(dissenting). Because I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes:
The plain statutory language [of subsection 301(5)(c)] is. unambiguous, and it does not permit the magistrate to consider the increased benefits a plaintiff may have been awarded more than two years after her injury under subsection 356(1).[1]
Although the majority’s textual interpretation may make sense if subsection 301(5)(c) could be viewed in isolation, I believe that subsection 301(5)(c) must be construed in consolidation with subsection 356(1).
The majority treats subsection 356(1) as though it is irrelevant by determining that literal construction principles confine our analysis to the plain language of subsection 301(5)(c). Although the majority opinion makes reference to subsection 356(1), the majority holds that a subsection 356(1) increase will not be factored into subsection 301(5)(c) benefit entitlement. Clearly, the majority holding applies the language of subsection 301(5)(c) alone. Yet, this Court is not con*408strained to consider subsection 301(5)(c) in isolation. Rather, the Court may depart from strict construction principles when a literal reading of the statute will produce absurd or illogical results, and this Court should attempt to give effect to all relevant statutory provisions. Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147; 528 NW2d 707 (1995); In re Landaal, 273 Mich 248, 252; 262 NW 897 (1935). Moreover, the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) is a remedial statute that should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507; 563 NW2d 214 (1997). Sobotka v Chrysler Corp (After Remand), 447 Mich 1, 20; 523 NW2d 454 (1994).
The majority’s interpretation violates several of the aforementioned principles. The majority gives no effect to subsection 356(1) and reaches a result that is clearly illogical in light of the purposes underlying the WDCA. It further construes the statute narrowly in favor of the employer, rather than broadly in favor of the employee.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that subsection 301(5)(c) must be construed in conjunction with subsection 356(1). When read together, it becomes clear that a literal interpretation of subsection 301(5)(c) would render subsection 356(1) meaningless. A literal reading would disqualify persons from receiving subsection 356(1) benefits once they return to the same job or have earning capacity equivalent to the wages they earned at the time of injury. I disagree with an interpretation of subsection 301(5)(c) that treats employees who have received a subsection 356(1) wage adjustment in the same manner as those who have not received the adjustment. Rather, I agree *409with the Court of Appeals that the purpose of subsection 356(1) is to “alleviate the inequities that may result when an employee is injured at a job paying much less than the employee would be able to command in the marketplace or would soon be able to command because of education, training, and so forth.” 229 Mich App 223, 228; 581 NW2d 766 (1998). Once a rate adjustment has been made on the basis that a particular person would be earning more money because of education or experience, it would be illogical to return that employee to the prior rate of pay. I believe that the statute, when viewed as a whole, contemplates a rate increase based on earnings the employees would have made but for their injuries. In my view, “legislative intent” is not preserved by limiting our analysis to a strict reading of a single statutory provision, but by giving effect to the sum of relevant statutory parts.
Viewing Michigan’s worker’s compensation system from an historical perspective, it becomes clear that the Court of Appeals decision was well reasoned. Under the WDCA, injured employees have no right to sue under negligence principles even though they may have lost the ability to work and advance in their fields of choice. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). Subsection 356(1) of the wdca compensates for lost earning potential in a fashion that helps balance the interests of all parties involved. If subsection 301(5)(c) is read without reference to subsection 356(1), then the equities fall out of alignment.
Under the majority view, employees might be discouraged from returning to work because they could receive higher worker’s compensation payments than their salary. Here, DiBenedetto’s new salary nearly *410mirrors her prior entitlement. Thus, the majority’s position may not seem harsh in this instance. On the other hand, had DiBenedetto been making five dollars more than her 1986 salary, she would still be cut off. The difference between her worker’s compensation benefits could then be substantial.
I am not persuaded that the Court of Appeals attempted to label the plaintiff’s subsection 356(1) adjustment as a preinjury wage. Neither did the Court attempt to squeeze the wage adjustment into the definition provided by subsection 301(5)(c). Rather, I think that the Court of Appeals read subsection 301(5)(c) in conjunction with subsection 356(1) and found incongruity. In response, the Court of Appeals considered legislative intent, and arrived at a logical interpretation.
I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.Ante, p 403.