(dissenting). This writer concurs with Judge Bronson’s statement of facts and his disposition of the first issue discussed in his opinion. As to the second issue discussed, however, I must disagree with his conclusions. In my opinion the defendants have complied with the provisions of GCR 1963, 117, and the trial court correctly found that plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of any evidence available at the time of trial that defendant Love was served intoxicating beverages at the Dexter Bar on the date of the accident. Such evidence was a necessary element of plaintiffs’ alleged cause of action. The language of *36Durant v Stahlin, 375 Mich 628, 638; 135 NW2d 392 (1965), is instructive in determining the plaintiffs’ burden in resisting defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on GCR 1963, 117.3:
"The court declined to grant the plaintiff a continuance and granted the motions for summary judgment on the basis that:
" 'There is no genuine issue as to any material fact.’
"We agree with the ruling of the trial judge and further hold that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a continuance. The basic rule in summary judgmént matters is simple. Its application is often difficult. When properly challenged, plaintiff must establish that he has a case on the law and that there are some evidentiary proofs to support his allegations as to any material fact.
"In a summary judgment proceeding, an affidavit is employed as a voluntary statement made ex parte. The function of affidavits by the defendant is to establish affirmatively under oath that there is no basis in fact to support plaintiff’s claims. In the case of plaintiff’s counter affidavits, they should establish that there is some evidence as to material facts upon which to proceed to trial. There is no question of the relative weight to be given the evidence. The party opposing the motion is given the benefit of all doubt. If he produces some evidence, the motion is denied. In this case the affiants were available for cross-examination by their own choosing.
"Using the language of GCR 1963, 117.3, the question is whether the affidavits 'together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action’ present a genuine issue as to any material fact.
"There has been presented by plaintiff not one single piece of admissible evidence by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise, of plaintiff or of anyone else from which it could be found that the defendants participated in any way in the preparation or publication of exhibit A or in the purported conspiracy surrounding its preparation and publication. The plaintiff was required to do this by *37GCR 1963, 116.4 and GCR 1963, 117.3. The latter sub-rule provides:
'The affidavits submitted by either party shall be governed by the provisions of sub-rules 116.4’.
"GCR 1963, 116.4 requires that the affidavits 'shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth with particularity such facts as would be admissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the pleading or motion.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
If, as proposed, we were to allow every case to go to trial where there is the faintest expectation of hope that a witness could change his testimony so as to supply a missing element of a cause of action or defense, the sub-rule of GCR 1963, 117.3 would be completely emasculated. Summary judgment under the rule could never be granted. I cannot believe that this was the result contemplated by the Supreme Court in formulating the rule.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.