concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the challenged zoning ordinance is unconstitutional. However, that is the only thing in the majority opinion with which I can agree.
Firstly, I see no legitimate reason to apply a different standard of review to zoning ordinances which explicitly exclude certain uses, than the standards applied to ordinances which exclude by implication. Thus, I would hold that the “fair share” principle announced in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977) is relevant to cases such as this.1 See Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 241, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970) (“At least for the purposes of this case, the *428failure to provide for apartments anywhere within the Township must be. viewed as the legal equivalent of an explicit total prohibition of apartment houses in the zoning ordinance.”).
Therefore, if a zoning ordinance explicitly or implicitly excludes the construction of multi-family dwellings, a presumption of unconstitutionality would be raised and the burden shifted to the municipality to prove that the exclusion bears some relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Cf. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Whiteland Township, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967) (imposing similar burden on township which totally excludes business uses). That presumption could, however, be rebutted by a showing that the municipality and the region surrounding it were not logical areas for growth and development; or that the subject municipality was already highly developed. Surrick, supra, 476 Pa. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110.
In the present case, the Board of Supervisors concluded as a matter of law that Schuylkill Township was not a logical area for growth and development. This conclusion was based upon findings of fact such as the following: the township is less accessible to major employment centers than other municipalities in the region; the projected population growth for the township by 1980 is less than 1,000 people; other municipalities in the region will have more rapid population increases than will Schuylkill Township; there are no specific plans to increase employment in the township, although such plans do exist on a county-wide basis; the Delaware Valley (consisting of Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia counties in Pennsylvania and Burlington, Camden, Gloucester, and Mercer counties in New Jersey) will experience no population growth between 1978 and 2000; the township is outside the Philadelphia metropolitan area; and, there is no need for high density housing in the township.
When reviewing a zoning appeal it is not our function to be fact finders. However, it is our function to ensure that *429there is evidence in the record to support the findings made below. In addition, we are required to review the legal conclusions arrived at by the lower tribunals, as well as the standards which they applied. Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 497 Pa. 66, 439 A.2d 105 (1981). On this record there does appear to be some support for the above findings. However, while I believe the learned Judge Stively adequately weighed the facts presented, I conceive a larger area for comparison than the one utilized by the learned court.
Although we have not precisely defined the concept of a logical area for growth, our prior decisions have made it clear that a municipality may not stand in isolation. The municipality and the region surrounding it must be studied as a whole. See Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983), Appeal of M.A. Kravitz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983). Among the factors to be analyzed are the following: the distance, both in miles and in driving time, from major urban areas; the accessibility of public transportation including regional high-speed rail lines; the proximity of industrial parks, corporate headquarters, and other sources of employment opportunity; the distance from major highways; and population trends in both the municipality and in surrounding municipalities that might logically and realistically be considered to be part of the region.2
In this case the board and the lower courts focused so narrowly on Schuylkill Township as to ignore all the evidence in the record that demonstrated that the area surrounding this enclave is constantly growing. That evidence established that Schuylkill Township is less than one hour’s *430driving time from center city Philadelphia and that it is on the edge of the Philadelphia Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Furthermore, it is located within minutes of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the Schuylkill Expressway, the King of Prussia office and retail complex,3 and the developing high-technology corridor along Route 202. There are large industrial parks and regional headquarters of major corporations located in nearby townships. A township in such a region cannot be said to be in an area of no growth or one that will be immune from suburban expansion.
On the issue of prior development within the township the Board of Supervisor made no factual findings. However, the record indicates that as of 1965 apparently 70% of the township was either farm land or was undeveloped. Approximately 17% was residential consisting mostly of houses built in the 1930’s and 1940’s. Industrial and commercial areas accounted for less than 1% of the township’s land.4
On this record I would conclude that the zoning ordinance of Schuylkill Township as it existed in April of 1975, fostered an unconstitutional exclusion.
On the remaining issue of remedy I strongly disagree with the majority’s discussion of Section 1101 of the Municipalities Planning Code (M.P.C.)5
That section sets forth factors to be considered by courts when awarding relief. The section provides in part:
§ 1011 Judicial Relief.
(1) In a zoning appeal the court shall have power to declare any ordinance or map invalid and set aside or *431modify any action, decision or order of the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality brought up on appeal, only if it determines that:
(a) the municipality has not acted in good faith or made a bona fide attempt in the adoption of its ordinances or maps, or any amendments thereto, to meet the statutory and constitutional requirements for nonexclusionary zoning; ...
