Appellant, Mabel Strong, appeals from that portion of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County directing that rental payments escrowed pursuant to the Rent Withholding Act1 (hereinafter “the Act”) should be paid to appellee, John Juliano, appellant’s landlord at the time of the instant dispute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the subject order.
On May 15, 1979, appellant was advised that she was eligible to withhold rent because the apartment in which she was a tenant was unfit for human habitation. Being without the financial means to bring the apartment into compliance with the requirements promulgated by the Department of Health, appellee placed the subject property up for sale and commenced an action before a district magistrate to terminate the tenancy, alleging as a reason therefore the need to make extensive repairs, presumably to enhance the marketability of the property. Process was served on July 3, 1979 and, on August 13, 1979, appellant having failed to appear, a default judgment for possession was entered. The landlord-tenant relationship was thus terminated for reasons other than nonpayment of rent and no appeal was taken.
*481Thereafter, on August 30, 1979, appellant’s attorney-presented to the court of common pleas a petition to open the judgment of possession entered by the district magistrate.2 Perceiving that it lacked subject matter “jurisdiction to direct that a judgment before a district justice be opened,” slip op. at 2, the trial court declined to entertain the petition. Nevertheless,
[i]n spite of the Court’s statement that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition of Strong, Juliano volunteered, as a humanitarian gesture, that he would be willing to permit Strong to remain in the premises even though he had an established legal right to immediate possession. Following this gesture of Juliano, Strong’s counsel agreed to the entering of a consent order by [the] Court whereby the parties agreed that there would be no eviction of Strong from the premises for a period of thirty (30) days; that Strong would bring no further actions before District Justice Sparrow; and, that in the event Strong failed to vacate within the thirty (30) days [the] Court (upon Juliano’s appearing before the Court and requesting it) would issue a writ of possession.
Slip op. at 2.3 At the conclusion of the hearing which resulted in the consent agreement, appellee requested the payment to him of rental payments that had previously been paid into an escrow account pursuant to the act. Although appellant objected to this request, the trial court added the following directive to the consent order: “Eo die, money held in rent escrow to be paid to John Juliano forthwith.” Order of Court, August 30, 1979. This appeal followed.
*482Appellant argues: that the trial court’s directive was in contravention of the terms and purposes of the Act; that appellee should have exhausted his administrative remedies before resorting to the court to seek the rental payments previously placed in escrow, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to order the Department of Health to release the escrowed funds because that department was not a party to the instant dispute. We cannot agree.
The Rent Withholding Act provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, or of any agreement, whether oral or in writing, whenever the Department of Licenses and Inspections of any city of the first class, or the Department of Public Safety of any city of the second class, second class A, or third class as the case may be,, or any Public Health Department of any such city, or of the county in which such city is located, certifies a dwelling as unfit for human habitation, the duty of any tenant of such dwelling to pay, and the right of the landlord to collect rent shall be suspended without affecting any other terms or conditions of the landlord-tenant relationship, until the dwelling is certified as fit for human habitation or until the tenancy is terminated for any reason other than nonpayment of rent. During any period when the duty to pay rent is suspended, and the tenant continues to occupy the dwelling, the rent withheld shall be deposited by the tenant in an escrow account in a bank or trust company approved by the city or county as the case may be and shall be paid to the landlord when the dwelling is certified as fit for human habitation at any time within six months from the date on which the dwelling was certified as unfit for human habitation. If, at the end of six months after the certification of a •dwelling as unfit for human habitation, such dwelling has not been certified as fit for human habitation, any moneys deposited in escrow on account of continued occupancy shall be payable to the depositor, except that any funds deposited in escrow may be used, for the purpose of making such dwelling fit for human habitation and for the *483payment of utility services for which the landlord is obligated but which he refuses or is unable to pay. No tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever while rent is deposited in escrow.
