dissenting.
I disagree that evidence of medical expenses is inadmissible to measure damages for pain and suffering. Accordingly, I dissent.
*427As the Superior Court aptly noted in this case, medical expenses are routinely considered by both attorneys and insurance companies in negotiating settlements. Martin v. Soblotney, 296 Pa.Super. 145, 442 A.2d 700, 708 (1982). In addition, appellate courts routinely look at medical expenses as a factor in determining whether the non-economic portion of a damage award is appropriate. See, e.g., Murphy v. Penn Fruit Company, 274 Pa.Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980); Fretts v. Pavetti, 282 Pa.Super. 166, 422 A.2d 881 (1980).
It makes no sense, therefore, to deny this evidence to the jury which has a duty to use its common sense and collective judgment to arrive at a measure of damages for pain and suffering—damages which attorneys, insurance companies and appellate courts evaluate, at least in part, in terms of actual medical expenses.
I would hold that it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit this evidence as proof of non-economic detriment under the No-Fault Act, and I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.