We granted leave in this case to determine whether the accident exception1 to the physician-patient privilege contained in subsection 9 of the implied consent statute encompasses the situation in which an occupied vehicle is lawfully "parked” on the shoulder of the roadway with headlights on and engine running. We conclude that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing such a situation as an accident within the meaning of the statutory exception. Accordingly, we vacate the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and we *243order that the results of defendant’s blood test that were previously admitted under the accident exception be suppressed.
i
FACTS
Our review of the record supports the following facts. On February 2, 1991, at approximately 6:48 p.m., a Republic Township2 police officer observed the defendant’s vehicle lawfully "parked”3 on the shoulder of the roadway, with headlights on and motor running. Tire tracks in the snow indicated that the vehicle had traveled in a straight line, following its departure from the roadway. Stopping his car to investigate further, the officer observed the defendant slumped over the steering wheel, apparently unconscious and breathing erratically. Using a "slim jim” to unlock the defendant’s car, the officer attempted to rouse defendant by shaking him. When defendant failed to respond, the officer summoned emergency medical services (ems) to transport defendant to Bell Memorial Hospital in Ishpeming, where a blood sample was drawn and analyzed, revealing a blood alcohol content greater than 0.1 percent.
Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor per se4 and, alternatively, operating a motor vehicle while visibly impaired, second offense.5
*244Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood tests, arguing that he had not been involved in an accident as required under the accident exception, and that, consequently, the results were not admissible under MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)(9).6 The district court denied defendant’s suppression motion, ruling that an accident had occurred within the meaning of the statute, rendering the results of the blood test admissible.
Defendant challenged the district court’s ruling in an interlocutory appeal in the circuit court, but the circuit court affirmed the district court’s order, and denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal, and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions in an opinion per curiam issued June 22, 1993.7 While recognizing that a lawfully parked car, without more, cannot logically be considered an accident, it nevertheless determined that the totality of the circumstances mandated the conclusion that an accident had occurred and that the results of the blood test were properly admitted under the accident exception. MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1X9). In support of its conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited Tope v Howe, 179 Mich App 91; 445 NW2d 452 (1989), a case in which the Court of Appeals had struggled with the problem of determining what constituted an "accident” for purposes of the provision for arrest without a warrant embodied in the implied consent statute.8 The Tope Court adopted the following definition of "accident,” *245which had been promulgated twenty-six years earlier in an insurance dispute:
[A]n "undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.” [Tope, supra at 99, quoting Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich 12, 18-19; 123 NW2d 143 (1963).]
Applying this to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals concluded that a car parked alongside the highway with its engine running, its lights on, and its driver slumped over the passenger seat, unable to be easily aroused, when considered in its entirety, constituted
"an 'undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.’ ” [200 Mich App 277, 281; 503 NW2d 755 (1993).]
On this basis, the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
On March 21, 1994, we granted defendant’s application for interlocutory leave to appeal,9 and we now vacate the decisions of the lower courts and order that the results of the blood test be suppressed.
n
The sole issue before this Court on appeal is *246whether defendant was involved in an "accident” within the meaning of the accident exception10 to the physician-patient privilege.11 Perhaps partly because of its belief that the meaning of the word "accident” was intuitively apparent, the Legislature neglected to define this term when it enacted this legislation. Despite this apparent omission, we have never before endeavored to provide a functional definition of "accident” applicable to subsection 9 of the implied consent statute. Although we have ascribed meaning to this term in the insurance setting, we conclude today that the expansive definition of "accident” adopted by this Court within the insurance context cannot be blindly transported into the criminal arena. Accordingly, we turn our attention to the statute and the case law in an effort to determine the appropriate meaning of "accident” under the accident exception.
A
Generally, information relating to medical treatment falls within the ambit of the physician-patient privilege, and remains confidential.12 Subsection 9 of the implied consent statute, however, carves out a limited exception. At the time of the alleged "accident,” MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)(9) stated in pertinent part:
*247If after an accident the driver of a vehicle in the accident is transported to a medical facility and a sample of the driver’s blood is withdrawn at that time for the purpose of medical treatment, the results of a chemical analysis of that sample shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for a crime described in subsection (1) to show the amount of alcohol ... in the person’s blood at the time alleged, regardless of whether the person had been offered or had refused a chemical test. [Emphasis added.]
