DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County striking the Nomination Petition of Francis J. Hanssens, Jr. as a Democratic Candidate for the Seventh Councilmanic District Seat on Philadelphia’s City Council (hereafter Seventh District). First, I do not believe that the trial court’s April 21, 2003 order complies with this Court’s remand order, which required the trial court to take testimony on the “after-discovered” evidence presented by Hanssens and then to issue new findings of fact and conclusions of law based on that evidence and a new decision. The April 21 decision recites findings of fact and conclusions of law but it offers no discussion of the trial court’s reasoning nor case law or statutory *1253authority for the decision reached. Second, I recognize that time is of the essence in these election law cases and that decisions must be made expeditiously, but I am not persuaded that the trial court properly considered all of the relevant, necessary and uncontradicted facts in this case in reaching the court’s decision.
The Supreme Court observed in Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974), that what constitutes “domicile” is a conclusion of law, which is based on the facts presented. Another well-settled principle is that an individual’s intent to establish a residence is determined by the “actual state of facts” as opposed to what the individual declares them to be, In re Prendergast, 543 Pa. 498, 673 A.2d 324 (1996), and further that the location of the individual’s family is considered generally to be the individual’s place of residence,1 In re Nomination Petitions of McIntyre, 778 A.2d 746 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). That latter fact alone, however, should not be dis-positive under the specific circumstances of this case. In addition, courts have held that where an individual registers to vote and actually does vote is a strong indicator of that individual’s residence. In re Pren-dergast.2
In this case, the uncontradicted testimony showed that apparently for some time Hanssens resided with his family in the Seventh District at the Godfrey Avenue address and that he was registered to vote from the Seventh District. In the May 2002 primary, Hanssens sought and won election as a Seventh District committeeman, and according to his testimony he planned for several years to run for the that district’s councilmanic seat. However, Hanssens’ Godfrey Avenue property and one other property that he owned were removed from the Seventh District boundary fines during redistricting in 2002. He owned a third piece of property that was located on Griscom Street, which was still located in the Seventh District. Hanssens testified that he moved into the Griscom Street property with the intent of making it his permanent residence, and once the renovations were complete his family would permanently relocate to this property with him later this year and he would put the Godfrey Avenue property up for sale.
The trial court focused principally on the minimal amount of clothing and food retained at the Griscom Street property, Hanssens’ lack of use of utilities at the property and the fact that his family remained at the Godfrey Avenue property. The record shows, however, that Hanssens did not seek to change his registration and residence from one councilmanic district to another to run for office in the latter dis*1254trict; rather, the record is clear and -unre-futed that he was registered to vote from the Seventh District, was an elected committeeman from the Seventh District and resided in the Seventh District at an address which was officially removed from the boundary fines of the district.
The trial court made no findings regarding uncontradicted evidence that Hanssens registered in 2003 to vote at the Griscom Street property, that he changed his driver’s license address to the Griscom Street property through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, that he filed his federal and state tax returns in 2003 using the Griscom Street property address and also used that address for 2003 tax purposes and that he was served on March 19, 2003 with the objectors’ petition to set aside his nomination petition at the Griscom Street property. In short, the trial court failed to consider many of the factors that courts indicate should be considered when determining an individual’s intent to establish a residence at a particular location.
The Supreme Court in In re Prendergast held that a person may acquire a new domicile only by showing physical presence at the new residence and an intention to make the new residence a principal home. The evidence demonstrates a physical presence at the Griscom Street property, a fact which the trial court previously rejected based on the subsequently discredited testimony of a key witness for the objectors, Steve Killian; on remand the trial court found that new evidence called into serious question the reliability of Killian’s testimony. In any event, the evidence further demonstrates Hanssens’ intent to make the new residence on Griscom Street his principal home. The Supreme Court did not require in In re Prendergast nor in any other case that a person in every situation must immediately move his or her family into the new premises, even while renovations are under way, to establish a new domicile. The trial court and the Majority evidently have, added this new requirement on their own.3
Nevertheless, unrefuted evidence unequivocally establishes Hanssens’ prior permanent residence and voting history and practices from the Seventh District and his election as a committeeman in 2002 from that district and that his prior residence was removed from the Seventh District boundary thereafter due to redistricting. That evidence, standing alone, supports the conclusion of law that Hans-*1255sens intended to remain a resident of the Seventh District and to make the Griscom Street property his new residence when he relocated to this property and listed it on voter and driving records and on federal and state tax records. I therefore would reverse the trial court’s decision to strike Hanssens’ nomination petition and would permit him to run as a Democratic Candidate for the Seventh Councilmanic District Seat in the May 2003 primary election.
. See also Section 704(d) of the Pennsylvania Election Code, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2814(d).
. Although not involving an election code dispute the Federal District Court's decision in Blackwood v. Zito, 2002 WL 31898887, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24745 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 19, 2002), involving a challenge to domicile, is instructive. The district court held that courts may consider a variety of factors when determining domicile. Those factors include, among others, voting registration and voting practice, location of personal and real property, the residence claimed for tax purposes and the residence listed for driver’s license and vehicle registration purposes. See also In re Prendergast (Supreme Court held that appellant established a new domicile in Virginia by virtue of the registration of her vehicle and most importantly her registration to vote and actual voting in several elections in that state; she therefore was not a citizen of Pennsylvania during the four years immediately preceding the election for Representative in the General Assembly, 196th legislative district).
. I find added support in In Re Hacker, 728 A.2d 1033 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), which involved an objector's challenge to Hacker’s nomination petition for sheriff of Berks County on the grounds that his affidavit improperly listed his residence to be in Kutztown where he and his wife had purchased property then under renovation. The objector alleged that Hacker’s residence was in Fleetwood where he resided with his wife, and a contractor in Kutztown testified that Hacker’s Kutztown property did not appear to have anyone living in it. Hacker testified that he was renovating the Kutztown property to reside there and had listed his Fleetwood home for sale.
In affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss the objector’s petition to set aside Hacker’s nomination petition, this Court noted in addition to the above that Hacker offered his voter registration card and his vehicle registration card which listed his Kutztown address. Citing the qualifications listed in the County Code for holding county office, which included residency in the county for one year next preceding the election, the Court noted the undisputed evidence that both of Hacker's “residences" were in Berks County and that even if he provided a different address on his candidate’s affidavit the defect was immaterial. His true residence was in Berks County nonetheless. The evidence in the case sub judice likewise establishes that Hanssens’ true residence was in the Seventh District.