concurring and dissenting:
I join in Part II. A. of the opinion of the Court affirming the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court erred in ruling that Rush was not sufficiently advised of her rights in accordance with Miranda, and in granting the motion to suppress her inculpatory statements on that ground. In other words, the Miranda warnings were constitutionally adequate.
I dissent from the majority’s ruling on the involuntariness issue. I agree with the State that Rush cannot appeal the Circuit Court’s finding that portions of her statement were voluntary. The ruling was interlocutory, and because there exists no statute or right to appeal such an order, her claim may be raised in an appeal from a final judgment, and not within the State’s appeal.
BELL, C.J., dissenting, in which GREENE, J. joins.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States considered “the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which accure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself,” id. at 439, 86 S.Ct. at 1609, in the process seeking “to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” Id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611. Addressing the concrete constitutional guidelines it intended to provide, it held:
“the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated bylaw enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.... As for the *106procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.”
Id. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added).. These guidelines were necessary because the Court
“concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s "will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”
Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624.
Having identified the rights of which a custodial defendant must be apprised, the Court explained the rationale underlying each:
*107“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury____Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.
“The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; ... a warning is a clear cut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.
“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of *108the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
“The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more ‘will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.’ Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762[, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964) ]. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
“The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the *109statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v. State of California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-448, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 1293-1296, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-26. But, the Court concluded, the advice of the right to counsel generally does not suffice, the defendant’s ability to afford counsel must be considered. It explained:
“In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights ..., it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warning of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.”
Id. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (footnotes omitted).
The importance of, indeed, the necessity for, the requirement that a defendant be informed explicitly of his or her right to have counsel present both before and during questioning was underscored by the Court and made manifest when it admonished that “[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.” Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626. Similarly, with regard to the indigent defendant, the Court was clear and unequivocal:
*110“[t]he financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent, as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance.”
Id. at 472, 86 S.Ct. at 1626-27.
The majority holds today that the Miranda warnings given the petitioner in this case satisfies the Miranda requirements here in before reviewed.1 Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 89-90, 939 A.2d 689, 702 (2007). I do not, and cannot, agree.
*111Rather than being read the Advice of Rights and Waiver Form, the petitioner was given warnings that were modified by the interrogating detective. As modified, the warnings given advised that if the petitioner wanted a lawyer and could not afford to hire one, counsel would be provided her at no cost, “at some time.” The latter phrase was added by the detective. In addition, rather than informing the petitioner in accordance with the last sentence of the Form, which acknowledged the petitioner’s right to elect to proceed with questioning without counsel, the detective amended the sentence to omit any reference to the petitioner’s right of election.2 By blessing these modifications, the majority undermines a key purpose of Miranda, jealously to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by making clear to a suspect in custody “that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). The advisements in this case are far from clear. To *112the contrary, the message that they convey is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, confusing. This is particularly the case when it is considered that the “at some time” qualifier applies only to appointed counsel; it does not, and the majority does not suggest that it does, apply to hired counsel. The message is also ambiguous with respect to whether appointed counsel can be present during questioning. While there is no explicit statement that appointed counsel, too, must be present at and during questioning, there is a suggestion that the opposite is the case: the advisements assumed, and conveyed to the petitioner, the expectation that questioning would occur, subject to termination later, when it did not recognize what must be obvious if the spirit and meaning of Miranda are to be respected, that for the questioning to proceed, the petitioner must have waived the right to counsel’s presence. And that waiver, Miranda requires to b e “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” made, an impossibility unless the options are clear and unambiguous. In that regard, the inclusion of the words, “at some time,” even if to explain the system or protocol for the appointment of counsel for indigents, is significant. That reference may, and indeed is likely to, lead an indigent defendant to believe, and not unreasonably so, that he or she is not entitled to an appointed attorney during the impending questioning, but, instead, counsel will be appointed for him or her only “at some time” in the future. These ambiguities had so muddied the advisements given, no waiver given, or taken, under these circumstances could ever be knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
Acknowledging that the goal of its review of the advisements given is to determine whether the petitioner’s rights under Miranda were adequately preserved, the majority purports to have “[a]ssess[ed] the totality of the advisements, both oral and written,” for that purpose. Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702. In fact, “[i]n lawyerlike fashion,” the majority “parses” the advisements, looking for an interpretation that plausibly could be consistent with Miranda. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 216, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2887, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Having noted that “Rush *113was told that she could speak with a lawyer before being questioned and at any time during questioning[,]” and concluding that the “modification of the advisements did not tie her right to counsel to a future event or to her ability to obtain a lawyer herself; rather, as in Duckworth, the modified language only clarified, in a separate advisement, how and when appointed counsel would be provided,” Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702, the majority is satisfied that, as in Duckworth, the advisements “touched all of the bases required by Miranda,” 492 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. at 2880, and “reasonably conve[yed] to [the petitioner her] rights as required by Miranda.” Id. (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)). It thus announces that “the modified language does not suggest ... that appointed counsel could not be present during questioning.” Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702.
