dissenting:
I am in total agreement with the majority in calling for a re-examination of the collateral order doctrine. On the facts of this case, however, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the order denying the motion to enforce the settlement agreement was not appealable.
It is well settled that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute. Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 93, 501 A.2d 211, 213 (1985); Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 678, 72, 394 A.2d 542, 544 (1978). “A final order is one which usually ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case.” Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 544-545. “Conversely phrased, an order is interlocutory and not final unless it effectively puts the litigant ‘out of court.’ ” Fried v. Fried, supra, 509 Pa. at 93, 501 A.2d at 213, quoting T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977). Moreover, “[t]he finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only after an examination of its ramifications.” Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545, quoting, Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 228, 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975); Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa.Super. 332, 337, 459 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1983).
The instant order denying appellant’s motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement is not a final order under these principles. It did not end the litigation, nor dispose of the merits of the case. Neither did it put either party out of court on a claim or defense going to the merits of the case.
These conclusions do not end the inquiry, however. Importantly, our courts have adopted and followed an exception to the final judgment rule carved out by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). See Fried v. Fried, supra, 509 Pa. at 94, 501 A.2d at 214; Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545; Praisner v. Stocker, supra, 313 Pa.Super. at 342, 459 A.2d at 1260-1261.
*553Under Cohen, an order is considered final and appealable if (1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. Id. 337 U.S. at 546, 59 S.Ct. at 1226, 93 L.Ed. at 536.
Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545, citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546, 59 S.Ct. at 1226. To qualify under the Cohen exception all three factors must be met. Fried v. Fried, supra, 509 Pa. at 95, 501 A.2d at 214.
The trial court’s order in the instant case is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action. The order disposed of whether or not a purported settlement agreement should be enforced, a matter separable from the merits of appellant’s claim in assumpsit. Moreover, the order involves a right too important to be denied review, i.e., the right to enforce a settlement agreement and thereby avoid further litigation. Finally, the question presented is such that, in my opinion, the claimed right will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final judgment in this matter. If we deny review at this time, appellant must litigate a claim which he contends has been settled. Appellant, as a result, may lose any right he has to avoid the time, expense and other burdens incidental to litigation, by requiring his adversary to abide by an allegedly binding settlement agreement. I am cognizant of the goal of eliminating “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” Pugar v. Greco, supra, 483 Pa. at 75, 394 A.2d at 545-546, quoting McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22, 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955). In this case, however, litigation may be avoided entirely if we allow review at this time rather than requiring appellant to wait until final judgment. Furthermore, such a decision comports with “a strong judicial policy in favor of parties voluntarily settling lawsuits.” Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 266, 469 A.2d 543, 546 (1983).
*554Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor. Judges and lawyers alike strive assiduously to promote amicable adjustments of matters in dispute, as for the most wholesome of reasons they certainly should. When the effort is successful, the parties avoid the expense and delay incidental to litigation of the issues; the court is spared the burdens of a trial and the preparation and proceedings that must forerun it.
Id., 503 Pa. at 267, 469 A.2d at 546, quoting Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (U.S.App.D.C.1969). See also Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Because I have found that the three factors under the Cohen exception have been met, the trial court’s order denying enforcement of the purported settlement agreement is appealable at this time.1
Before turning to the merits of this appeal, I believe a review of the facts and procedural history is necessary.
On September 19, 1985, appellant, National Recovery Systems, filed an action in assumpsit to recover $18,000 which appellee, Allen Perlman, had allegedly borrowed and failed to repay.2 Appellee filed preliminary objections which were argued and subsequently denied. Thereafter, on December 26, 1985, appellee filed an answer and new matter to appellant’s action. The case was then scheduled to be heard by an arbitration panel on May 21, 1986.
Prior to the hearing date, however, the parties exchanged correspondence regarding settlement. By letter dated April *5554, 1986, appellee’s counsel wrote to appellant’s counsel as follows:
After discussions with my client, I am authorized to offer the sum of $9,000.00 in full and final settlement of the above-captioned matter. Payment will be made to you within ten days after I receive notice of your acceptance of this offer. I await your advice.
Appellant’s motion to enforce settlement, Exhibit A. By letter dated April 10, 1986, appellant’s counsel responded as follows:
This will confirm my telephone conversation with you yesterday wherein I advised that my client had accepted the offer of $9,000.00 in full and final settlement.
In accordance with our agreement I look forward to receipt of your check within ten days, together with executed copies of the forms. Upon receipt of your check or when your client’s check clears I will provide an Order to make the case settled, discontinued and ended.
Appellant’s motion to enforce settlement, Exhibit B.
Subsequently, on May 9, 1986, appellant filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement allegedly contained in the foregoing letters. On the same date, appellant filed a rule to show cause why the motion should not be granted. Appellee answered the motion and rule on May 27, 1986, admitting the exchange of the above letters but at the same time denying that the case was settled “since the acceptance of the offer to settle was not in accordance with the terms of the original offer and, indeed, the acceptance of said offer placed an additional condition of ten days payment upon which the Defendant did not agree to nor did Defendant make.” Appellee’s answer to motion and rule, paragraph 14.
