Plaintiff is a Michigan corporation, owner in fee simple of certain real estate located in Hayes Township, Charlevoix County, commonly known as the "Camp Charlevoix” property and consisting of 338 acres of land, including 2800 feet of Lake Charlevoix frontage. This property is zoned R-l pursuant to the Hayes Township zoning ordinance, the most restrictive residential classification.
Plaintiff proposed to the township to develop a residential condominium development on the property pursuant to the "planned unit development” (pud) provision of the township zoning ordinance, being § 6.01 of the ordinance. The pud proposal was revised and presented to the township at several township meetings. At a special meeting of the township planning commission held on September 11, 1984, the proposal was rejected because it failed to comply with provisions of § 5.13(A) and (B) of the zoning ordinance. Those provisions of the zoning ordinance purport to regulate the building of structures near the shoreline and regulate the amount of dock space which may be installed.
On January 8, 1985, plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court alleging, inter alia, that § 5.13(A) and (B) of the zoning ordinance is invalid and improperly enacted inasmuch as such regulations are not authorized under the provisions of the Township Rural Zoning Act, MCL 125.271 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(1) et seq.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for partial *650summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), on the grounds that § 5.13(A) and (B) is unconstitutional and invalid because it is not authorized under the trza, because it deprives plaintiff of due process and because it is contrary to the law set forth in OAG, 1981-1982, No. 6070, pp 652-655 (May 15, 1982).
The trial court issued a written opinion denying the motion for partial summary disposition. The trial court found that the restrictions in § 5.13 of the zoning ordinance were a reasonable exercise of the legislative authority granted by the trza as they regulate, but do not prohibit, development to achieve a valid public interest: namely, conservation of water, a natural resource. The trial court determined that the ordinance was constitutionally valid both on its face and as applied.
Plaintiff now appeals by leave granted and we reverse.
This Court is presented with two questions to address. First, we must determine whether defendant’s regulation by zoning ordinance of dock space along a lake is authorized by the trza. Second, we are asked to determine whether a township may regulate dock space, or whether regulation of dock space is preempted by the state pursuant to the Inland Lakes and Streams Act, MCL 281.951 et seq.; MSA 11.475(1) et seq. However, because of our resolution of the first issue, we decline to address the second.
i
Townships have no police power of their own. They may exercise such power only by virtue of a grant by the state. In the case of zoning, power is extended through zoning enabling acts. Davis v Imlay Twp Bd, 7 Mich App 231; 151 NW2d 370 *651(1967); Lake Twp v Sytsma, 21 Mich App 210; 175 NW2d 337 (1970); Brandon Twp v North-Oakland Residential Services, Inc, 110 Mich App 300; 312 NW2d 238 (1981). The trza, MCL 125.271 et seq.; MSA 5.2963(1) et seq., is the basic enabling act which grants townships the power to pass ordinances concerning zoning. Lake Twp, supra; The Detroit Edison Co v Richmond Twp, 150 Mich App 40; 388 NW2d 296 (1986). The trza is a broad grant of power and authority to townships to zone for the "public health, safety, and welfare.” Delta Charter Twp v Dinolfo, 419 Mich 253; 351 NW2d 831 (1984).
Generally, a zoning ordinance is presumed valid, and the burden is on the attacking party to show by competent evidence the lack of a substantial relationship between the restriction of the ordinance and public health, safety or general welfare of the community. Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957); Lutheran High School Ass’n v Farmington Hills, 146 Mich App 641; 381 NW2d 417 (1985).
The question before us appears to be one of first impression. Accordingly, our analysis must begin with the principles of statutory construction. The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature that enacted the statute. Borkus v Michigan National Bank, 117 Mich App 662; 324 NW2d 123 (1982). The language of the statute is the best source for ascertaining this intent. Great Lakes Steel Division of National Steel Corp v Public Service Comm, 143 Mich App 761; 373 NW2d 212 (1985). Words should be given their ordinary meanings. If the language of the statute is clear, it is assumed that the Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning and the statute must be enforced as written. Bailey v DAIIE, 143 Mich App 223; 371 *652NW2d 917 (1985). If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no room for statutory construction or interpretation of that statute. Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453; 235 NW 217 (1931); Todd v Textron, Inc, 140 Mich App 412; 364 NW2d 718 (1985).
