dissenting.
I join in Mr. Justice Gappy’s dissenting opinion, however, I write separately to emphasize the inadequacy of the warning for the intended user of the product.
*273As set forth, in part, in the Majority Opinion, the relevant facts reveal that Kimberly Davis (Appellant), was a quality control inspector for Keystone Equity Meats (Equity). Her duties included the operation of two blenders, manufactured by Bepex Corporation and Berwind Corporation (Appellees). Each blender had the capacity to mix 2,000 pounds of meat at one time. The blenders mixed lean and fat meats into regulation quality. Appellant was responsible for testing the meat in the blenders to assure that it met certain fat content specifications. Once the specifications were met, Appellant would operate each blender on its discharge mode to release the meat into a hopper where it would be carried on a conveyor belt to the next phase of processing.1 Because Equity had removed an interlocking safety device from the blenders, an operator, like Appellant, did not have to use both hands to depress the valves that opened the discharge doors to release the meat. The purpose of the safety device was to prevent an operator’s hands from coming anywhere near the rotating blender blades. Without the safety device, the discharge doors on the blenders would remain open until the operator returned the levers to the closed position.
On July 16, 1985, while discharging meat from a blender, Appellant noticed that meat was accumulating on the convey- or. It had piled up on the conveyor to the level of the blender’s discharge doors. Because the levers held the discharge doors open, Appellant was exposed to the risk of the rotating blades. She then pushed the button to stop the mixing blades, turned off the conveyor, and reached toward the meat. Her right hand came into contact with the continually rotating blender blades, which traumatically severed her index, ring and middle fingers.
I agree with Mr. Justice Cappy that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the removal of the safety *274device by Equity was not so extraordinary to be unforeseeable to Appellees and, therefore, was not a superseding cause of Appellant’s injuries. See Sweitzer v. Dempster Systems, 372 Pa.Super. 449, 539 A.2d 880 (1988); Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, 364 Pa.Super. 178, 527 A.2d 1012 (1987). When removal of the safety device would allow an employee in a production line to operate more than one blender at a time, thus increasing productivity, it is particularly significant that Appellees did not permanently attach the safety device to the blender, but shipped it separately for the employer to install, and that Appellees did not design the blender so that it would not operate absent the safety device. Because the removal of the safety device exposed the user to the risk of the rotating blades, the next question is whether Appellees’ warning was inadequate for failing to alert the user that the blades would continue to rotate after turning off the power.
It is well-settled that a product may be considered defective for strict liability purposes absent adequate warnings to the ultimate user concerning dangers inherent in the product. Mackowick v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 525 Pa. 52, 575 A.2d 100 (1990).
The seller must provide with the product every element necessary to make it safe for use. One such element may be warnings and/or instructions concerning use of the product. A seller must give such warning and instructions as are required to inform the user or consumer of the possible risks and inherent limitations of his product. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment h.
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 100, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975).
As demonstrated in Maekowick, the adequacy of a warning is measured in relation to the knowledge or training of the intended user. See also Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220, 545 A.2d 906 (1988)(the necessity of a warning depends in part on the knowledge of the ordinary consumer, with knowledge common to the community as to the characteristics of the product). In Maekowick, an electrician was severely burned when he pointed a screwdriver into a live *275capacitor, causing the electricity to “arc” to him from the capacitor.2 The capacitor carried a warning concerning the danger of live, uninsulated fuses and instructed the user to ground the electricity before handling it. We rejected the electrician’s claim that the warning was insufficient for failing to specifically warn of the danger of electrical arcing inherent in the product. We reasoned that the product was intended to be used only by qualified electricians who would be expected to know of the dangers of arcing in such equipment. There, the plaintiff had thirty years of experience as an electrician and was more than adequately alerted to the danger. Therefore, we concluded that the manufacturer had no duty to provide a warning concerning the propensity of electricity to arc from the product.
In contrast, in Berkebile, we allowed a plaintiff to pursue a claim against a helicopter manufacturer for inadequate warnings and instructions concerning the operation of an on-board safety device. In Berkebile, the manufacturer marketed a particular helicopter model as easy to fly for both beginning and professional pilots. Berkebile, a businessman, purchased one. While flying alone, he was killed when his helicopter crashed after experiencing engine failure. The manufacturer had provided certain instructions concerning activation of the safety device in case of engine failure, but had failed to provide a specific warning concerning the need to activate the safety device almost instantaneously. We reversed the jury verdict for the manufacturer and remanded for a determination, inter alia, of whether the warnings were sufficient to alert Berkebile of the urgency of the situation.
Following the rationale of Mackowick and Berkebile, I believe that Appellees provided an inadequate warning to the ultimate user of their product, an employee on-line in a meat processing plant. As a matter of common sense, Appellant would have known that while injury may result from contact *276with the still blade of a blender, a greater risk of serious injury arises from the rotating blades. As noted by Mr. Justice Cappy, common experience would instruct the average person, such as Appellant, that the danger of rotating blades arises from operation of the machinery. Here, however, the grave danger posed by the rotating blades existed after the blender was no longer in operation. Appellant, in fact, was unaware that the blades would continue to rotate after she turned off the power. Appellees should not have presumed that an intended user, such as Appellant, would have anticipated a danger contrary to common experience. The warning, “DANGER, KEEP FINGERS OUT OF DOOR OPENINGS,” failed to alert her of the specific, inobvious danger, when the power was off, of the continued rotation of the blades. Thus, after depressing the “stop” button on the blender, Appellant was not informed of the extent of the danger she faced as she reached her hands toward the discharge doors to release accumulated meat. As we stated in Berkebile, “a greater degree of danger requires a greater degree of protection.” Id. at 102, 337 A.2d at 902. Here, however, the warning was inadequate for failing to warn of the danger posed by the continued rotation of the blades.
The Majority states that an additional warning concerning the continued rotation of the blades only becomes necessary if the user blatantly ignores the warning to keep his or her fingers away from the door openings. Citing Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807 (1984), the Majority concludes that where, as here, the manufacturer provides a warning, the manufacturer may reasonably assume that the user will heed it. Baldino, a negligence action, does not, however, stand for the proposition that an inadequate warning may relieve a manufacturer of liability. Instead, Baldino instructs that whether a user’s failure to heed a warning absolves a manufacturer of liability depends on the adequacy of the warning to alert the user of the particular dangers inherent to the product. Here, the manufacturer’s warning failed to inform the user of all inobvious risks inherent to the product. Therefore, the user may have proceeded in disre*277gard of certain known risks, i.e., the danger of still blades, but without knowledge of the particular danger that caused her injury, i.e., the danger of rotating blades. As a result, the user’s failure to heed the inadequate warning should not absolve the manufacturer from liability.
Because the evidence supports a determination that Appellees failed to provide an adequate warning, thus, rendering the product defective, I respectfully dissent.
. As alleged by Appellant, she would depress levers to open doors on the side of the blender to allow the meat to fall onto a conveyor that would carry the meat to the next processing stage. It was critical for Appellant to maintain a continuous flow of meat because all subsequent stages of the production line were dependant on the availability of the blended meat.
. “Arcing” is a principle of electricity that occurs when a grounding instrument or object is close enough to the electric charge so that the electricity explosively flashes to the instrument or object and flows through it. Maekowick.