(dissenting). I dissent because I cannot agree with the majority’s resolution of plaintiff’s due process claim.
Due process is a fluid and flexible concept that provides fundamental protection from unreasonable governmental intrusion. There are no rigid forms for the application of due process; rather, it adheres in whatever form is most appropriate whenever private property or personal liberty is threatened.
*367The basic indispensible elements of due process consist of a hearing before an impartial decision maker in which a citizen is given the opportunity to present his or her case after having been given adequate notice of the reason underlying the deprivation of liberty or property. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). The standards of due process are not merely theoretical, they are substantial safeguards that must be tailored to each situation.
There is no doubt but that even the temporary loss of the use of one’s automobile deprives the owner of a property interest that falls within the protection of the due process clause. Stypmann v San Francisco, 557 F2d 1338 (CA 9, 1977), Huemmer v Ocean City, 474 F Supp 704 (D Md, 1979), Craig v Carson, 449 F Supp 385 (MD Fla, 1978), Graff v Nicholl, 370 F Supp 974 (ND Ill, 1974). Therefore, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s parenthetical notation that the property deprivation suffered by plaintiff was only "temporary and of short duration”. Rather, I further challenge the validity of that proposition on its face.
This case, and those like it in which property is taken by the state and withheld from its rightful owner until a fee is paid, present not one but alternate property deprivations to an individual. That is, the individual is given the choice of either accepting permanent loss of the property or permanent loss of whatever sum of money is required to redeem it. As was aptly stated by the Court in Craig v Carson, supra, 394:
"The ordinances authorizing the assessment of towing and storage charges, the requirement that they be prepaid before return of the owner’s car, the creation of a lien against the car for those charges, and the foreclosure of the lien and forfeiture of the car after sixty *368days, are utterly devoid of any procedural due process safeguards. The ordinances confront the owner of a car that has been towed and stored with the proverbial Hobson’s choice: he must pay the charges assessed against him or forfeit his car. Under either alternative, the owner is compelled to relinquish his personal property, whether his car or his money, without an opportunity to dispute the loss. See Seals v Nicholl, 378 F Supp [172 (ND Ill, 1973)] at 177.
"The importance of a person’s interest in his car is obvious in today’s society, for purposes of earning a living, conducting one’s business affairs, and carrying on the majority of one’s activities. See Stypmann v San Francisco, 557 F2d at 1342-43; Holladay v Roberts, 425 F Supp 61, 66 n 6 (ND Miss, 1977). Similarly, one’s interest in being free from unjustified payments of charges and fees is equally obvious. The governmental ways cannot justify the withholding of a person’s car, or assessing him for towing and storing charges, without any opportunity to determine the validity of either. The fact that the procedure under the ordinances might be administratively more convenient, expeditious, and inexpensive, is no excuse or justification for the absence of procedural due process protections.”
The Michigan State University towing ordinance unconstitutionally deprives an automobile owner of property without due process of law. The seizing and towing of a vehicle without a prior hearing can be justified only in situations where the governmental interest is overriding, that is, where the car is a safety hazard. Even in such situations, an adequate opportunity for a hearing must be accorded promptly after the seizure. Tedeschi v Blackwood, 410 F Supp 34 (D Conn, 1976), Watters v Parrish, 402 F Supp 696 (WD Va, 1975).
Perhaps it may be true that very few cars towed . under this ordinance were properly parked. However that is no justification for depriving the owners of such vehicles of their use. Far less intrusive *369methods of enforcing parking regulations easily can be devised. For instance, the levying of an appropriate fine might well be sufficient to force compliance with these regulations, and such a fine would not be unconstitutional if it were exacted after proper notice and hearing.
In sum, the Michigan State University ordinance is unconstitutional because it permits the state to deprive an automobile owner of his or her property without first affording notice and hearing. Moreover, it also violates due process because it requires the payment of a fee in order to secure return of the automobile without first affording the vehicle’s owner a hearing to contest the validity of the fine.
I neither favor nor approve of any procedure by which a citizen is deprived of his or her property that is justified only because it is administratively convenient. Much the less can I approve of a procedure by which an arm of the state permits private towing concerns to get rich off towing automobiles belonging to a segment of our society, students, that can least afford their redemption price.
Finally, I would caution all state universities that have towing provisions similar to the instant one that they are responsible and must answer for the actions of the private agents they choose to tow parked automobiles. Universities may be called upon to recompense the injuries suffered by an automobile owner when the university’s agent damages the vehicles or when the owner is deprived of its use solely on account of some business procedure of the agent.
The Michigan State towing ordinance violates due process. The lower court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. I would reverse.