concurring:
I join in Parts I through VII of the majority’s opinion. I agree with the result reached by the majority in Part VIII.
With respect to Part VIII of the majority’s opinion: The majority states that “a non-resident, who has already received payment for medical expenses under the now repealed Pennsylvania No-Fault Acts, is precluded from securing a second recovery for those same benefits when suit is brought pursuant to Section 110(c)(2) of this Act.” Majority op. at 132. This statement, I suggest, is dictum because unnecessary to our decision, and is in error.
The legislature recognized that when a non-resident victim of an automobile accident brings suit in Pennsylvania, one of two situations will arise: the victim’s own state *133either does or does not have its own no-fault act. Section 110(c) was enacted in anticipation of these situations. If the victim’s own state has a no-fault act, then the victim may not recover benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act but may recover only under the no-fault act of the victim’s own state. If, however, the victim’s own state does not have a no-fault act, then the victim may recover benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act. 40 P.S. § 1009.-110(c)(1); Toter v. Knight, 278 Pa.Super. 547, 420 A.2d 676 (1980). Here, the victim’s own state, Maryland, does not have a no-fault act. See Ropka, et al. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 347 Pa.Super. 507, 500 A.2d 1171 (1985). Accordingly, the victim is entitled to recover, and she has recovered, benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act.
The victim is not, however, entitled to recover those benefits twice — once under the no-fault act and once as part of his damages for trespass. This is settled if the victim is a resident of Pennsylvania. 40 P.S. § 1009.301. The fact that here the victim is a resident of Maryland does not alter this conclusion. Section 110(c)(2) provides that “[t]he right of a victim ... to sue in tort shall be determined by the law of the state of domicile of such victim.” Here, looking to Maryland law, one sees that the victim does have a right to sue in tort — in other words, Maryland does not have a no-fault act extinguishing her right to sue in tort. Cf. Toter v. Knight, supra (New Jersey resident allowed to sue in tort in Pennsylvania because under New Jersey no-fault act, resident’s right to sue in tort was not extinguished, although if Pennsylvania’s no-fault act were applicable, it would be extinguished). The fact that the victim was therefore entitled to maintain her action in Pennsylvania, however, does not by itself entitle her to recover double damages in Pennsylvania. To provide that one may maintain an action in Pennsylvania is not to say that in that action one may recover double damages. Since under Pennsylvania law double damages may not be recovered, the *134trial court properly refused to mold the verdict to permit such recovery.
Appellee argues, however, that had she brought her action in Maryland, she would have been able to recover double damages, and that therefore she should be able to recover them in her action in Pennsylvania. However, she did not bring her action in Maryland. If she had, the Maryland court might, or might not, have permitted her to recover double damages. In Toter, we said that if the victim’s state did permit recovery of double damages, that was not precluded by the Pennsylvania no-fault act. I believe this statement was correct.