In a proceeding in the Juvenile Court two infant children were found to be without adequate parental care 1 and they were committed to the Board of Public Welfare. The father of the children testified at the hearing and apparently consented to the commitment. The mother of the children brought this appeal.
The first error assigned is the refusal of the court to grant a trial by jury on the issues involved. No contention is made that appellant or the children had a constitutional right to jury trial. Such contention could not be validly made because this was a statutory proceeding to determine the best interests of the children,2 and not a criminal or common-law proceeding. From time immemorial cases involving custody of children have been heard and determined by a chancellor or a judge exercising equity jurisdiction.
Appellant rests her contention on the section of the Juvenile Court Act embodied in section 11-915 of the 1940 Code which in part provides: “The court may conduct the hearing in an informal manner, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time. In the hearing of any case the general public shall be excluded and only such persons as have a direct interest in the case and their representatives admitted. All cases involving children may be heard separately and apart from the trial of cases against adults. The court shall hear and determine all cases of children without a jury unless a jury be demanded by the child, his parent, or guardian or the court.”
It is appellant’s contention that the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph gives her or anyone concerned the right to trial by jury in “all cases of children”. If the statute, as some statutes do, clearly gives the right to a jury trial, then of course the court would have no right to deny it.3 However, our statute does not clearly say that the right to a jury trial shall be had in all cases of children. It specifically says trial shall be without a jury “unless a jury be demanded by the child, his parent, or guardian or the court.” We do not believe that Congress intended in this indirect way to make a sweeping grant of the right of jury trial to all persons involved in all cases involving children. Had it intended to make so drastic a change, we feel it would have said so in a plainer and more direct manner. Problems presented in *413cases involving custody and welfare of children are usually of a complicated and difficult nature. The welfare of the child is paramount but the rights of parents cannot be ignored. Each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. There are only general principles, and no specific rules, to aid in reaching a decision. Such cases are not ordinarily submitted to a jury for determination and we cannot believe that Congress intended that juries should decide these cases. Our conclusion is that the statute did not enlarge the right to trial by jury but only preserved it where a constitutional right to jury trial exists, provided seasonable demand therefor is made.
Appellant also claims that she was never properly served with process. However, her attorney entered his appearance for her and thus any question of' process was waived. In this connection, appellant argues that her attorney was compelled by the court to enter a general appearance in order to object to the jurisdiction of the court. The statement of proceedings and evidence does not support this contention. There is included in the record an affidavit of appellant’s counsel on this subject, but we must decide the case on the official record and not on statements of counsel.
Finally, claim is made that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction because the children were nonresidents of the District of Columbia. The record does not disclose their residence, but, wherever their legal residence was, they were in the District and subject to the jurisdiction of the court.4
Affirmed.
. Code 1940, § ll-908(a) (6).
. Thomas v. United States, 74 App.D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905; In re Stuart, 72 App. D.O. 389, 114 E.2d 825; Bule v. Geddes, 23 App.D.C. 31. See also Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205, 67 A.L.R. 1075.
.See Newman v. Wright, 126 W.Va. 502, 29 S.E.2d 155; Ex parte Satterthwaite, 52 Mont. 550, 160 P. 346; In re Johnson, 173 Wis. 571, 181 N.W. 741.
. Boone v. Boone, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 150 F.2d 153.