transported the tractor to Stafford for his use on weekends and after hours. There was no evidence presented that this particular reason for termination was false. By the time the issue reached Terrell, the allegations of “loan sharking” and improper dumping had vanished. Thus, four of the five circumstantial evidence factors were not met in this case regarding Johnson’s representation of Babers.
However, there was evidence that at least one similarly situated employee was not treated the same as Johnson. The only people other than Johnson who would have had control over the location of the tractor were Stafford and Scott. Stafford was terminated. Scott received no disciplinary action at all.
Based on circumstantial evidence, there was at least some evidence, more than a scintilla, of a causal connection between Johnson’s termination and his alleged reporting of a violation of the City’s drug abuse policy when Johnson represented Elvis Babers. There is legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding based on this inference.
But, is the evidence factually sufficient to support the same finding by the trial court? We know that evidence of a negative attitude, standing alone, is not enough. Is evidence that one supervisor was not disciplined factually sufficient to establish a causal connection? In this situation, we think it is not. The three employees who were involved with the delivery and use of the tractor were disciplined. All three, Johnson, Dixson, and Stafford, were terminated. Dixson was ultimately reinstated but placed on probation for 6 months. Johnson and Stafford were supervisors. They both knew Stafford planned to use the tractor after hours and on weekends. Scott was the superior of all the employees disciplined by the City. While he may have given permission to use the tractor, nothing in the record supports the inference that he had the same level of involvement in the incident as did Johnson and Stafford. He did not deliver the tractor to Stafford’s property. The record does not support the inference that Scott knew Stafford would use the tractor on nights and weekends. The great weight and preponderance of the evidence reveals that only Johnson and Stafford were similarly situated employees, and they both were fired. We hold that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s termination was caused by his report of the City’s drug abuse policy in connection with Johnson’s representation of Babers.
The City’s third issue is sustained, in part.
The Others
Terrell knew, at one point, that Johnson was an employee representative. But, no evidence was produced by Johnson that Terrell either knew that Johnson was the employee representative of these particular employees or that he made reports of violations of laws while he represented these employees. Further, there is no evidence in the record that Terrell harbored a negative attitude toward Johnson because he reported violations of law when he represented these other employees. There is no different or additional testimony regarding the remaining circumstantial evidence factors than was discussed in the application section in Babers’s case. Thus, the analysis and result regarding the other employees are the same. The evidence is *169legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s termination was caused by reporting violations of law in connection with his representation of city employees but is factually insufficient to support that same finding.
The City’s second and seventh issues are sustained, in part.
Computer Theft
There is no evidence in the record that Terrell knew anything about Johnson’s report of possible computer theft or that he had a negative attitude toward Johnson because of that report. Again, there is no different testimony regarding the remaining circumstantial evidence factors. Thus, the analysis and result are the same. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s termination was caused by reporting violations of law in connection with his representation of city employees but is factually insufficient to support that same finding.
The City’s fourth issue is sustained, in part.
Pete Nelson
The trial court’s finding that Pete Nelson’s negative attitude caused Johnson’s termination has no bearing on the outcome of this case. Nelson did not have the ultimate authority to either terminate or reinstate Johnson. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to make a determination as to whether this evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding.
Conclusion 4
Because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court. findings that Johnson’s termination was caused by reporting violations of law in connection with his representation of City employees, reporting a violation of the City’s drug abuse policy when he represented Elvis Babers, and helping two City employees to report a possible theft and misappropriation of computers, the findings cannot stand. Our disposition of these issues makes it unnecessary to review the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s findings regarding damages for mental anguish; witness tampering; the propriety of the injunction; and the City’s failure to post a notice in the workplace.
Having found error in the trial court’s judgment, this cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice VANCE dissenting.
. Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985).
. The other employees specifically mentioned by Johnson were: Roger Rodriguez, Jake Downs, Eric Davis, Lon Haggerty, and Pamela Faisom.
. Well after oral argument, the City presented another brief. Although the brief was filed because it was characterized as a post-submission brief, it is actually a supplemental brief because the City raised a new issue regarding whether Johnson’s report of a violation of law was made to an appropriate law enforcement agency. We decline to address the issue raised for the first time in this post-submission supplemental brief. See 10th Tex. App. (Waco) Loe. R. 13(e).