dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
This is a suit instituted by the estate of a deceased medical doctor to recover work loss and survivors loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. At the time of his death he was a duly licenced medical doctor serving his residency. He was single, without children, survived by his mother. His mother is the administrator of his estate.
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Freeze v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, 301 Pa.Superior Ct. 344, 447 A.2d 999 (1982). As set forth in my dissent, the No-Fault Act makes no provisions for the recovery of work loss benefits by the estate of a deceased victim. The estate is not a survivor as defined by the Act.
In the within appeal, the majority fails to distinguish, as did Judge Greenberg of the court below, between the mother as a parent of the deceased victim, and the mother as the administrator of his estate. The appellant is the estate, not the mother as a survivor. The majority obviously considers the mother to be the appellant rather than the estate. The majority thus proceeds to determine that even though the mother was not dependent upon her deceased son at the time of his death, she was entitled to both work loss and survivor’s loss benefits. That issue of dependency is not and should not be involved in this appeal.
The majority should not have proceeded into determining whether the mother was dependent upon her deceased son at the time of his death. The mother is not the appellant. The mother is not a party to this litigation. The estate is the appellant. The estate is a separate and distinct entity. To *367understate the situation, there is a vast difference. The mother, being a parent, is included in the definition of “survivor” in the No-Fault Act. The estate is not.
On page 1081 the majority states:
Although the Decedent’s mother was not financially dependent on him at the time of his death, she maintained that Decedent would have contributed some financial support toward her goal to immigrate to the United States. Therefore, she maintains that under the No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. 1009.101, et seq., she is entitled to the $15,000 policy limit covering work loss, and the $5,000 policy limit covering survivor’s loss. (Emphasis added).
I respectfully submit this information is irrelevant. The mother is not the appellant-plaintiff. The estate is the appellant.
The majority continues on page 1081 to state:
“Although the parties had stipulated that appellant would have received in excess of $5,000 from her son had he survived the accident, the court denied both the work loss benefits and survivor’s loss benefits because appellant was not dependent upon him for support at the time of his death.” (Emphasis added).
This is not a correct recitation of the facts. The appellant is the estate of the deceased victim. It is obvious that the majority mistakenly considers the mother to be the appellant.
As stated by the majority, the expressed intent of the legislature in enacting the No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.102:
(3) the maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents on Commonwealth highways;
(4) to avoid any undue burden on commerce; during the intrastate transportation of individuals, it is necessary and proper to have a Statewide low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system of compensating and restoring motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims;
*368(b) Purposes.—Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish ... a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims. (Emphasis added).
I direct the majority’s attention to the repetitive use of the term “survivors”. There can be no doubt that the Legislature intended the recovery of the No-Fault benefits only for the “Survivors” as defined in the Act.
As the majority has further pointed out, the legislature defined the term “Survivor” as used in the Act:
“Survivor means
(a) spouse; or
(b) child, parent, brother, sister or dependent upon the deceased for support.”
It is obvious that the estate of a deceased victim cannot be considered a survivor under the provisions of the No-Fault Act. The Legislature has omitted an estate from the definition of “Survivor”.
It is equally obvious that the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius must here be applied by this Court. By expressly naming the entities that are to be considered as “Survivors”, the Legislature intended to exclude all parties and/or entities not included in their definition.
The majority goes to great lengths to set aside this Court’s panel Opinion in Midboe v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 447, 395 A.2d 991 (1978); affirmed by the evenly divided Supreme Court, 495 Pa. 348, 433 A.2d 1342 (1981).
I respectfully submit the Midboe opinions have no application to the fact situation in the case at bar. In Midboe, the suit to recover No-Fault benefits was instituted by Elizabeth Midboe, the mother of an 18 year old boy killed in a motor vehicle accident. She was clearly a “survivor” under No-Fault and entitled to the benefits provided for in the Act. She sued in her own name, not in the name of the estate of her deceased son. The trial court denied recovery on the *369basis that the mother was unable to demonstrate that she was dependent upon her 18 year old son at the time of his death. The lower court reasoned that the definition of the term “survivor” in the Act mandated that the mother, as a parent, had the burden of proving that she was dependent upon the deceased son at the time of his death.
There was no question that the appellant-plaintiff was a “survivor” under the Act.
The majority would adopt the “last antecedent rule” and hold that the clause “dependent upon the decedent for support” modified only the word “relative” and not the words “child”, “parent”, “brother”, “sister”. Therefore the parent does not have to prove dependency upon the deceased victim. I concur with this conclusion.
However, I repeat, the majority should not have reached the dependency issue. The estate of a deceased victim, by statute, cannot collect survivors loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. The estate cannot be a “survivor ” within the No-Fault Act definition of survivor. Further, the Act does not provide for the recovery of the basic loss benefits by the estate of a deceased victim. This portion of the Act is not ambiguous. It requires no Judicial interpretation.
I therefore dissent.