DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) properly concluded that, based on the doctrine of absolute privilege, Lawrence Y. Edwards (Edwards) is entitled to summary judgment in the defamation suit brought against him by Edward Appel (Appel). For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
Edwards is a member of the Warwick Township Board of Supervisors (Board); as a township supervisor, Edwards is a “high public official.”1 At the Board’s September 7, 1999, meeting, Appel made it known that he wished to bring a matter to the attention of the Board. The minutes of the meeting state:
Mr. Edwards said that before Mr. Appel speaks, “he is vehemently opposed to Mr. Appel speaking. He is an admitted thief of Township property. He is an admitted thief of personal property from a private organization, and not only that, it is a well know fact that (inaudible)”. *475Mr. Peluso interrupted Mr. Edwards, taking Ms. Sehaafs words as advice, that it is Mr. Appel’s right to speak. We should not treat any citizen in this matter.
(Minutes of 09/07/1999 Board meeting, p. 2). Appel then proceeded to speak to the Board about a drainage problem on a road.
The doctrine of absolute privilege provides that high public officials are exempt
from all civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory statements and even from statements or actions motivated by malice, provided the statements are made or the actions are taken in the course of the official’s duties or powers and within the scope of his authority, or as it is sometimes expressed, within his jurisdiction_
Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 194, 88 A.2d 892, 895 (1952) (emphasis in original). Two factors have helped courts determine whether the doctrine of absolute privilege applies in a particular case: (1) the formality of the forum in which the allegedly defamatory comments were spoken or published; and (2) the relationship of the legitimate subject of governmental concern to the person seeking damages for the defamatory utterance. Hall v. Kiger, 795 A.2d 497, (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 713, 813 A.2d 846 (2002).
Here, there was no legitimate subject of governmental concern before the Board at the time Edwards made his allegedly defamatory comments. Appel had only requested permission to speak. The alleged defamation was already a fait accompli by the time Appel was permitted to raise the issue of a drainage problem on a road. Because Edwards’ allegedly defamatory comments were not made in connection with any legitimate subject of governmental concern, I would conclude that the comments were not made within the scope of his official duties.
As a high public official, Edwards has no absolute privilege to defame a citizen for merely exercising his constitutional right to free speech or municipal right to freely speak at a public meeting. The doctrine of absolute privilege given to public officials is to be used as a shield, not as a sword. Otherwise, citizens will be treated like there is a totalitarian climate when they attend public assemblies, with the citizens in fear of raising their hands or speaking out because public officials could intimidate them and defame them without fear of retribution.
Because I conclude that the doctrine of absolute immunity does not protect Edwards from Appel’s suit for the damages, I would reverse that part of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Edwards and remand this case for further proceedings.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER joins in this dissent.
. Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 62, 244 A.2d 751, 753 (1968).