concurring.
I.
WHETHER A “NO BENEFIT” FINDING WAS REQUIRED
Because this court has now effectively, albeit somewhat cryptically, held that a “no benefit” finding is not required under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C.Code § 24-801 et seq. (1989) (the DCYRA), see Peterson v. United States, 657 A.2d 756, 763 (D.C.1995) (two-judge concurring opinion), I have joined the per curiam opinion in this case. I note, however, that in Veney, and apparently in Peterson, the government made its argument on the unchallenged assumption that a “no benefit” finding is required under the DCYRA.
On a clean slate, I would be most reluctant to decide an issue which has neither been briefed nor argued. However compelling a theory may seem, I do not think the court should reach out to adopt it when it has not been presented to us in the normal course or subjected to the rigors of the adversarial process. We ought to resist the blandishments of the activist credo, which has been characterized as “Have Opinion, Need Case.” See In re Estate of Chuong, 623 A.2d 1154, 1161 n. 1 (D.C.1993) (en banc) (concurring opinion) (quoting Bernard E. Witkins, Manual On Appellate Court Opinions § 85, at 155 (1977)). I would be more comfortable with Peterson as authority if the issue there *626summarily decided had been contested by the parties.
At the same time, I cannot agree with Judge Ferren, see dissenting opinion, post at 631, that the question which he and Judge King have been debating is settled by [James] Smith v. United States, 597 A.2d 377 (D.C.1991). In that case, the defendant had been placed on probation pursuant to the DCYRA, and had violated the conditions of his probation. To the extent that the question of the need for a “no benefit” finding can be found in that case at all,1 it was in the context of a defendant who had already been found amenable to DCYRA treatment. If the Smith opinion, as its author now suggests, is construed as having decided that a “no benefit” finding is required where the defendant has not previously been sentenced under the DCYRA, id. at 382-83 n. 11, then the court undertook to address and decide an issue not before it. I therefore agree with Judge King that the language in Smith purporting to require a “no benefit” finding in all DCYRA cases is not binding (but, on the contrary, is advisory only) when sought to be applied in Peterson and Veney to defendants who had never been found amenable to DCY-RA sentencing. If there was “reaching out” in Peterson to decide the question one way, there was likewise “reaching out” in Smith to decide it the other way.
Under these circumstances, I believe that it may be appropriate for this court, upon a timely request, to consider, en banc, the “no benefit” issue as to which judges of this court disagree but which, so far, the parties have not debated at all. This would enable us to resolve conclusively the binding character, or lack thereof, of Smith and Peterson, and to provide definitive guidance to trial judges who may now be confused as to which of these cases they should follow.
In Veney, as I have mentioned, both sides assumed that a “no benefit” finding is required under the DCYRA. The only issue argued to us was whether the judge had made a sufficient finding. Because, in my view, affirmance is appropriate even upon that assumption, because the status of Smith and Peterson is a bit murky, and because I disagree most fundamentally with what Judge Ferren has written on that point, I now turn to the question that was presented to us for decision.
II.
WHETHER A “NO BENEFIT” FINDING WAS MADE
A. The heart of the matter.
The trial judge explicitly stated in open court that he had considered the option — for that is what it is — of sentencing appellant Tycho Barnardo Veney pursuant to the provisions of the DCYRA. Even under the regime of the former Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5010, et seq. (now repealed), that is all that the judge was required to do. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). Assuming, for the sake of argument, that he was obliged to articulate his finding in terms of personal benefit to Veney, the judge also explicitly did that. To be sure, the judge also considered the danger to the community which would be posed by a DCY-RA sentence but, unlike Judge Ferren, I am satisfied that a sentencing judge may, and indeed should, do just that. Accordingly, quite aside from the issue decided in Peterson, there was no trial court error.
B. The death of Marc Locust.
The principal question posed by this case is one of law, but legal issues do not arise in a vacuum, and a few words are in order about the events which precipitated this appeal. Because the materials in the file are focused primarily on the mental and emotional problems of the defendant, we do not know very much about his victim. It appears from the government’s sentencing memorandum, *627however, that on February 28, 1992, Marc Locust was riding his bicycle to the Ivy Market, a local convenience store which he apparently frequented. Veney, who had purchased a revolver about four weeks earlier from a “junkie,” was pacing back and forth at a corner near the market. As Locust approached the store, Veney pulled the revolver from his waistband, pointed it at Locust, and shot him in the chest from a distance of six feet. The bullet pierced Locust’s heart and lungs.
