(concurring specially).
I concur in the majority opinion, but I feel impelled to respond to the dissent because it grossly exaggerates the majority opinion’s purpose and effect and erroneously describes the present state of the law in other jurisdictions.
I. First, let me say I believe this appeal could have been disposed of on the ground there was substantial compliance with Sisco and Brainard standards, even though the majority has elected not to go that route.
Defendant claims, and the dissent agrees, he is entitled to have his plea set aside because the trial court did not specifically advise him that intent was an element of each of the two crimes to which he pled guilty. It is claimed, too, the trial court erroneously set out for defendant the elements of each crime by omitting the element of intent in doing so. This is true only if one places full reliance on a portion of the record while disregarding the full record and the totality of the circumstances.
The trial court interrogated defendant at length concerning the charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. He explored the question of consent, purported consent, and mistaken consent. Defendant’s answers unequivocally disclosed he claimed none of these. As I understand the criminal intent in this charge, it is established by proof of driving without any claim of right to do so, either real or supposed. Under this record, it is unrealistic to say defendant did not know or understand this because the trial court failed to use the expression “criminal intent.” This was inherent in the court’s interrogation. It is inconceivable defendant did not know the State must prove lack of such consent.
*495The same is true to a lesser degree on the charge of breaking and entering. Again the interrogation elicited that defendant broke into the place and removed some boxes of merchandise. On the whole record — not just on one incomplete statement of the trial court concerning elements— there can be no reasonable doubt defendant understood what he was charged with, understood what the State must prove and understood what would constitute a defense to the information.
II. Turning now to my disagreement with the dissent, I do not find the state of the law in other jurisdictions to be as represented there. If anything, the trend is precisely contrary to the dissent’s claims. The asserted unanimity among the states as to guilty plea procedures simply does not exist.
Among the cases contrary to the position taken by the dissent is Merrill v. State, 206 N.W.2d 828, 831 (S.D.1973). There the court said:
“The sentencing court in the instant case should have made a more complete record by advising petitioner of his privilege against self-incrimination. We hold that the court’s failure to do so will not vitiate the plea where the postconviction proceedings clearly show that the petitioner was aware of his constitutional rights and that he understood those rights at the time he entered his guilty plea. Such a finding will support the ultimate finding that petitioner’s guilty plea was in fact voluntarily and intelligently entered.” (Emphasis added.)
In Edwards v. State, 51 Wis.2d 231, 186 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1971), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said Boykin did not require a defendant to specifically waive his constitutional rights “in seriatim form on the record.” The court put reliance on the fact that defendant did not claim ignorance of his rights but merely objected because the record did not show a specific waiver of them. The court said:
“The record as a whole shows Edwards understood what constitutional rights he waived by his plea and that is sufficient.”
In State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971) the Nebraska Supreme Court said that the defendant need not be given an item-by-item review of his constitutional rights nor need the court obtain a separate expressed verbal waiver as each of them before it can find an intelligent and voluntary waiver by defendant.
Apparently besieged by numerous guilty plea cases, much as we are, the Supreme Court of Michigan felt it necessary to consider the problem in a special case entitled In re Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132, 138-139 (1975). There the court said:
“In the necessary accommodation of the desirable with the practical it would be unrealistic to impose on the judge the obligation to impart to a defendant the substantive law applicable to his case.”
In this case the Michigan court detailed a number of specific omissions and errors which did not constitute grounds for setting aside a guilty plea.
The court held that the failure to advise the defendant of his rights does not necessarily require a reversal of his plea except as to the so-called “Jaworski rights” set out in People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21, 194 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1972). The three “Jawor-ski rights” are right to trial by jury, right to confront witnesses, and right against self-incrimination.
Michigan further amended its rules to relax the requirements in taking guilty pleas. The new rule provides the court need not explain the elements of the offense, or possible defenses, to a defendant before accepting a guilty plea. (235 N.W.2d at 149).
A number of the federal circuits have also refused to permit a defendant to escape the consequences of his plea on grounds much like the dissent finds to be reversible error.
In United States v. Sherman, 474 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1973) we find this:
“A criminal defendant possesses a great number of rights which he is foreclosed from asserting by the entry of a guilty plea * * * Requiring a specific waiv*496er of every one would only sow the seeds for later collateral attack * * * ”
In United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1971) the court said that knowledge of the consequences of a plea need not come from the judge, “despite what the McCarthy case says,” but may come from any source.
In Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059, 1060 (4th Cir. 1972) the court said:
“As a matter of expediency and circumspection, state judges may choose to engage in the colloquy mandated for their federal colleagues by Rule 11, but there is nothing in Boykin that requires them to do so. The exhortation to state judges to exercise the utmost solicitude ‘in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences’ is silent as to the method of discharging that function. If the record affirmatively shows that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, that is enough.”
The recent Supreme Court case of Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) apparently contains something for everyone. The dissent finds considerable comfort in that case; so do I. To me, for instance, that opinion rather clearly states courts may ordinarily assume a defendant has been advised of elementary and fundamental rights by his counsel as a factor in determining whether defendant entered a voluntary and intelligent plea. The court said:
“Normally, the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. * * * ”
The foregoing authorities are cited only to demonstrate courts are not, as the dissent insists, “raising instead of lowering their sensitivity to the critical issues in guilty plea cases.” The cases cited are illustrative, not exclusive, on the question.
I find the dissent’s insistence on the formalism of Sisco and Brainard rather than on the substance of the rules announced there to be unreal, illogical, and contrary to what those opinions themselves say.
Despite protestations to the contrary, Sis-co and Brainard did promise relief from frivolous appeals following guilty pleas. See State v. Sisco, supra, 169 N.W.2d at 546; Brainard v. State, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 713. Instead we have had an unending stream of such appeals.
The dissent reminds us of Learned Hand’s maxim that justice should not be rationed. I doubt Justice Hand meant that to set a unilateral standard. Society, too, is entitled to justice and to have criminal charges resolved promptly and fairly.
This dual obligation to the defendant and to society is what we had in mind when we called on lawyers to be more diligent in making guilty pleas valid guilty pleas. State v. Williams, 224 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa 1974).
The Michigan Supreme Court was even more pointed in its consideration of this same question in People v. Jaworski, supra, 194 N.W.2d at 873, where this appears:
“This Court could not fail to note that this appeal was brought by the same counsel who assisted the defendant, and, presumably as an officer of the court, the trial court as well. A certain anomaly is evident. On the one hand this attorney counseled with defendant presumably advising him of his legal rights in submitting a guilty plea, in this case even certifying in writing, with approval, defendant’s written statement that he pleads ‘understanding^.’ On the other hand, the same counsel, not too many months later, helps defendant petition to review the guilty plea procedure on the claim that defendant did not ‘understanding^’ waive his Boykin rights.
“The anomaly presents a dilemma. There are esteemed jurists including *497those who have sat on this bench who have felt that guaranteeing counsel to defendant practically assures defendant all his legal rights, unless counsel proves incompetent in the case. There are others that feel defendant’s rights are so basic that while assistance of counsel is the best assurance that the defendant will have concerned and learned advice, the court should still on the record advise defendant so that defendant’s rights will not only be presented to him but impressed upon him.
“In this case, if we were to follow the philosophy that assuring counsel insures understanding pleas, we should dismiss the petition for review — somewhat leaving counsel hoisted on his own petard as far as serving his client. On the other hand, if we should grant relief, we would in effect be passing judgment sub silentio that we could not as a judicial procedure rely on counsel to fully advise a defendant of his rights.
“This leaves unspoken a theoretical further alternative, namely a criminal trial as an adversary procedure not only between defendant and prosecutor, but between defendant and the court as well. The implications of this certainly do not comport with this Court’s philosophy of the proper administration of justice. As a consequence, we shall look to counsel in all criminal cases to advise their clients to the best of their ability, and as well or better than the high standard that the State Bar will seek to impose. But further than that this Court, regarding attorneys as officers of the court, will look to them to cooperate with the courts and not only see that their clients are personally well advised by them, but that the court will be assisted to see that all of a client’s rights are protected on the record. An attorney will do this not only in fulfillment of his oath and duty as an attorney, but also because any petition for review that is based on the defendant seeking a plea review on the grounds he did not enter his plea understandingly is a reflection on both the court and the defendant’s counsel, and incidentally insofar as proper procedure could have avoided the necessity of review, a burden on the administration of justice, and a disservice, if not an injustice, to others who have occasion to employ or operate the machinery of justice.”
I do not believe the majority opinion does violence to the substance of Sisco and Bram-ará. Rather it is a reasonable, fair, and constitutional effort to resolve this perplexing question.