concurring:
I do not agree that the Commonwealth infringed appellant’s fifth amendment right to remain silent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 246 Pa.Super. 132, 369 A.2d 846 (1977) (Dissenting Opinion by Price, J.) However, I do agree with Judge Hoffman that this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because it was an abuse of discretion to deny appellant a continuance.
I would add only the following facts to the details of the record, which, to me, control. After the Commonwealth had presented its case, appellant was granted a recess for the rest of the day to prepare his defense. During the recess, defense counsel attempted to contact doctors who purportedly would substantiate appellant’s insanity defense. When court resumed the following day, defense counsel informed the court that one of the doctors dimly remembered appellant’s case. However, the doctor would have needed a day to retrieve his records. A second doctor was vacationing, and a third had left her former position without leaving a forwarding address. After communicating the above information to the court, the defense rested without presenting any evidence.
It is well settled that brevity of preparation time, alone, is not grounds for a continuance. Commonwealth v. Glasco, 241 Pa. Super. 484, 362 A.2d 420 (1976). However, I have found no Pennsylvania case upholding the denial of a continuance where the denial prevented the defendant from presenting a substantial defense. For example, we noted in *74Commonwealth v. Harding, 245 Pa.Super. 333, 336, 369 A.2d 429, 431 (1976), that denial of a continuance was not error because “ ‘[t]he defendant was ably and vigorously represented by trial counsel.’ ” In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 574, 364 A.2d 665 (1976), as in Commonwealth v. Simpson, 222 Pa.Super. 296, 294 A.2d 805 (1972), defense counsel actually had been appointed long before the case came to trial, and he was able to present a competent defense.
Where, as in this case, the events which lead to the request for a continuance are not clearly established to be the defendant’s fault, and where the denial of a continuance deprives the defendant of a substantial defense, I agree that to deny this continuance was an abuse of discretion. On this ground solely would I reverse the judgment of sentence of the lower court and remand for a new trial.
WATKINS, President Judge, joins in this concurring opinion.