Locust, who was unarmed, fell from the bicycle and tried to run away. Veney gave chase and fired again; a second bullet grazed Locust’s forehead. Minutes later, Locust was found by his brother in a gutter, bleeding and gasping for breath. Marc Locust then died. He was twenty-one years old.
Veney was arrested and gave a videotaped statement to the police. He stated that he and Mare Locust had argued several summers earlier over a girl. He claimed that Locust had shot at him a few weeks before the killing, but he could not remember exactly where this occurred.2 Veney admitted that he shot Locust, and that he ran home and hid the revolver. He later threw the weapon into the river.
Veney was charged with first degree murder while armed and with associated weapons offenses. In spite of the considerable evidence of premeditation, he was permitted to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter while armed. Murder charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
In advance of sentencing, Veney’s counsel presented to the court evaluations of her client by two psychologists and one psychiatrist. It is apparent from these evaluations that Veney is at least moderately retarded3 and that he suffers from various mental and emotional disorders. He was abused by both parents, and he was apparently present when his mother shot his father. Like his mother, Veney has on occasion attempted suicide. There can be no doubt that he is a limited young man and that he grew up in most unfortunate circumstances.
The materials submitted by the defense also reveal, however, that Veney is an extremely dangerous individual. Since his teens, he has been engaged in numerous unlawful activities, including setting fires, cruelty to animals, stealing cars, destruction of property, fighting, and carrying a knife. He was committed to Saint Elizabeth Hospital and to the Receiving Home, and he spent two years at The Pines Treatment Center in Portsmouth, Virginia. He was released in June 1991. Then, according to the defense psychiatrist, Neil Blumberg, M.D., Veney
retened to the District of Columbia and began associating with a delinquent crowd. He did not work, began drinking and abusing drugs, and eventually became involved in selling drugs, which became his primary means of support.
Veney’s chosen lifestyle is especially dangerous, both for him and for others because, in the words of defense psychologist Lanning E. Moldauer, Ph.D.,
Mr. Veney is particularly poorly equipped for the role of drug dealer or street “hustler” where the action is likely to turn violent and the demands for making quick, accurate distinctions in life-and-death situations are all too great.
Veney, according to Dr. Moldauer, is “abnormally hypervigilant and unrealistically fearful.” This is a trait which may well have led to the death of Marc Locust.
The prosecutor and defense counsel prepared separate thoughtful submissions to the sentencing judge. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor remarked, inter alia, that
[tjhere has been a lot of discussion about what would help Mr. Veney. I think the time has come to put the needs of the community ahead of those of Mr. Veney.4
*628The judge declined to sentence Veney pursuant to the DCYRA, and ordered him incarcerated for a period of fifteen years to life. This appeal followed.
C. The DCYRA, the FYCA, and Dorszynski revisited.
The DCYRA provides that if the court shall find the defendant eligible by age and offense5 for sentencing as a youth offender, it “may sentence [him] for treatment and supervision’" pursuant to the Act. D.C.Code § 24-803(b) (1989). If the court finds that the youth offender “will derive benefit from the provisions of this chapter, the court shall make a statement on the record of the reasons for its determination.” Id. § 24-803(c). The Act goes on to state that
[i]f the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) of this section, then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
Id. § 24-803(d). A statement of reasons is thus explicitly required when a DCYRA sentence is imposed, but there is no comparable requirement that the judge explain his reasons for imposing an adult sentence. Finally, § 24 — 803(f) provides that the sentencing alternatives provided by sub-sections (a) through (e) are “in addition to the options already available to the court.”
At first blush, there appears to be some tension between the various sub-sections of § 24-803. Section 24-803(b) states that the court “may” sentence an eligible offender pursuant to the Act, not that the court “shall” do so. Section 24-803(d), on the other hand, authorizes imposition of an adult sentence “if’ — and thus arguably only “if’— the court finds no benefit. But Section 24-803(f) provides in effect that the sentences available to the judge prior to the passage of the Act remain available — a provision which makes sense only if the judge retains the option to impose an adult sentence on any offender.
