Commonwealth v. McCann

CIRILLO, Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. It is well settled that the particular course of action chosen by counsel must have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967); see also: Commonwealth v. Roman, 494 Pa. 440, 431 A.2d 936 (1981); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 490 Pa. 225, 415 A.2d 887 (1980).

Trial counsel, admittedly experienced, was aware of the Supreme Court case of Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977), but chose not to request an instruc*453tion on the ramifications of the jury returning a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Counsel’s basis for this position was that the jury could well have been outraged that there was no guarantee that this dangerous criminal would be committed, or that he could be released after a short period of time, and therefore would not consider a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.1

The test is whether the course chosen by counsel was reasonable, not whether other alternatives were more reasonable upon hindsight evaluation of the record. Commonwealth v. Hugney, 491 Pa. 222, 420 A.2d 422 (1980). The tactic employed by trial counsel in this instance had a reasonable basis and certainly was in his client’s best interests. Thus, this is not an occasion of ineffective stewardship.

There was nothing inherently unfair or prejudicial about the trial. A new trial, to correct what turned out to be a tactical error by defense counsel, must be paid for by the taxpayers of this Commonwealth, will burden an already crowded judicial calendar, and will further delay the administration of justice in this particular case. The best interest of the parties, of society, and of the law have already been served by the jury trial previously conducted.

Accordingly, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

. Had the court below followed the “Pennsylvania Suggested Standards, Criminal Jury Instructions 5.01(a),” the jury would have been told, inter alia, that

[W]hen a defendant is found not guilty as the result of insanity, he may be the subject of an immediate court proceeding to commit him to a mental treatment facility and if committed his commitment will continue until he is no longer dangerous to others or to himself. [Emphasis added.]