dissenting:
The ruling of the Majority, being based on conclusionary statements unsubstantiated by the record, unduly and unnecessarily protracts an already overdue disposition of the Hankin Family Partnership assets. Thus, I vigorously dissent to the reversal of the lower court’s Order directing that there be a distribution in kind of the partnership property.
The standard to be adhered to in reversing the findings of fact of a Chancellor who hears testimony in a non-jury trial has been oft-stated: “ ‘In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, matters purely within the discretion of a trial court are not reversible on appeal . .. [and] [t]o justify a reversal, the abuse of discretion must be clearly shown.’ C. E. Williams Co. v. H. B. Pancoast Co., 412 Pa. 166, 170, 194 A.2d 189, 191 (1963) (citations omitted).” Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. 179, 204, 420 A.2d 1090, 1103 (1980); see also Zvonik v. Zvonik, 291 Pa.Super. 309, 435 A.2d 1236 (1981).
The Majority states that where, as here, “it does not appear that the liquidating partners [appellants] have had a reasonable, unhindered time in which to accomplish an orderly liquidation of such vast holdings[,] . . . they should be granted another year to accomplish same.” (Slip Opinion at 5) I do not agree.
As a reading of the record unerroringly reveals, the liquidating efforts of the appellants, over a period of some two (2) years, have resulted in less than Vi of the properties held by the partnership being sold. (RR 215a-229a) Such fig*302ure, based on this writer’s perusal of the evidence, is not linked to appellees’ efforts to protect their share in the partnership assets. Rather, the evidence more logically points to appellants’ insistence on selling the holdings of the partnership as a package to prospective buyers, instead of attempting to sell them in parcels, as a contributing factor to the paucity of sales. More particularly, given the depressed realty market and the sky-rocketing interest rates on loans, appellants’ approach to liquidating the assets was ill-advised. On this point, the lower court aptly stated:
“It was particularly by reason of the unique nature of a number of the[ ] [partnership’s] properties, and the assertions by [appellants] that it was essential to preserve their status as a chain of properties, on the basis of the whole being more valuable than the aggregate of the parts, that the Court earlier refused [appellees’] request for appointment of a receiver. [Appellants] were adamant in asserting that the motel properties could be sold within a reasonable time; that it would be detrimental financially to break the set, and dispose of the motels on an individual basis; and that these assets were producing substantial income for the benefit of the partnership, rather than wasting or facing injury or diminution in value. Although the Court accepts the documented assertions of [appellants] that they have, indeed, vigorously engaged in selling efforts, pursuant to their representations, the fact is that the motels remain unsold. [Appellants] now ask for additional time, based upon their continuing assertions of confidence, in which to attempt to effectuate a sale; to which the [appellees] rightfully reply that the [appellants] have had their opportunity, and that the time has come to change.
Much has happened in the intervening two years since the date of the original Adjudication. Interest rates have risen drastically; financing real estate sales has become *303increasingly difficult by reason of the volatility of interest rates; .. . . ” (Lower Court Opinion at 2 & 3)
The lower court went on to opine:
“By reason of the various changes in circumstances which have ensued since the date of the original Adjudication by this Court; and, considering that, in fact, [appellants] have controlled the show since that date, with results that can be described only as disappointing; and, because a continuing delay in allowing [appellees] finally to enjoy possession of their interests in the Hankin [Family Partnership] property would manifestly be unjust; the Chancellor has concluded that the within case represents such special situation as would justify a decree directing distribution in kind of the remaining partnership assets. The debts of the partnership are insignificant as a result of the proceeds of those sales which have been accomplished being applied toward their retirement. The failure of the [appellants] to dispose of the seven motels after all this time indicates that, for whatever reason, there is no strong market for acquisition of the entire chain. To allow the long delay which resulted from the well-intentioned assurances of the [appellants], that they would liquidate the real estate, to work against [appellees] over whose protests the [appellants] were given their day, would be unjust.” Id. at 5-6.
I agree with the sentiments espoused by the Chancellor, set forth supra.
The instant litigation has had an extended run in the courts, i.e., since August of 1977. During this entire period, Judge Stefan, as noted by this Court in Hankin v. Hankin, supra, has done “an admirable job in handling the very large record in this case.” He has presided over numerous hearings, in which each side has presented a voluminous amount of evidence. For example, records were submitted and testimony was elicited as to the energy expended by all interested parties as to the expeditious liquidation of the *304partnership holdings. Based on such evidence, the Chancellor made detailed findings of fact1 and conclusions of law2 *305in deciding that the most equitable method by which the partnership property could be disposed of, without impairing the interests of the respective parties, would be by ordering a distribution in kind.
I find, from my reading of the record, that because there is no evidence that the lower court “ ‘ “abused its discretion or that the court’s findings lack evidentiary support or that the court capriciously disbelieved the evidence[,]” ’ ” Zvonik v. Zvonik, supra, 291 Pa.Super. at 309, 435 A.2d at 1238, the Order below should be affirmed. Thus, the Majority’s ruling being to the contrary, I must dissent.
. Such findings consisted of the following:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At the time of this Court’s Adjudication on April 2, 1979, when this Court evaluated all of the partnership properties at more than $72,000,000., the following properties had been sold and closed or were under agreements of sale which subsequently closed:
l/6th interest in lot......$110,000 (Property #42)
Baker’s Country Club......$175,000 (Property #46)
Pancake House $250,000 (Property #22)
Willow Grove Park .... $7,717,430 (Property #17, 18)
TOTAL $8,252,430
2. The following properties have been sold and closed since this Court’s Adjudication:
Tarrytown $375,000 (Property #37)
Cranberry Township.....$2,251,000 (Property #35)
Davisville Road $400,000 (Property # 14)
Knock-on-Wood ......$460,000 (Property #32)
4.74 Acres, Upper Moreland . . .$237,000 (Unidentified by property number)
Davisville Road lot ...... $ 10,000
TOTAL $3,733,000
3. The following properties are now under agreements of sale which have not yet closed:
Evans Products $200,000
6.4 Acres, Warner & .....$1,100,000* Gulf Roads
Valley Forge Golf Course . . $13,700,000*
Beotoll ......$ 80,000
TOTAL $15,080,000
* Settlement on these properties is conditioned upon zoning approvals from Upper Merion Township. As of this date, such approvals have not been obtained.”
(Lower Court Opinion at 6-7)
4. The balance of partnership properties remain unsold.
. Such conclusions consisted of the following:
*305“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Liquidation by [appellants] has not in a period of almost four years succeeded in liquidating the bulk of partnership assets into cash.
2. The partnership debt is insignificant in relation to partnership assets.
3. If the Court ordered either an auction or the appointment of a receiver, the proceeds received in liquidation would suffer as a result.
4. By reason of their remaining in exclusive control of the partnership properties during the liquidation period requested by them; and, by reason of the death of Dr. Samuel Hankin [—one of the appellees]; [appellants] would have a clear and distinct advantage over [appellees] in any auction.
5. Equity and justice in this matter militate strongly in favor of a distribution of assets in kind.”
(Lower Court Opinion at 7-8)