Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Kramer :I respectfully dissent. While this writer must concede that the facts set forth in the eight enumerated paragraphs of the majority opinion support the Court’s conclusion that there was a proper tax sale under the Act, there are additional facts in this case which were presented to the court below sitting in equity which, from my point of view permitted that court to cancel the deed to Irvin E. Povlow (Povlow).
Although it is well recognized that courts of equity in this Commonwealth do not have general equity powers, it is equally recognized that the principles under which suits in equity are determined have remained the same from early common law times. Equity springs from and is administered through the conscience. It is the epitome of justice. As Blaekstone himself stated: “ [I] t has been said that a court of equity is not bound by rules or precedents, but acts from the opinions of the judge, founded on the circumstance of every particular case.” (3 Blaekstone Commentaries 432)
The appellee in this case, Lola J. Brown (Brown) is a widowed Black lady now 75 years of age, with a third-grade education. On February 16, 1968, she purchased the dwelling house here in question for $10,500 in cash, with monies obtained from the sale of her former dwelling house. She occupies her home with a daughter and a number of her grandchildren. After she purchased the property, she expended $3,000 to improve it. It is interesting to note that she has paid all real estate taxes, i.e., county and city, with the exception of *309the school taxes for the years 1968-69. Her property was sold to Povlow' for $744.19, which included the unpaid school taxes.
The record shows that after Brown received her 1968 tax notices she appeared at the tax collector’s office and complained about the amount of taxes claimed in the tax statement. She testified that she had been informed upon the purchase of the property that the taxes would run about $245, and the tax statement indicated taxes in the amount of $318. She testified that she was advised by a man in the tax office to “Wait, I’ll let you know.” She stated: “He said they were go’in to have a meet’in, and Tm go’in to present your name.’ ”
There are additional facts contained in the pleadings and admitted by the defendant. In paragraph 8 of Brown’s complaint it is stated: “After several attempts to obtain a reduction in assessment, Plaintiff [Brown] on August 24, 1970, filed a Statement of Intention to Appeal the assessment with the Dauphin County Commissioners.” This paragraph was admitted in the answer insofar as relevant. In paragraph 9 of the complaint, we find: “The Dauphin County Commissioners set a hearing on the appeal for September 17, 1970, which thereby stayed the tax sale set for September 14, 1970.” The answer denies that the setting of a hearing stays the tax sale, but there is no denial that a hearing was set.
I refer to these facts which are established in the record because they show that the taxing authorities had knowledge that Brown was contesting her assessment a,nd that this was not the usual case of a delinquent taxpayer but rather was a case involving a possible contest on tax liability. This is not to say that there was any merit to Brown’s contention concerning her assessment. The point is that before the time of this tax sale the taxing authorities knew that this taxpayer had paid all of her taxes with the exception of *310the 1968 and 1969 school taxes, and that she was contesting, rightly or wrongly, those unpaid taxes. Furthermore, the majority overlooks the finding of the court below that for at least one of the notices sent to Brown, someone other than Brown signed the return receipt card. Even the most casual examination of Brown’s other signatures in the record with the signature on the subject suspect return receipt card would disclose that it was signed by someone other than Brown.
Accepting the holding of the majority that a tax sale cannot be upset because of inadequacy of price alone, my point is that there are sufficient facts in this record which would permit a court of equity under the principles of justice to cancel this deed conditioned upon full restitution to Povlow, thereby permitting Brown to keep her home.
I would espouse the principle for this case that where the taxing authorities have knowledge of a taxpayer’s contest on tax liability and where the chancellor finds as a fact that the taxpayer did not know personally of all of the notices to which she is entitled, the presumption that the taxing authority has carried out all of its statutory responsibilities in a tax sale should not be utilized to penalize the taxpayer. Once again I state, this is not the usual case of the delinquent taxpayer. The record discloses that after she lost her appeal on the assessment, Brown attempted to pay the unpaid school taxes and was told “We done got our money now.” From my point of view, if there was ever a case where a chancellor properly carried out the responsibilities of a court of equity, this is the case. I would affirm the court below.