concurring and dissenting:
I agree that the lower court’s broad injunction permanently enjoining Pilgrim’s communication with its policyholders constitutes a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 7 of our state constitution.1 I further *326agree that the record supports the chancellor’s finding that Pilgrim intentionally interfered with I.A.B. existing contractual agreement with the other appellees, contrary to § 766, Restatement (Second) of Torts and hence injunctive relief for such interference was appropriate. However, I believe that the majority’s modified injunction is too broad and should be limited to enjoin only Pilgrim’s interfering in the relationship between I.A.B. and the parties involved in this action only and not as to future clients.
I think also that the majority is in error in sustaining the award of punitive damages to I.A.B. My reading of this record fails to disclose any award of compensatory damages to I.A.B.,2 hence punitive damages cannot be awarded. See Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1956) (no award for punitive damages may be made where actual damage has not been suffered) Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F.Supp. 437 (1965) (it is the award of actual damages, and not its showing, which determines whether a verdict for punitive damages will stand). See also 75 Dick.L.Rev. 585.
. See Adler et al. v. Epstein et al., 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978).
. The June 13, 1978 Order of the Chancellor states in paragraph two:
“The plaintiff insurance adjustment bureau is awarded punitive damages in the sum of $7500.”
No reference whatsoever is made to compensatory damages. In all other awards of punitive damages in this order, there were awards under the policy for compensatory damages as well as punitive damages.
The only reference on the award to I.A.B. in the next to last paragraph referred to by the majority is the statement, “it is directed that plaintiff Insurance Adjustment Bureau recover from the plaintiff as contracted compensation, 10% of the sums designated as payable under the insurance policies and as consequential damages only.” This can hardly be construed as an award against the defendant (Pilgrim). Indeed the chancellor specifically refrained from making any award for actual damage as appears in his adjudication of 2/27/79 on the Exceptions wherein he states:
“We are aware that the law ordinarily requires there be actual damages in order for there to be punitive damages, although this contention does not appear in defendants brief. While finding the fact of actual damages we are not inclined to speculate as to the amount.