CONCURRING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I believe that, in citing Chipman v. Avon Grove School District, 841 A.2d 1098 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 862 A.2d 1257 (2004), the majority has cited insufficient legal authority for the proposition that Pa. R.A.P. 811(a)(4) permits an appeal as of right from the grant of a preliminary injunction.
It is true that, in Chipman, (citing Nunemacher v. Borough of Middletown, 759 A.2d 57 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000)), this court stated that Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) permits an appeal as of right from an order regarding a preliminary injunction. However, in Nu-nemacher, the case cited, this court never addressed whether Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) permitted an appeal as of right from an order regarding a preliminary injunction. Although that issue was raised by the parties, this court disposed of the entire matter after concluding that Nunemacher lacked standing.
Nevertheless, because I agree with the result reached by the majority, I concur.1
. I note that, until our supreme court amended Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) in 1996, this court differed in its interpretation of Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) from our superior court. Our superior court had held in Agra Enterprises, Inc. v. Brunozzi, 302 Pa.Super. 166, 448 A.2d 579 (1982), that Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) allowed an appeal as of right from a decree nisi in a permanent injunction case. However, this court rejected that interpretation in Humphreys v. Cain, 84 Pa.Cmwlth. 222, 474 A.2d 353 (1984), holding that Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) applied only to preliminary injunctions. See "Note" to Pa. R.A.P. 311.