Veney’s argument proceeds from the assumption that if an age-and offense-eligible defendant’s prospects of rehabilitation would be enhanced by DCYRA sentencing, then the judge must sentence the offender pursuant to that statute and may not impose an adult sentence, regardless of the potential competing interest of the community. Agreeing with Veney, Judge FeRREN characterizes “amenability to treatment leading to rehabilitation” as the “controlling factor.”
Even if we were writing on a clean slate, this interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the language of the statute as a whole, and especially with § 24-803(f). Moreover, it runs counter to the trial judge’s traditionally broad discretion in the imposition of sentence. See, e.g., In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.1988).6 In any event, Veney’s approach and Judge Ferren’s dissenting opinion cannot, in my view, be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorszynski.7
*629The Supreme Court held unequivocally in Dorszynski that
[t]he authority to sentence a youth offender under “any other applicable penalty provision” is expressly reserved to federal trial courts by [18 U.S.C.] § 5010(d), and thus is within the permissible range of sentences which may be imposed under the Act. The “no benefit” finding required by the Act is not to be read as a substantive standard which must be satisfied to support a sentence outside the Act, for such a reading would subject the sentence to appellate review even though the sentence was permitted by the Act’s terms, thereby limiting the sentencing court’s discretion. We will not assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it. As our review has shown, the exclusive sentencing power of district judges was acknowledged, and Congress’ intention to affirm that power was clearly indicated.
418 U.S. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3051 (emphasis added). Indeed, “the [FYCA] was intended to increase the sentencing options of federal trial judges, rather than to limit the exercise of their discretion whether to employ the newly created options.” Id. at 440, 94 S.Ct. at 3051 (emphasis added); see also Tribble, supra note 7, 447 A.2d at 774. Accordingly, “[o]nce it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it, however, no appellate review is warranted.” Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 3052; Tribble, 447 A.2d at 774. It is undisputed that, in this case, the trial judge considered — and rejected — the option of sentencing Veney pursuant to the DCYRA.
Later in the Dorszynski opinion, the Court stated that
[l]iteral compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.
418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053 (emphasis added). Given Chief Justice Burger’s repeated allusions to the optional character of FYCA sentencing, however, the Court obviously did not contemplate in the italicized language that statements by the trial judge to the effect that he or she elected not to exercise that option were to be rigorously parsed, as Veney now seeks to parse them, in order to assure that sufficient or even exclusive weight was being accorded to the defendant’s personal benefit. “Appellate courts should not be subject to the burden of case-by-case examination of the record to make sure that the sentencing judge considered the treatment option made available by the Act.” Id.
Moreover, in the present case, the judge made an explicit defendant-oriented finding. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that she had explored the availability of psychiatric counselling at Lorton and at the Youth Center, and that “I have not seen anything that would indicate that he will receive better treatment at the Youth Center ... than at Lorton.” Veney’s attorney took the position that
[t]he Youth Center is not ideal. It does not have everything that will help and treat Mr. Veney, but it’s certainly better and it certainly has more than what regular Lorton, adult Lorton, has.
The judge expressly addressed the issue whether the Youth Center would provide Ve-ney with rehabilitative treatment superior to that at Lorton:
A Youth Act sentence is inappropriate. I’m satisfied that your treatment as an adult will be just as good as it would be as a youth.
Given the context of the lawyers’ arguments, the judge’s reference to “your treatment” plainly referred to rehabilitative opportunities. If adult facilities were “just as good” as those at the Youth Center, then Veney failed to show that DCYRA sentencing would provide him with any benefit from a rehabilitational perspective.
The judge was also obviously of the opinion that the safety of the community, as well as the nature of Veney’s crime, called for severe punishment. He noted that if he sentenced Veney pursuant to the DCYRA, he *630would have “absolutely no control over the ultimate decision those folks would make when to release you.” His concerns were among those which have traditionally been invoked in the sentencing process. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563-64, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3220, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082-83, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); Butler v. United States, 379 A.2d 948, 950 (D.C.1977). Judge Ferren insists, however, that these authorities are not decisive here because, in his view, the decision whether to impose a DCYRA sentence turns exclusively on the question of rehabilitative benefit to the defendant. It is to that theory I now turn.
