dissenting:
Collective bargaining involves a process of exploratory problem solving in which governmental bodies and labor organizations explore and consider a variety of problems to be resolved through compromise. The process of compromise is therefore the essential ingredient of effective and successful collective bargaining.
In my view, collective bargaining in public tends to inhibit if not destroy the collective bargaining process. It suppresses free and open discussion, causes proceedings to become formalized rather than spontaneous, induces rigidity and posturing, fosters anxiety that compromise might look like retreat and, therefore, freezes negotiators into fixed positions from which they cannot recede. Most courts, labor boards, and commentators agree that collective bargaining in public tends to damage the process of compromise necessary for successful collective bargaining. E.g., Burlington Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 268 N.W.2d 517, 523-24 (Iowa 1978); Board of Selectmen of Marion v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 360, 362, 388 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1979); State ex rel. Bd. of Pub. Utilities v. Crow, 592 S.W.2d 285, 290-91 (Mo.Ct.App. 1979); Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 535, 323 A.2d 912, 913-14 (1974); accord NLRB v. Bartlett-Collins Co., 639 F.2d 652, 656 (10th Cir.), cert. *157denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 3109 (1981); Latrobe Steel Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 176-79 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821, 102 S.Ct. 104 (1981); see Quamphegan Teachers Ass’n v. Board of Directors, School Admin. Dist. No. 35, Case No. 73-05, April 20, 1973 (Maine Public Employees Relations Board); Mayor Samuel E. Zoll & The City of Salem, Mass. & Local 1780, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Case No. MUP-309, December 14, 1972 (Labor Relations Commission); Washoe County Teachers Ass’n & the Washoe County School Dist., Nevada Local Gov’t Employee-Management Relations Bd., Case No. A1-045295, May 21, 1976; Brielle Bd. of Educ. & Brielle Educ. Ass’n, State of New Jersey PERC, Docket No. CO-77-88-92, June 23, 1977 (Public Employment Relations Commission); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Board of School Directors of the Bethlehem Area School Dist. Case No. PERA-C-2861-C, April 11, 1973, GERR 505 (E-1) (Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 1973); City of Sparta & Local 1947-A Wisconsin Council of County & Municipal Employees, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Case VIII, No. 19480, DR(M)-68, Decision No. 14520, April 7, 1976 (Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission); see also 1 Werne, Law and Practice of Public Employment Labor Relations § 15.3 at 266-67 (1974); Committee on State Labor Law, Section of Labor Relations Law, A.B.A., 2 Committee Reports 274 (1975).
In 1968, the Legislature enacted Md. Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Art. 77, § 160, the predecessor to Md. Code (1978 & 1981 Cum.Supp.) §§ 6-401 through 6-411 of the Education Article (hereinafter referred to as Public Employment Labor Relations Act). In so doing, the Legislature established that it is the public policy of this State to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its public school employees by permitting such employees to organize and bargain collectively. The purpose of that Act was to encourage the use of the collective bargaining process in a segment of the public sector.
The majority here holds that the Board can unilaterally determine that collective bargaining sessions shall be con*158ducted in public, a result that it concedes will neither promote harmony nor avoid discord in the collective bargaining process. In reaching its result, the majority fails to recognize that when the Legislature enacted the Open Meetings Act in 1977, Md. Code (1957,1980 Repl.Vol.), Art. 76A, §§ 7-15, it did not intend that Act to impede the collective bargaining process and, consequently, to destroy harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its public school employees. Unlike the majority, I find that it is not only possible, but also preferable, to harmonize the Open Meetings Act and the Public Employment Labor Relations Act without violating the express provisions of the former or undermining the purpose of the latter.
Section 10 of the Open Meetings Act requires meetings of public bodies covered by the Act to be open "unless closed in accordance with § 11.” Section 11 (a) (8) permits a meeting for the purpose of "conducting collective bargaining negotiations” to be closed. Thus, the Open Meetings Act expressly provides that some collective bargaining sessions may be open and some may be closed.
The Act, however, does not expressly state who should determine whether such sessions are to be open or closed. My view that conducting collective bargaining sessions in public is destructive of the collective bargaining process leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act can be preserved only if neither party is entitled under § 11 (a) (8) of the Open Meetings Act to determine unilaterally that such sessions should be open. Thus, a harmonious construction of both relevant Acts dictates that under § 11 (a) (8) of the Open Meetings Act, collective bargaining sessions are to be open only when both parties agree. Such a result is consonant with the language of the Open Meetings Act that expressly provides for both open and closed collective bargaining sessions and with the purpose of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act which is to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its public school employees through the collective bargaining process.
Here the record shows that the Board unilaterally deter*159mined, over the Association’s objections, that collective bargaining sessions would be conducted at meetings open to the public. In so doing, the Board violated § 11 (a) (8) of the Open Meetings Act which, when read in harmony with the Public Employment Labor Relations Act, requires that collective bargaining sessions be open only when both parties agree. Under these circumstances, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court without reaching the remaining issue decided by the majority. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Judge Cole authorizes me to state that he joins me in the views expressed herein.