Pursuant to this section, results of a defendant’s blood tests may be obtained irrespective of whether the physician-patient privilege has been waived or a valid search warrant has been obtained. The admission of such evidence at trial in accordance with this subsection violates neither the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures nor the physician-patient privilege.13
In People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 328; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), we examined the constitutionality of subsection 9 of the implied consent statute, and concluded:
We find subsection 9 to be a carefully tailored statute which only allows chemical test results to be turned over to the state under narrowly defined circumstances, if the state requests them. For the statute to apply there first must be an accident, a person must be taken to a medical facility, the person must have been the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, and medical personnel must order a chemical analysis, on their own initiative, for medical treatment. This is not a sweeping abandonment of the physician-patient privilege. Prosecutors can only gain access to. chemical test results. They cannot obtain all of a *248person’s medical records, nor can they obtain a blood sample for their own discretionary testing. Consequently, within narrow parameters, the Legislature has created a minor exception to the physician-patient privilege.
It is this "minor exception” that we seek to interpret and apply in the instant case. We are constrained in this endeavor by the well-established canon of statutory construction that compels the judiciary to seek to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). In doing so, we must employ the "ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature.” Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Ever mindful of these guiding principles, we commence an examination of the purposes underlying the statute.
B
The legislative purposes underlying the accident exception were articulated in Perlos, supra, where we observed that subsection 9 was designed to promote the safety of both the public and the drunk driver. Perlos, supra at 333. Public safety is enhanced by simplifying the prosecution of drunk drivers; this "ease[] of prosecution” flows naturally from subsection 9’s authorization of the admission into evidence of blood-alcohol content test results obtained without a warrant.14 The injured drunk driver’s safety is facilitated by allowing police to acquire the test results without a war*249rant, thereby eliminating any potential delay in securing prompt medical attention resulting from the police officer’s need to effectuate a lawful arrest; arresting the driver before the administration of the blood-alcohol test is not a prerequisite for admission of the test results. Cognizant of the recognized purposes underlying the provision, we turn now to the relevant case law.
c
Initially, we note that neither our Court nor the Court of Appeals has had occasion to define "accident” under the accident exception. We are not without guidance in this endeavor, however, as both the Court of Appeals and courts of foreign jurisdictions have grappled with assigning meaning to the term "accident” under relevant criminal statutes.
1
In Tope, supra, the Court of Appeals was presented with the problem of defining "accident” under the provision for arrest without a warrant of the implied consent statute.15 The plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after she had driven her car over a lawn in the middle of a bright, autumn day, for no apparent reason.16 Upon dismissal of the criminal charge, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the arresting officers alleging, inter alia, false arrest and false imprisonment. The lawfulness of the arrest without a warrant hinged on whether the plaintiff’s actions could be classified as an acci*250dent.17 After acknowledging the absence of a definition of "accident” within the criminal context, the Court of Appeals proceeded to embrace a definition of "accident” advanced in the insurance setting, concluding that there was
no reason to believe a different definition would prevail in the context of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors or controlled substances. [Tope, supra at 99.]
Consequently, "accident” was defined as:
[A]n "undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.” [Tope, supra at 99, quoting Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York, supra at 18-19.]
We decline to adopt such an expansive definition of "accident” within the context of the accident exception at issue. Although this definition contains many words often employed in describing an "accident,” it is both over inclusive and under inclusive. Its over inclusiveness is evident from the case at bar. Despite the seemingly calculated nature of the defendant’s conduct in driving his car off the road, such action, when viewed from the perspective of an observer, may be characterized as being "out of the usual course of things,” and thus classified as an accident, contrary to our holding today. Its under inclusiveness is evident from the definition’s ostensible exclusion of intentional conduct from the realm of "accident.” We *251conclude below that both intended and unintended conduct may properly be classified as an "accident” within the meaning of the accident exception. Accordingly, we reject this definition of accident and commence an examination of the interpretation of "accident.”
2
The problem of defining the parameters of an accident arose in People v Martinson, 161 Mich App 55; 409 NW2d 754 (1987). The defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, both of which stemmed from his actions in spraying the victim with a fire extinguisher and using his automobile to pin the victim between two cars before driving away. The defendant argued that he could not be convicted of both crimes on the same facts because the former was premised on an intentional act, while the latter, involving "accidents,” could apply only to unintentional conduct.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding:
Where the term accident appears in criminal statutes which forbid leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted accident to include intentional conduct, reasoning that such statutes are not concerned with the cause of an accident but are intended to include all automobile collisions. [Martinson, supra at 57. Citations omitted.]
We believe two points should be extracted from this case. First, that the intent of the actor, though relevant, is not controlling in determining *252whether an accident has occurred,18 and secondly, that the term "accident,” when modified by "automobile,” generally refers to a collision.19
3
Our Court of Appeals had the opportunity to apply the accident exception in People v Stoney, 157 Mich App 721; 403 NW2d 212 (1987). The determinative issue in that case, as in the case at bar, concerned the admissibility of blood-alcohol content test results. The defendant was bleeding and incoherent when discovered at the scene of an accident and two other passengers in his car were also injured. The Court of Appeals concluded that the test results were admissible because the tests had been performed by medical personnel after the defendant had been transported to a hospital for treatment following the accident.