D. Response to the dissent.
According to Judge Ferren, the DCYRA authorizes consideration of harm to the community only to the extent that, if an offender is rehabilitated, the community will benefit because, presumably, the offender will be unlikely or less likely to break the law again. Judge Ferren insists that, under the DCY-RA, “the sentencing judge [may not] engage in a discretionary weighing of potential benefits to the offender from YRA treatment against the potential harm to the community from such treatment.” (Emphasis added).8 Any consideration of the community’s interest, or any weighing of that interest against the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, is said to be forbidden by the statutory language, and thus taboo.
It may be useful to consider this question from the perspective of a legislator in the District of Columbia or, for that matter, anywhere else in this country. Can one imagine an elected official who would say, publicly, that a sentencing decision in any criminal case, but especially in an armed homicide case, must be made with only one goal in mind — the potential rehabilitation of the defendant — and that considerations of public safety, incapacitation, deterrence and punishment are irrelevant? I suggest that a politician who made such a statement would promptly become an ex-politician. Judges are not supposed to wear blinders when they go on the bench, cf. Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 141-42 (D.C.1992), and I think it is fair to say that any official who might have to run for re-election would take considerable pains to avoid association in the public mind with such a viewpoint. The DCYRA was enacted in 1985 by practicing politicians, and it is hard to believe that they meant what Judge Ferren says they meant. Nor is this solely a matter of political advantage; most reasonable people would perceive such a one-dimensional focus on the interests of the offender (to the exclusion of the victim and his family and the law-abiding citizens of the community) to be unwise, unfair and morally questionable.
As Judge Ferren acknowledges, the purpose of the DCYRA, as stated in the Judiciary Committee Report, was
to provide rehabilitation opportunities for deserving youth adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 22 while incarcerated, and at the same time [to] fully protect the public safety by enabling the court to impose a maximum penalty where warranted.
Council of the District of Columbia Committee on the Judioiary, Report on Bill 6-47, Youth Rehabilitation Act of 1985 (Committee Report) 2 (1985) (emphasis added). The emphasized language belies any notion that the legislature was concerned solely with rehabilitative opportunities for young criminals. On the contrary, the imposition of maximum penalties, where necessary, was an option upon which the Council focused in enacting this very legislation. The use of the word “deserving” is also significant, for if the court views the defendant as “undeserving” (e.g., because the crime was too severe), then, according to the Report, DCYRA sentencing is not called for.
Moreover, it is not subject to dispute that incapacitation of the offender and the prevention, deterrence, and punishment of crime have traditionally been appropriate considerations in the sentencing calculus. In Dorsz-*631ynski, as we have seen, the Supreme Court declined to infer an intention on the part of Congress to restrict the sentencing judge’s traditional discretion, and it explicitly held that the “no benefit” requirement did not establish a new or “substantive” standard. 418 U.S. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3051. Judge Ferren, however, treats the “no benefit” language as creating not only a substantive standard, but a controlling one. I think my colleague thus reads the DCYRA, contrary to Dorszynski’s construction of the FYCA, as restricting the sentencing judge’s discretion rather than as providing the judge with additional sentencing options.
In any event, Judge Ferren’s assertion that, under the DCYRA, the sentencing judge may not weigh harm to the community against rehabilitational benefit to the defendant is strikingly at odds with his own opinion for the court in [James] Smith. In that case, Smith had complained that the sentencing judge had abused her discretion in revoking his DCYRA probation, and that she had failed to find a proper balance between the community’s interest and his own. In rejecting that contention, Judge Ferren wrote, citing prior cases, that
the trial court need not expressly state on the record how it balances the competing interests of the community with the rehabilitative goals of probation.
597 A.2d at 383 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The clear import of the italicized words is that the judge is supposed to balance the community’s interest in public safety against the interest of the offender in rehabilitation, but need not explain how he did so. The probation at issue in Smith was Youth Act probation, so that the balancing process described in the court’s opinion was unequivocally viewed as applicable to the DCYRA.9
To be sure, this particular issue was not contested in Smith. The defendant in that case took the position that, even in a DCYRA probation case, the safety of the community must be considered. As we recently pointed out in Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202 (D.C.1994), “[a] point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative.” Id. at 205 (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.1989)). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that if a proscription against considering public safety lurks somewhere in the bosom of the DCYRA, the court in Smith failed to discern its existence. If the statute contained such an extraordinary feature, surely somebody would have noticed it before this appeal.
