(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that sec. 52.28, Stats., furnishes the exclusive procedure for a mother and putative father to contract for the support of an illegitimate child. In my view, the statute applies only to contracts intended to settle or bar paternity proceedings. I would draw a distinction between those contracts and the one before us, which was not made in consideration of an agreement to forbear from instituting paternity proceedings.1
*343This case arises on demurrer. According to the old, familiar rule, facts pleaded in the complaint are admitted. Among these facts are that deceased admitted paternity of the child and promised to pay for its support until such time as he and plaintiff could be married. I see no reason in policy why the language of the statute should be extended beyond its clear application to proceedings instituted under secs. 52.21 to 52.45, Stats. No interest of the public, the mother, or the child is offended; paternity proceedings are not barred by the contract. An agreement for support of an illegitimate child by weekly payments until such time as the mother and putative father can be married does not raise a probable or even possible inference of blackmail.
At common law the mother, not the father, was responsible for the support of an illegitimate child. By statute, the father, if determined, is primarily responsible and the mother secondarily.
The purpose of ch. 52, Stats., is to assure, as its title states, “Support of Dependents.” 2 It was enacted to protect the child and to relieve the public of responsibility of support. For this purpose the agreement, in order to relieve the putative father, must be approved by the court and drawn by the district attorney.
1 cannot read into sec. 52.28, Stats., a prohibition preventing the mother from contracting with the putative father to protect herself against her liability for the support of the child. The state, through the district attorney, can insist upon a proceeding that will result in a contract or judgment to protect the interests of the child and the public which would supersede or supplement a contract between the mother *344and putative father, but in the absence of such statutory contract or judgment I see no reason of public policy prohibiting the enforcement of the contract between the mother and putative father.
The plaintiff may well have some difficult problems of proof at trial; we are not reviewing the trial but merely examining the complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action. I would hold it does and reverse the order of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this dissent.
Such contracts have long been recognized in the law. See 10 Am. Jur. (2d), Bastards, p. 897, sec. 70: “Contracts binding a putative father to provide for or support his illegitimate child do not offend public policy or good morals, but rather accord with the policy of the law, especially where the putative father is under a statutory duty to support his illegitimate child.”
“52.45 Construction of sections 52.21 to 52.45. Sections 52.21 to 52.45 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved in any proceedings hereunder.”