This case is instructive for two reasons. Initially, we note the lack of analysis in the Court’s determination that an accident had occurred. The obvious explanation is that it will often be readily apparent that an "accident” has occurred.20 In this *253case, the serious injury sustained by both the driver and the passengers dispels any doubt that they were involved in an accident. The second point meriting consideration is a natural corollary to the first. While not dispositive, it is often the case that an accident will spawn either personal injury or property damage.21 Although the absence of injuries or property damage cannot conclusively prove the nonoccurrence of an accident, the existence of either of these following a collision compels the conclusion that an accident has occurred.
4
The dilemma of determining whether an accident had occurred was again before the Court of Appeals, though within a slightly different context,22 in People v Spencley, 197 Mich App 505, 506; 495 NW2d 824 (1992). The facts of that case are similar to the facts presented in the case at bar. The defendant’s automobile was partially parked on the shoulder of US 31 and partially in a motel driveway. Its lights were on and the engine was running, with defendant crouched down behind the wheel, asleep. A strong odor of alcohol permeated the vehicle.
The issue on appeal was whether the officers had the authority to arrest the defendant where the offense was committed outside the officers’ presence and the arrest was effectuated without a warrant. The validity of this misdemeanor arrest without a warrant hinged on whether it fit within an exception to the warrant requirement. One such exception exists when an accident has oc*254curred. See MCL 764.15(l)(h); MSA 28.874(l)(h). Consequently, the validity of the arrest was necessarily contingent on whether an accident had occurred. Without engaging in any analysis, the Court proceeded to state in conclusory fashion that the defendant had not been involved in an accident and that the arrest was illegal. Spencley, supra at 505. The importance of this case lies in its illustration that the unusual nature of an event is not necessarily sufficient to render it an "accident.”
5
Finally, we survey the definition of accident found in both the American Heritage Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary.23 Accident has been defined by the American Heritage Dictionary (new college ed), p 8, as "[a]n unexpected and undesirable event; a mishap.” Black’s Law Dictionary offers the following as the most commonly accepted meaning of the word accident:
"[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens . . . .” [6th ed, p 15.]
The key point to be distilled from these definitions is that an accident often encompasses an event that is undesirable for and unexpected by at least *255one of the parties involved.24 This factor, however, is not dispositive. Despite the Court of Appeals apparent ruling to the contrary, the unexpectedness or undesirability of an event viewed from the perspective of a policeman coming on the scene is not necessarily sufficient to classify the incident as an "accident.” Rather, it is only one of many factors to be considered. With this in mind, we turn now to the rule to be derived.
in
A
We do not attempt to propound a general definition of "accident” applicable to all criminal statutes, or even to only the accident exception. Rather, we believe that the determination whether an accident has occurred will depend on an examination of all the circumstances surrounding an incident.25 Although we are declining to formulate a precise definition of the term, we think the relevant factors used in making such a determination can and should be delineated. Accordingly, we believe consideration should be given to whether there has been a collision,26 whether personal in*256jury or property damage has resulted from the occurrence, and whether the incident either was undesirable for or unexpected by any of the parties directly involved. While we do not intend this to be an exhaustive list of factors to be considered, included are those that we believe will appear with frequency in true "accidents”; such factors may be regarded as the distinguishing characteristics of an accident. With these considerations in mind, we turn now to their application in the case at bar.
B
As stated above, defendant’s vehicle was lawfully "parked” on the shoulder of the roadway, with its headlights on and its motor running. Tire tracks in the snow established that defendant’s vehicle had traveled in a straight path upon leaving the roadway. Defendant was slumped over the steering wheel, breathing erratically and seemingly unconscious. There was no sign of a collision, no evidence of property damage, and no apparent personal injury, other than visible intoxication. Because the defendant was the only party involved in the incident, we need only examine whether such incident was undesirable for or unexpected by him. It seems clear that these circumstances were neither undesirable for nor unexpected by defendant. Rather, it appears as though he parked on the side of the road in order to sleep off the effects of alcohol, leaving his car running in an attempt to stay warm on this February night in Marquette County. Consequently, we conclude that the events that led the officer to believe that an accident had occurred were neither undesirable for nor unexpected by the defendant, but, instead, embodied a calculated effort on defendant’s part to *257mitigate the potential harm stemming from his intoxication.
