dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that Rule 1100 was complied with. In order to properly deal with the Rule 1100 *406issue, it is necessary to detail the circumstances relevant thereto, which are.as follows: Charges were filed on July 21, 1976. Trial was required to commence by January 17,1977. The case was listed for trial on November 8, 1976, but not reached. On January 7, 1977, the Commonwealth, alleging that Appellee could not be brought to trial within the 180-day period, filed a Petition for Extension pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100(c). Appellee’s counsel did not file an Answer to the Petition or appear at the hearing. The Petition was summarily granted. Trial was held on February 8, 1977.
At the evidentiary hearing, Appellee’s trial counsel could not offer any justification for failing to contest the Petition for Extension. He testified that at the time, a secretary had just left his employment, that his office “was really all loused up”, that to the best of his knowledge, he was not aware, of the Petition for Extension, although his file showed that he was properly notified of it, and that he would have appeared for a hearing on such a petition if he had been aware of it.
The Chief Clerk in the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office testified concerning the Commonwealth’s actions prior to trial. He testified that the District Attorney’s Office was responsible for listing cases for arraignment and then scheduling trial dates. Appellee was arraigned on October 12, 1976 and scheduled for trial on November 8, 1976. The witness testified that the District Attorney’s Office had no control over the scheduling of the case after its initial listing for trial.
A Criminal Assignment Clerk employed by the Court Administrator’s Office also testified. She said that cases are tried in the order they are listed and that the instant case was not tried because there were previously listed cases ahead of it. The witness testified as to the number of judges available for trial. The number varied from week to week. During the period from the listing of the case for trial to the actual trial, there were eight weeks during which four judges were available for criminal trials, one during *407which three were available, three during which two were available and two during which none were available. The witness testified that the order in which cases were tried could be changed when there was a grant of a continuance or an attorney conflict. She said that the order was not changed on the basis of the age of the cases for Rule 1100 purposes. She said that she had no knowledge of any case being reassigned from one Assistant District Attorney to another during the relevant time period and that such reassignment would be under the control of the District Attorney’s Office.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100(c)(3) provides that an extension of the deadline for commencement of trial on motion of the Commonwealth “shall be granted only upon findings based upon a record showing that trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth and, if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, upon findings based upon a record showing the causes of the delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.”
The Commonwealth has the burden to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the requirements of this provision have been met, Commonwealth v. Ehredt, 485 Pa. 191, 401 A.2d 358 (1979). A court may grant an extension on a showing of due diligence and a certification that trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business, but if a delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must show the causes of the delay and the reasons why it cannot be avoided, Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). A bare assertion that a case was ready for trial but not reached is insufficient to justify an extension for judicial delay, Commonwealth v. Hill, 290 Pa.Super. 399, 434 A.2d 813 (1981). Judicial delay that prevents a case from being tried within the prescribed period does not justify an extension if the situation is brought about by a lack of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth. In Commonwealth v. Martin, 246 Pa.Super. 407, 371 A.2d 903 *408(1977), the Commonwealth did nothing to bring defendant to trial for four months after the Complaint was filed and waited five and one-half months to obtain an indictment. Such delay on the part of the Commonwealth was held to manifest a lack of due diligence and to preclude an extension on the basis of judicial delay.
Under the facts of the instant case, I would find that there was not a proper basis for extension. The Commonwealth should be held to the requirement that it exercise due diligence at all times during the pendency of a case. The Commonwealth’s unexplained delay in arraigning Appellee manifested a lack of due diligence similar to that shown in Martin, supra. Furthermore, the Superior Court decided that an extension on the basis of judicial delay could not be granted in the absence of a showing that the case could not be moved ahead of other cases that did not have Rule 1100 problems. The testimony indicated that it was not the court’s practice to change the order in which cases were tried for that reason, and thus no effort was made to determine whether Rule 1100 problems could be avoided by moving the case ahead of others.
The majority holds today that strict adherence to the 180-day rule is ill-advised because of the rigidity it demands and the hardships it causes in urban areas with crowded dockets. I must respectfully disagree. Applying the majority’s view of Rule 1100 totally emasculates the purpose for which the Rule was adopted. The Rule was promulgated to ensure a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and to avoid a case by case review to determine whether that right has been violated. It is totally illogical to have a rule designed to protect both an individual defendant and society at large and now to apply that rule in such an elastic fashion so as to accommodate the practices of various judicial districts. If the majority is of the belief that the Rule should be abandoned, then it should do so without the charade of judicial gymnastics.
Counsel’s failure to contest the Petition for Extension constituted ineffectiveness such as to entitle Appellee to relief. As noted supra, counsel offered no justification for *409failing to contest the Petition for Extension. In Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967), we held that in a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court must conduct an independent review of the record and examine counsel’s stewardship in light of available alternatives. Counsel is deemed effective once it is determined that the course of action had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interests. The failure of counsel to take a particular action on behalf of a client does not constitute ineffectiveness if it is based on a reasonable assessment of its value, but the failure does constitute ineffectiveness if it is the result of sloth or lack of awareness of available alternatives, Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). Counsel is not ineffective in failing to assert a baseless claim, but an inquiry into the basis for counsel’s decision must be made if the claim has arguable merit, Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). In the instant case, the record shows that the failure of counsel to oppose the Petition for Extension was due to neglect and not a reasonable assessment of the merits. Counsel should be deemed ineffective, as opposition to the Petition for Extension would have had merit.
I would affirm the Order of the Superior Court and discharge Appellee.