Following argument, the Honorable David E. Mellenberg, by an order dated October 10, 1986, denied appellant’s motion. Judge Mellenberg indicated that appellant, by listing the matter for argument rather than following the procedures outlined in Pa.R.C.P. 209, had admitted appel*556lee’s allegation that the purported acceptance by appellant included the additional condition of payment within ten days after acceptance. That being the case, the judge found that the alleged acceptance was actually a counteroffer, and concluded that consequently, there was no enforceable settlement agreement. Appellant filed a timely appeal which appellee subsequently moved to quash as being interlocutory in nature.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to enforce the alleged settlement based upon appellant’s failure to comply with the procedures of Pa.R.C.P. 209. Under that rule, when a petitioner orders the cause for argument on the petition and answer without first taking depositions on any disputed fact issues, factual averments responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer are to be taken as true against the petitioner. Philadelphia City Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bryant, 310 Pa.Super. 526, 531, 456 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1983); Shainline v. Alberti Builders, Inc., 266 Pa.Super. 129, 137, 403 A.2d 577, 580 (1979). Noting that appellant listed the matter for argument without taking depositions, the trial court ruled that it would take as true appellee’s allegations that the purported acceptance of appellee’s settlement offer included the additional condition of payment within ten days after acceptance. Finding that this additional term was material to the agreement, the trial court concluded that appellant’s reply was merely a counteroffer and that, therefore, there was no agreement to enforce.
Appellant contends that it was not required to take depositions in this matter in view of admissions contained in appellee’s answer to appellant’s motion. Specifically, appellee admitted that his counsel made an offer of settlement by the letter dated April 4, 1986, and that his counsel received the April 9, 1986, letter from appellant’s counsel purporting to accept that offer. Appellee’s offer, appellant notes, states that payment would be made within ten days after appellee’s counsel received notice of acceptance of the offer. Accordingly, argues appellant, the ten-day requirement was *557not a term which appellant added, but was part of appellee’s offer. Moreover, the letters attached to the petition and admitted by appellee, appellant asserts, speak for themselves, thus alleviating the need for depositions on this question.
After careful consideration, I conclude that the trial court erred in ignoring appellee’s admission regarding the letters discussing settlement. In ruling on appellant’s motion, the trial court relied solely on Rule 209, focusing exclusively on the averments of paragraphs 9 and 14 of appellee’s answer. Although Rule 209 does require that the trial court take as true factual averments properly pleaded in appellee’s answer, the rule does not require that the court close its eyes to appellee’s admissions also contained in that answer. Cf. Pittsburgh National Bank v. Kemilworth Restaurant Co., 202 Pa.Super. 238, 241, 195 A.2d 919, 920 (1963) (“There is nothing in [Rule 209] which precludes the court from accepting facts not in dispute, as admitted by the pleadings.”).
Troublesome in this case is the apparent inconsistency in appellee’s answer. Before the court on the one hand is appellee’s allegation, which must be taken as true under Rule 209, that appellant’s alleged acceptance added the condition of payment within ten days, while on the other is appellee’s admission that his counsel offered the sum of $9,000.00 in full and final settlement by a letter dated April 4, 1986, which letter-offer includes the statement that “[pjayment will be made to you within ten days after I receive notice of your acceptance of this offer.” Nothing in appellee’s answer explains this inconsistency. Appellee having made the foregoing admissions, the trial court, in my opinion, erred in relying exclusively on Rule 209 and appellee’s averment concerning the ten-day requirement in ruling on appellant’s motion to enforce the settlement.
Due to appellee’s inconsistent pleading, factual issues remain unresolved. Consequently, I believe it appropriate to remand the case for depositions and argument on whether the acceptance of appellee’s offer added the requirement of payment within ten days. Taking into consideration *558appellee’s admission regarding the April 4, 1986 letter, the trial court should make appropriate findings and conclusions and grant or deny appellant’s motion accordingly.
. In Darabant v. Atwood Home Builders, Inc., 281 Pa.Super. 153, 421 A.2d 1194 (1980), a panel of this Court dismissed an appeal from an order striking a settlement agreement and placing the case on the trial list, holding that such an order was neither a final order from which an appeal can be taken under Pa.R.A.P. 341, nor one of the appealable interlocutory decrees from which an appeal is authorized by Pa.R.A.P. 311. Id., 281 Pa.Super. at 155, 421 A.2d at 1195. The panel did not address, however, whether the order in question was separable from and collateral to the main cause of action and therefore potentially appealable under the Cohen exception. I, consequently, find Darabant distinguishable from the case presently before us.
. Appellant is the assignee of Caesar’s Palace Hotel of Las Vegas, Nevada. Appellee denies that said sums were a loan, claiming that they were instead monies used to gamble in Las Vegas.