Consideration of these factors compels the conclusion that defendant was not involved in an accident as required under the statutory exception. We believe this result is also supportable from a policy perspective. We noted earlier that one of the purposes of the accident exception was to facilitate the safety of both the public and the drunken driver. To conclude that an accident has occurred when a drunk driver has recognized his impairment and left the road in an attempt to recover his sobriety by sleeping is to discourage the one drop of sensible conduct in a sea of irresponsible action. We do not believe the Legislature intended these consequences, and we decline to interpret "accident” in a manner both inconsistent with and subversive to our perception of the legislative intent underlying the accident exception.
IV
The absence of a collision, personal injury, or property damage, and the seemingly expected and desired nature of defendant’s actions in driving his car onto the side of the roadway, with lights on and engine running, compels us to conclude that the actions of the defendant cannot be construed as an accident within the meaning of the accident exception. Consequently, the results of defendant’s blood test cannot be admitted into evidence on the basis of the accident exception.27 Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and order that the results of defendant’s blood tests be suppressed.
Cavanagh, C.J., and Levin, Riley, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Brícele y, J.At the relevant time, MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)(9) provided, in pertinent part:
If after an accident the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident is transported to a medical facility and a sample of the driver’s blood is withdrawn at that time for the purpose of medical treatment, the results of a chemical analysis of that sample shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for a crime described in subsection (1) to show the amount of alcohol ... in the person’s blood at the time alleged, regardless of whether the person had been offered or had refused a chemical test. [Emphasis added.]
Republic Township is located in Marquette County, Michigan.
Although the police officer initially testified that the vehicle was lawfully parked, on redirect examination, the officer explained that the vehicle was just "[pjulled off to the side of the road. The vehicle has a standard transmission; it was in neutral.” For purposes of this appeal, we need only note that the vehicle was not in motion and out of harm’s way.
MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325.
MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2).
See n 1.
200 Mich App 277; 503 NW2d 755.
See MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1), which provided in pertinent part:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when *245the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person was, at the time of an accident, the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident ....
444 Mich 973.
MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)0). See n 1.
MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157, which provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do any act for the patient as a surgeon.
See n 11.
See People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305; 462 NW2d 310 (1990).
Our Court of Appeals acknowledged this same purpose in People v Stoney, 157 Mich App 721, 726; 403 NW2d 212 (1987), when it noted that this provision was designed to simplify the prosecution of drunk drivers by allowing prosecutors access to blood-alcohol test results performed by hospitals, without having to obtain a search warrant.
MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1). See n 8.
The plaintiff’s actions in driving over the lawn were observed by the homeowner and evidenced by the three ruts remaining in the lawn.
See MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1) and n 8.
The intentional nature of a person’s conduct does not preclude characterizing such conduct as an "accident” under subsection 9 of the implied consent statute, though it may weigh against such a classification.
See State v Parker, 299 Or 534, 542; 704 P2d 1144 (1985) ("The word 'accident,’ therefore, is used in a generic sense, to mean any occasion in which a driver’s vehicle 'collides with’ or, in other words, strikes against another object”).
See People v Dexter, 49 AD2d 981; 374 NYS2d 727 (1975), where the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held that an accident had occurred within the meaning of the applicable statute when the defendant’s vehicle was discovered after following skid marks leading across both sides of the road, into a field, and finally ending at the defendant’s vehicle, twenty-five to thirty feet off the public highway. The existence of skid marks on both sides of the road and the car’s exodus into the field enabled the court to infer that the car was out of control, and thereby conclude, without analysis, that an accident had occurred.
See State v DuBray, 298 NW2d 811 (SD, 1980) (Where there was noticeable damage to the headlight, headlight bezel, and the bumper guard, it was evident there had been a traffic accident).
Namely, under the statute pertaining to the operation of a motor vehicle while impaired, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2).
We note that our consideration of dictionary definitions comports with our mandate to employ the "ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature.” Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, supra at 376.
Although we note that it is often unexpected and undesired by one of the parties, we are not holding that that must be the case. We can envision a scenario in which a car intentionally may be driven on to a person’s own property, yet it could be classified as an "accident” within the meaning of the accident exception.
Furthermore, we note that an accident is often unexpected and undesired by at least one of the parties involved, but not necessarily all, because it may be that one or more of the parties involved in the "accident” intended such action, and we have determined that such intentional conduct may properly be characterized as an “accident.”
See State v Smyth, 121 RI 188, 191; 397 A2d 497 (1979), where the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that an accident "is a generic concept requiring examination of its environs in order to define it.”
Collision is defined as "[a] direct, violent striking together; crash,” in the American Heritage Dictionary (new college ed), p 262.
See n 1.