concurring.
I join in the majority opinion for the following reasons. In Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 99, 331 A.2d 435, 438 (1975), we stated:
Our Post Conviction Hearing Act and the principles of judgment finality mandate that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel may be raised in PCHA proceedings 1) where petitioner is represented on appeal by his trial counsel, for it is unrealistic to expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness, 2) where the petitioner is represented on appeal by a new counsel, but the grounds upon which the claim of ineffective assistance are based do not appear in the trial record, 3) where the petitioner is able to prove the existence of other “extraordinary circumstances” justifying his failure to raise the issue, Post Conviction Hearing Act, § 4(b)(2), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b)(2) (Supp.1974) or 4) where the petitioner rebuts the presumption of “knowing and understanding failure,” Post Conviction Hearing Act § 4(c), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(c) (Supp.1974).
As this summary of the Post Conviction Hearing Act indicates, when a P.C.H.A. petitioner raises the ineffectiveness of counsel for the first time in his P.C.H.A. petition, not having raised ineffectiveness on direct appeal, his claim is waived unless he can establish (1) “extraordinary circumstances” or (2) the absence of “knowing and understanding failure” to take an appeal.
*642Petitioner must be permitted to raise his claims of ineffectiveness at P.C.H.A. in this case inasmuch as the record establishes both the existence of extraordinary circumstances and the absence of knowing and understanding failure to take an appeal. Petitioner was sentenced on December 23, 1975. On January 14, 1976 he wrote to his guilty-plea counsel as follows:
I am writing at this time to ask you to inform the court that I do wish to appeal my sentence .... I realize that these are only technicalities, but wish to follow up on them and any other such details to present on my appeal.
An appeal was never filed. The failure to appeal, therefore, was not “knowing and understanding.” Further, the failure of counsel to appeal in these circumstances constitutes “extraordinary circumstances.”
KAUFFMAN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.