dissenting:
Because I find no error in the suppression court’s determination that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Emilio Lopez, I must respectfully dissent.
This Court has stated that “an exchange of some unknown items between citizens in a public place, even a place known to be frequented by drug traffickers, does not, without more, *449establish probable cause to arrest those citizens.” Commonwealth v. Malson, 434 Pa.Super. 155, 161, 642 A.2d 520, 523 (1994). In the present case, at the suppression hearing, Officer Fetters testified that he and another officer were “working burglary detail” at 9:30 p.m. on October 30, 1992. He further testified that, while seated in an unmarked vehicle approximately 40 feet away from a man later identified as Aponte, he observed Aponte engage in two suspicious transactions with unidentified males. Subsequently, Officer Fetters observed Lopez reach into the trunk of a car, retrieve a “tied-up” plastic baggie that measured approximately two inches in diameter, cross the street, and hand it to Aponte. He made this observation in the dark, without the use of binoculars. Officer Fetters observed no exchange of currency between Lopez and Aponte. Although Officer Fetters observed an exchange of currency between Aponte and each of the two unidentified males, those exchanges cannot be used to form probable cause as to Lopez. See Commonwealth v. Kearney, 411 Pa.Super. 274, 279, 601 A.2d 346, 348 (1992) (although reasonable suspicion existed, officers had no probable cause to arrest appellant without a warrant where appellant was standing next to a person who officers believed was engaged in selling drugs). Further, the officer had no information that Lopez was a known drug dealer, nor was he responding to any citizen complaints concerning drug activity at that location on that date. In addition, Officer Fetters testified that, although he had worked in the area for seven years and made numerous narcotics arrests there, he had never seen Aponte or Lopez prior to this occasion. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Lopez acted in a suspicious manner or attempted to flee when the officers approached him. Finally, Officer Fetters had no information that the vehicle involved had been used for the distribution of narcotics.
Based upon these facts, the suppression court determined that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Lopez. Accordingly, the court concluded that the officers’ search of the trunk was illegal. See also In Interest of J.H., 424 Pa.Super. 224, 229, 622 A.2d 351, 354 (1993) (“[W]here proba*450ble cause to arrest does not exist, any evidence seized in a search incident to arrest must be suppressed.”). Because I find no error in the trial court’s conclusion, I would affirm the order that granted Lopez’ motion to suppress. Cf. Commonwealth v. Malson, supra, at 155, 642 A.2d 520 (no probable cause to arrest where an officer witnessed two men exchange unidentified objects at 9:00 p.m. from a distance of 50 feet away without binoculars); Commonwealth v. Agnew, 411 Pa.Super. 63, 600 A.2d 1265 (1991) (no probable cause to arrest where an officer could not identify objects exchanged and had no prior information or reason to believe that appellant would be engaging in a drug transaction).