Plaintiff contends that an analysis of the statutory construction of § 1 of the trza clearly reveals that the legislative grant of authority to a township is limited to the regulation of land development and does not extend to the regulation of the riparian rights of a landowner, especially when such regulation attempts to limit access to navigable waters or the number of dock slips a riparian landowner may build or possess. Plaintiff contends that the sections of the Hayes Township zoning ordinance which attempt to limit dockage and access are beyond the authority granted by the trza. We agree. MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1) provides as follows:
The township board of an organized township in this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts in the portions of the township outside the limits of cities and villages which regulate the use of land and structures; to meet the needs of the state’s citizens for food, fiber, energy, and other natural resources, places of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, and other uses of land; to insure that use of the land shall be situated in appropriate locations and relationships; to limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land and congestion of population, transportation systems, and other public facilities; to facilitate adequate and efficient provision for transportation systems, sewage disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and other public service and facility requirements; and to promote public health, safety, and welfare. For these purposes, the *653township board may divide the township into districts of such number, shape, and area as it considers best suited to carry out this act. The township board of an organized township may use this act to provide by ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts which apply only to land areas and activities which are involved in a special program to achieve specific land management objectives and avert or solve specific land use problems, including the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts in areas subject to damage from flooding or beach erosion, and for that purpose may divide the township into districts of a number, shape, and area considered best suited to accomplish those objectives. Ordinances regulating land development may also be adopted designating or limiting the location, the height, number of stories, and size of dwellings, buildings, and structures that may be erected or altered, including tents and trailer coaches, and the specific uses for which dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, may be erected or altered; the area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and the sanitary, safety, and protective measures that shall be required for the dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches; and the maximum number of families which may be housed in buildings, dwellings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, erected or altered. The provisions shall be uniform for each class of land or buildings, dwellings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, throughout each district, but the provisions in 1 district may differ from whose in other districts. A township board shall not regulate or control the drilling, completion, or operation of oil or gas wells, or other wells drilled for oil or gas exploration purposes and shall not have jurisdiction with reference to the issuance of permits for the location, drilling, completion, operation, or abandonment of those wells. The jurisdiction relative to wells shall be vested exclusively in the supervisor *654of wells of this state, as provided in Act No. 61 of the Public Acts of 1939, being sections 319.1 to 319.27 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that the inclusion of a thing by specific mention excludes that which is not mentioned. The very grant of specific powers under restrictions is an exclusion of other powers in reference to the same subject matter not granted by the Legislature. Sebewaing Industries, Inc v Village of Sebewaing, 337 Mich 530, 546; 60 NW2d 444 (1953); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 90 Mich App 767, 783; 282 NW2d 472 (1979), aff'd 412 Mich 321; 314 NW2d 184 (1982). The trza expressly lists the specific subjects which a township may regulate. Section 1, as quoted above, states that townships may provide by zoning ordinance for the "regulation of land development,” "establishment of districts,” "regulate the use of land and structures,” "limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land,” etc. The only mention of "water” in § 1 is in the provision quoted above relevant to the "efficient provision for transportation systems, sewage disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and other public service and facility requirements.”
The statute also states that special districts may be established which apply only to land areas subject to damage from flooding or beach erosion. The statute specifically mentions dwellings, buildings, structures, including tents and trailer coaches, yards, courts, open spaces, and number of families. There is no mention or reference to the regulation of waters, waterway access, dockage or boat usage. This Court is to assume that the express mention of any one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of other similar things. Mich *655Mutual Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co, 146 Mich 475, 481; 382 NW2d 169 (1985), aff'd 426 Mich 346; 395 NW2d 192 (1986).
In urging us to interpret the trza as permitting the zoning of water and other riparian rights, the township relies upon § 3 of the trza, MCL 125.273; MSA 5.2963(3), which states that a zoning ordinance shall be "based upon a plan designed ... to conserve natural resources and energy” and requires that reasonable consideration be given to natural resources. The township argues that Michigan’s lakes and streams are natural resources and, therefore, § 3 of the trza authorizes zoning ordinances which regulate lakes and streams. However, unlike the township, we do not read § 3 of the trza as being a grant of power to the townships. Rather, our reading of § 3 is that it is one of restriction upon the zoning powers of a township by specifically requiring the township to give consideration to various factors, such as the impact upon the natural resources, before enacting a zoning ordinance. Even accepting the township’s broad definition of "natural resources” to include lakes and streams, the fact that a township must consider the impact of a zoning ordinance upon lakes and streams does not necessitate the conclusion that townships have the authority to regulate lakes and streams by way of a zoning ordinance. For example, the zoning of land for industrial use may affect lakes and streams with respect to industrial pollution. Thus, consideration must be given to that affect by the township before zoning, a parcel of land for industrial use.
The township also relies upon Const 1963, art 7, § 34, which provides that provisions of the constitution and statutes concerning townships shall be liberally construed in favor of the township and that powers granted to townships by the constitu*656tion and statutes shall include those powers fairly implied and not prohibited by the constitution. While that constitutional rule of construction must be kept in mind while interpreting the trza, it obviously does not give carte blanche to the township.
Even with the liberal construction of the provisions of the constitution in mind, we do not believe that the trza grants authority to townships to regulate or limit boat dockage construction or riparian access rights. After consideration of all the applicable rules of statutory construction, we can only conclude that the Legislature, in enacting the trza, granted authority to townships to zone land use but not water use or to regulate riparian rights. Accordingly, the provisions in the Hayes Township zoning ordinance which limit boat dock-age and "funnel development,” § 5.13(A) and (B), are invalid. Accordingly, the trial court was incorrect in determining that the ordinance was valid.
ii
Plaintiffs second argument is that the subject matter of the Hayes Township zoning ordinance is preempted by the Michigan Inland Lakes and Streams Act, MCL 281.951 et seq.; MSA 11.475(1) et seq. While plaintiffs preemption argument appears at first blush to be valid, we note that this issue was not raised in the trial court. In light of our conclusion that the zoning ordinance is invalid under the trza, it is unnecessary to consider the preemption argument and we decline to do so.
iii
The decision of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for *657further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.