I am unable to reconcile with reality or with just plain common sense the notion that in 1985 — a time of referendum-approved mandatory minimum sentences and a staggering homicide rate in our capital10 — a group of legislators enacted a law requiring the judge, even in an armed homicide case, to consider only the defendant’s long-term prospects for rehabilitation and to ignore the community’s immediate interest in public safety. Accordingly, I must respectfully but emphatically disagree with Judge Ferren’s most recent reading of the DCYRA. I would vote to affirm the judgment even if Peterson had not been decided.11
. In their briefs in Smith, the parties focused on whether an adult sentence upon revocation of probation was "more severe” than the defendant's initial imposition of probation under the DCYRA, and on whether the trial judge had abused her discretion in revoking probation. Id. at 379.80. As in Peterson, the division in Smith ruled on an issue with respect to which the parties never crossed swords, and then phrased the ruling broadly enough to cover situations completely different from that presented in Smith.
.The prosecutor represented that, if the case had gone to trial, government witnesses would have testified that Veney had fired at Locust a week or so before Locust’s death, but had missed.
. When tested, Veney did not know the number of months in the year, believed that 10 minus 6 equals 7, and was unable to explain the word "repair.”
. There was no objection to this argument. Under the doctrine now expounded by Judge Fer-*628ren, however, the prosecutor’s comment was irrelevant and, presumably, subject to a motion to strike.
. Unlike the FYCA, the DCYRA is not available to defendants convicted of murder. See D.C.Code § 24-801(6) (1989).
. In the act of sentencing, the judge approaches the attribute of the Almighty — he sits in judgment of his fellow man.... To sit in judgment of a man while looking him in the eye and knowing him in some way first hand is one thing, but to do so only by way of the dispassionate and remote confines of an appellate record, no matter how elaborately composed, is quite another.
L.J., supra, 546 A.2d at 434 (footnote omitted) (quoting Foster v. United States, 290 A.2d 176, 178-79 (D.C.1972)).
.As this court recognized in (James) Smith, supra, 597 A.2d at 382 & n. 11, the Council of the District of Columbia was well aware, in enacting the DCYRA, of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Dorszynski of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), which the DCYRA was enacted to replace. Indeed, the DCYRA, unlike the FYCA, does not "tilt” towards sentencing as a "youth offender.” The FYCA contained a presumption, not retained by the DCYRA, that age-eligible offenders would be sentenced to treatment under the FYCA; under the DCYRA, on the other hand, the judge must provide a statement of reasons before sentencing a defendant pursuant to its provisions. See § 24-803(c). The FYCA also permitted "youth offender” sentencing for murder, see Tribble v. United States, 447 A.2d 766, 774 (D.C.1982), whereas the DCYRA does not.
. I have italicized Judge Ferren's own language in response to the gentle chiding in footnote 13 of his opinion. Perhaps the italics may persuade my colleague (or other readers) that my perception is not quite as inaccurate as that footnote suggests.
. In footnote 12 to his opinion, Judge Ferren says that, according to [James] Smith, the judge may take the safety of the community into consideration in deciding whether to revoke probation, but that if he does revoke, he must then remove this factor from the calculus in selecting the defendant’s punishment. To state that proposition is to refute it.
. The DCYRA was enacted less than three years after the citizens of this jurisdiction voted overwhelmingly for mandatory minimum sentences for armed offenses (as well as for certain other crimes). That legislation was precipitated in part, by the devastation wrought by firearms. In 1979, the number of Americans killed by handguns was more than forty times as great as the number of persons killed by such weapons in Canada, Israel, West Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden and Great Britain combined. See Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C.1989). Veney shot Marc Locust to death with a handgun.
.Veney also claims that the judge's finding that he would receive treatment as an adult just as favorable as the treatment he would receive at the Youth Center "was not supported by any facts established in the record.” This is precisely the type of inquiry which appellate courts are not required to make. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053; Tribble, 447 A.2d at 774.