The majority is right, of course, its interpretation of the advisements is a plausible one all of the requirements were mentioned and, thus, all the bases were touched. It cannot be disputed that, superficially and technically, Rush was told she could speak with a lawyer before and during questioning. The trouble with the majority’s analysis is that the question it answers is the wrong one. It is not the question whether all of the requirements were mentioned or whether one interpretation is to be preferred over another; rather, the question is whether the advice given was sufficiently clear and unambiguous as to enable the defendant, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, to waive her Miranda rights. It is important to consider the advisements both in toto and in context. In that regard, it is significant that, immediately after being told of the right to have counsel before and during questioning, the petitioner was told that if she could not afford a lawyer, she would be appointed one “at some time,” not prior to the commencement of questioning. The petitioner could have, and probably did, glean from the “at some time” qualification that only those able to afford a private attorney would be entitled to seek counsel during questioning, and accordingly, those *114unable to- afford an attorney would have to wait until a later period in time. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 216-17, 109 S.Ct. at 2887, in which Marshall, J., dissenting, observed, in language remarkably applicable to the case sub judice:
“What goes wholly overlooked in [the majority’s] analysis is that the recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects unlettered in the law, not lawyers or judges or others schooled in interpreting legal or semantic nuance. Such suspects can hardly be expected to interpret, in as facile a manner as [the majority], the pretzel-like warnings here-intertwining, contradictory, and ambiguous as they are.”
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 399 A.2d 111, 115 (1979).) Just as important, the petitioner was told of her right to terminate questioning once it was begun, but not that the commencement of questioning without counsel had to be with her consent to proceed in that fashion.
Miranda mandates that, before an accused may be subjected to custodial interrogation, he or she must be “adequately and effectively apprised of his [or her] rights against self-incrimination,” 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, which includes being informed explicitly of his or her right to have counsel present both before and during questioning. Id. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. The warnings in this case do not pass muster. If “[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right [to counsel, appointed, if appropriate, during and before custodial questioning] will suffice to stand in its stead,” it follows that no amount of parsing to find a plausible interpretation of an ambiguous advisement will save that advisement. Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626. When the advisement is ambiguous, there can be no voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Only an explicit, clear warning provides the “ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.” Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct at 1626. What the Supreme Court iterated over forty years ago bears repeating and remembering:
“[t]he warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent—the *115person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present----[0]nly by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (emphasis added).
I dissent. Judge Greene joins in the views expressed herein.
. As relevant, the interrogation proceeded:
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: All right. Well, let’s get the formalities out of the way.
"RUSH: Okay.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Need anything to drink or anything or— "RUSH: No. I’m okay.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Okay.
"RUSH: Actually, I was wonderin’, I don’t know why I’m even here. The detective, police showed up at my door and arrested me, said I had a warrant.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Okay. Cindi, how far'd ya get in school? "RUSH: Ninth grade.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Do you know how to read?
"RUSH: Yeah, I’ve taken GED classes and I just haven’t been able to go take the test. I'm very (unintelligible). I have my CNA license and everything.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Okay. All right. Just to prove to me that you know how to read—
"RUSH: Mm-hmm.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN:—I’m going to let you read a portion of this statement for me, okay?
"RUSH: Okay.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Can you move that chair on up? Read this first sentence—
"RUSH: Mm-hmm.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN:—on the top line for me.
“RUSH: 'I am now going to read to you your rights under the law.' "DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: Very good. All right. I’m gonna read the rest to you out loud and then we'll go over it together, okay? "RUSH: Okay.
"DETECTIVE JERNIGAN: 'I'm now going to read you your rights under the law. If you do not understand something that I say to you, please stop me and I will explain it to you. You have the right to *111remain silent. If you choose to give up this right, anything that you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you’re asked any questions. You have the right, you, you have the right to have a lawyer with you while being questioned. If you want a lawyer and can’t afford one, one will be provided to you at some time at no cost. If at some point in time during our questioning you decide you don't wanna talk anymore, that’s your right as well.' Okay?
A short time later, Rush signed an Advice of Rights and Waiver Form, the contents of which, though similar, differed from the Detective's oral advisements in significant ways. Instead of 'If at some point in time during our questioning you decide you don't wanna talk anymore, that's your right as well,’ the last sentence of the Form reads ‘If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.’ The Form, which was typed, included a handwritten insertion of the phrase some time[.]”
. That sentence read: “If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.” As phrased by the detective, it informed the petitioner, “[i]f at some point in time during our questioning you decide you don’t wanna talk anymore, that’s your right as well,” in effect assuming that the questioning without counsel would proceed.