35 P.S. § 1700-1 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In ruling on the constitutionality of the Act in DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971), our supreme court stated:
It is evident that the sanctions imposed by the Act bear a real and substantial relationship to its objective of assuring decent and habitable rental property. “In Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 289-90, 243 A.2d 395 (1968), we recognized that a severe housing shortage exists in many parts of the Commonwealth and that much of what housing does exist is in very poor condition. The legislature was obviously attempting [through the Rent Withholding Act] to improve this situation by giving tenants the power to put pressure on landlords to repair dilapidated, unsafe dwellings.” Klein v. Allegheny County Health Dep’t, 441 Pa. 1, 7, 269 A.2d 647, 651 (1970) (footnote omitted). It seems a matter of common sense that one in the business of renting real estate for profit who is faced with the temporary or permanent loss of rental income will, in some instances, take steps to avoid that loss.
441 Pa. at 394, 272 A.2d at 504 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It seems just as much a matter of common sense that, when, as here, the landlord-tenant relationship has ceased to exist and the “landlord” is no longer “in the business of renting real estate for profit,” the continued application of the sanctions imposed by the Act would no longer “bear a real and substantial relationship to [the Act’s] objective of assuring decent and habitable rental property.” Id.
The express language of the act thus provides that the landlord’s right to collect rent shall be suspended until the occurrence of one of two contingencies: (1) the building is certified as fit for human habitation; or (2) the tenancy is *484terminated for any reason other than nonpayment of rent. Id. “The purpose of the Act is to restore substandard housing to a reasonable level of habitability as swiftly as possible and to deter landlords from allowing their property to deteriorate into a condition unfit for habitation.” Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 287, 405 A.2d 897, 905 (1979). See, e.g., Newland v. Newland, 26 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 519, 364 A.2d 988 (1976); Palmer v. Allegheny County Health Department, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 246, 345 A.2d 317 (1975). Consequently, the first contingency, certification of the building as fit for human habitation, is tailored to meet that objective. • The second contingency, termination of the tenancy for a reason other than nonpayment of rent, recognizes that, where the landlord-tenant relationship has been terminated, and the termination of that relationship was not a retaliatory maneuver, the Rent Withholding Act no longer governs the relationship of the parties.
Instantly, the tenancy was terminated as of August 13, 1979, when a judgment for possession was entered in favor of appellee. Since the tenancy was terminated for a reason other than nonpayment of rent, appellee’s right to collect rent came out of suspension and the trial judge properly directed payment of the escrowed funds to appellee.4
*485Accordingly, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is affirmed.
BROSKY, J., files a dissenting opinion.. Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. 1534 § 1, as amended August 11, 1967, P.L. 204 § 1, June 11, 1968, P.L. 159, No. 89 § 2, 35 P.S. § 1700-1.
. Significantly, appellant testified that she was unaware of any such petition, the hearing thereon, the resulting consent decree, or the appeal to this court. (Vol. 6, N.T. February 1, 1980 at 82-84.) Because appellant has not questioned the actions of her attorney, however, we need not determine whose rights the Neighborhood Legal Services Association was seeking to vindicate, through its representation of appellant.
. Appellant failed to vacate the premises in accordance with the consent order and, ultimately, a writ of possession was issued.
. Appellant’s assertion that appellee should have exhausted his administrative remedies prior to resorting to the courts is without merit. It was certainly appellee’s right to place his building up for sale when he realized that he could not comply with the requirements for certification as a habitable dwelling. It was also appellee’s right to seek the lawful termination of the tenancy in order to facilitate the sale of his building. Had appellee not made the “humanitarian gesture” of allowing appellant to remain in his building for an additional thirty days, following the entry of judgment in his favor, appellant would not only have been without a place to live but also out of court, since the appeal period had already expired and the petition to open the judgment of possession had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The tenancy was thus at an end and the Rent Withholding Act no longer governed the relationship between appellant and appellee. It follows, therefore, that the administrative procedures promulgated by the Department of Health pursuant to the Rent Withholding Act were likewise inoperative with respect to the relationship between appellant and appellee.
Equally meritless is appellant’s contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the Allegheny County Health Department *485to pay to appellee funds escrowed pursuant to the Act. Since the Act “does not purport to be the exclusive tenant remedy for unsavory housing,” Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. at 286, 405 A.2d at 904, a fortiori, the administrative agency that facilitates the Act need not be a party to every landlord-tenant dispute. This is particularly true when, as here, we have already determined that the Act had ceased to govern the relationship between appellant and appellee. The trial judge thus properly ordered the Health Department to pay the escrowed funds to appellee.