(2) If the court, in accordance with the standards provided in subsection (1), finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order thereunder which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or restricts a development or use which has been described by the landowner through plans and other materials submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality whose action or failure to act is in question on the appeal, it may order the described development or use approved as to all elements or it may order it approved as to some elements and refer other elements to the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof for further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court’s opinion and order. In issuing its order the court shall consider the following: (i) the locational suitability of the site for the uses proposed including the general location of the site with regard to major roads, sewer facilities, water supplies, schools and other public service facilities or the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance of the municipality and the county if they exist; (ii) the impact of the proposal on regional housing needs, the transportation network, and the other public services and facilities; (iii) the suitability of the site for the intention of use proposed by the site’s soils, slopes, woodland, wetlands, flood plains, aquifers, natural resources and other natural features; (iv) the impact of the proposed use on the site’s soils, slopes, woodlands, wetlands, flood plains, natural resources and natural features, the degree to which these are protected or destroyed, the tolerance of the resources to develop*432ment and any adverse environmental impacts; and (v) the impact of the proposal on the preservation of agriculture and other land uses which are essential to public health and welfare. (Emphasis added.)
53 P.S. § 11011. Appellants have argued, and the majority agrees, that this section is inapplicable to the present case since it was not effective until 1978. However, Section 8 of Act 249, provides that the procedures established by 53 P.S. § 11011(2) shall apply to substantive challenges that are within the jurisdiction of any court on the effective date of the act.6 The majority inexplicably ignores this fact, and concludes that appellants have a substantive right to develop their property in derogation of this Act. Such an interpretation is simply erroneous and should not be allowed to stand.
The majority further concludes that in deciding the question of remedy, our holding in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974), prevents the lower court from considering any ordinance or regulation which was not in effect at the time of their initial challenge. I cannot agree with this conclusion.
In Casey, the basis of this Court’s decision was the recognition “that an applicant, successful in having a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional should not be frustrated in his request for a relief by a retributory township.” Id., 459 Pa. at 228, 328 A.2d at 468 (emphasis added). The Court was obviously seeking to protect a *433landowner from a municipality which would “penalize [him as] the successful challenger.” Id.
Today’s decision has carried Casey to an absurd extreme by mandating the approval of a huge multi-family complex, situated in the middle of a single-acre-zoned community, based on the rather fortuitous circumstance that the absentee owner of this land arrived at the court house prior to an apparently well-intentioned zoning amendment.
I do not believe that the Court in Casey, anticipated such a result. However, even if such a result was intended, the absurdity of it mandates a modification of this absolute rule. Communities should be permitted to make a good faith attempt to amend their ordinances, without having a possible white elephant foisted upon them to forever remind them of their past errors. See Casey, id. Dissenting Opinion, Jones, C.J.
I would therefore allow the court of common pleas to take into account the present zoning of appellants’ tract as one of the factors to be considered when determining an appropriate remedy.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in the dissenting portion of this opinion.. In Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper Providence, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977), this Court said:
[It is a] basic proposition that a political subdivision cannot isolate itself and ignore the housing needs of the zureas surrounding it. To implement these concepts, we adopted the "fair share” principle, which requires local political units to plan for and provide land-use regulations which meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries.
Id., 476 Pa. at 189, 382 A.2d at 108.
. For example, Schuylkill Township is located in a large region often called the Delaware Valley which is generally considered to include four counties in New Jersey across the Delaware River from Philadelphia in addition to the five counties in south-eastern Pennsylvania. However, it is probably unlikely that those four New Jersey counties would have much of a direct impact upon the demand for housing in Schuylkill Township. On the other hand, neighboring municipalities in Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties would almost certainly affect that demand.
. Ten years prior to the commencement of the present controversy this Court decided National Land and Investment Company v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In the opinion we noted "a market for residential sites is being generated by the fast growing industrial-commercial complex in the King of Prussia-Valley Forge area to the north of Easttown Township." 419 Pa. at 519, 215 A.2d at 605. (Easttown Township is in eastern Chester County to the south of Schuylkill Township).
. Schuylkill Township: A Development Plan, pp. 2-6 to 2-10. (Exhibit A-24).
. Act of October 5, 1978, P.L. 1067, No. 249, § 2 et seq., 53 P.S. § 11011.
. Section 8 provides:
Section 8. (a) Anything in this act to the contrary notwithstanding the procedures established by section 1011 of this act shall apply to substantive challenges within the jurisdiction of any court on the effective date of this act.
(b) it is hereby declared that the provisions of subsection (a) are found to be needed to alleviate the problems caused by uncoordinated development of municipalities and tire essential to the maintenance of the health, safety and welfare of the residents of the Commonwealth.