dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. A mechanics’ lien for improvements to property attaches to the structure only, even if the work performed is preparation work not done to the structure itself. A complaint under the Mechanics’ Lien Law must allege that a structure exists. In neither the original *272nor the amended complaint did Morehall allege that structures existed on the property. Therefore, the trial court properly granted Brittany’s preliminary objections.
Morehall performed ground preparation clearly intended for the construction of housing units. Morehall filed a mechanics’ lien claim and a complaint against Brittany Estates. The complaint described the work done in terms of preparation for construction, but it did not allege that buildings were subsequently built. See the excerpt from the complaint, Judge Hoffman’s Opinion at 269-270. The trial court sustained Brittany Estates’ preliminary objections on the grounds that the labor performed was not the erection, construction, alteration or repair of an improvement to property as required by the Mechanics’ Lien Law, codified at 49 P.S. 1101 et seq, because the existence of a building was not alleged.
The right to a mechanics’ lien arises pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law:
Every improvement and the estate or title of the owner in the property shall be subject to a lien, to be perfected as herein provided, for the payment of all debts due by the owner to the contractor ... for labor or materials furnished in the erection or construction, or alteration or repair of the improvement....
49 P.S. § 1301. An improvement means “any building, structure or other improvement of whatsoever kind or character erected or constructed on land ...” 49 P.S. § 1201.
Thus, the remedy of a mechanics’ lien is created for the purpose of securing priority of payment for work performed or materials furnished.in erecting or repairing a building. As a lien, it is a claim or charge upon realty, rather than merely against the owner, and therefore, proceedings for its enforcement are in the nature of proceedings in rem. See 23 P.L.E. Mechanics’ Liens § 1. “The proceeding here is against the building, and being in rem the lien must appear by the record ...” Hunter v. Lanning, 76 Pa. 25 (1874).
*273Reasoning from this principle, our Court in Sampson-Miller Associated Companies, Inc., v. Landmark Realty Co., 224 Pa.Super. 25, 303 A.2d 43 (1973), determined that a mechanics’ lien cannot attach to work preliminary to construction if a building was never built. First, the court set forth that the Mechanics’ Lien Law represents a special remedy in favor of a unique class of creditors and thus a court should review mechanics’ lien claims with a strict construction of the statute. Sampson-Miller, 224 Pa.Super. at 26-27, 303 A.2d at 43. As in the present case, the lien claimant had done site preparation work. The work done in Sampson-Miller was almost exactly like the work done in the present case; it involved clearing, excavating and grading of the land, installation of storm sewers, sanitary sewers, paving, curbing and seeding. The court interpreted 49 P.S. § 1301, quoted above, in conjunction with the definitions provided in 49 P.S. § 1201 to determine whether the lien could attach to realty absent a building.
The court, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, held that “In no case ... has a lien been allowed for work on land alone where no building or permanent structure is erected.” Sampson-Miller, 224 Pa.Super. at 31, 303 A.2d at 46. As with any element of any cause of action, facts in support of the requirement that a structure exist must be alleged in the complaint. At a minimum, a pleader must set forth concisely the facts upon which his cause of action is based. Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a), 42 Pa.C.S.; Line Lexington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Pennsylvania Publishing Corp., 451 Pa. 154, 301 A.2d 684; Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 349 Pa.Super. 147, 502 A.2d 1317 (1986), appeal denied 514 Pa. 639, 523 A.2d 346 (1987). This is especially true with the material facts, those which are essential to show the liability sought to be enforced. See 2 Goodrich-Amram 2d § 1019(a):2 (1976). That a building exists is a material element of a mechanics’ lien claim.
Morehall makes two arguments to this court, both of which fail. First, he argues that the work done is covered under the Mechanics’ Lien Law because the nature of the *274work is building preparation work. The decision in Sampson-Miller, discussed above, disposes of this argument. Second, Morehall argues that, under the substantial compliance principle, his complaint is sufficient. Underlying this argument is the fundamental misconception that in order to plead a sufficient cause of action under the Mechanics’ Lien Law, one need only plead what is enumerated in 49 P.S. § 1503, “Contents of Claim”: the name and address of the party claimant, whether he files as contractor or subcontractor, the name and address of the owner or reputed owner, date of completion of the work, a detailed statement of labor and materials furnished and a description of the property upon which the lien shall be placed that is sufficient for identity of that property.
A line of cases interpreting section 1503’s requirements hold that so long as the filing of the lien gives sufficient notice to furnish “some data by which, in case of dispute, they may be enabled to ascertain the truth,” Tesauro v. Baird, 232 Pa.Super. 185, 189, 335 A.2d 792, 793 (1975), the doctrine of substantial compliance will temper the strict construction requirement for a statutory cause of action.
However, in the present case substantial compliance with the § 1503 notice requirement is not at issue. Rather, we are presented with the threshold issue of whether Morehall has alleged a material element of a claim under the Mechanics’ Lien Law so as to be able to invoke the statutorily created remedy at all. I would hold that it has not. The substantial compliance principle has never been applied to establish whether the essential element of whether a building exists has been pleaded. I therefore do not agree with Judge Hoffman’s conclusion that the complaint is good on the basis that it did not “clearly and without a doubt” fail to allege that the work performed was related to an improvement. I would rely, rather, upon the basic rule of law that a court should review mechanic’s lien claims with a strict construction of the statute. Sampson-Miller, supra.
Following a hearing pursuant to 49 P.S. § 1505, see Site Improvements, Inc., v. Central and Western Chester *275County Industrial Development Authority, 293 Pa.Super. 1, 5, n. 5, 437 A.2d 960, 962 n. 5. (1981), the trial court dismissed the complaint and sustained preliminary objections because the rem in this in rem action was not alleged and that therefore the complaint did not state a cause of action. I would agree.
Morehall’s complaint alleges that they did ground preparation work for buildings. Neither the complaint nor the amended complaint states that buildings were ever built. Exhibits (such as photographs) attached to a claim may be considered part of the pleading, Marchak v. McClure, 108 A.2d 77, 176 Pa.Super. 381 (1928), but no such exhibits were attached. Brittany’s preliminary objections averred that the work performed was not incident to construction of an improvement to property as defined in 49 P.S. § 1301. Morehall responded to the preliminary objections simply by saying that their description of the work as work preliminary to building was sufficient. The trial court correctly concluded that because “plaintiff has not specifically alleged anywhere in its amended mechanics’ lien claim or amended complaint that any building or structure was in fact erected or constructed or equipment was in fact installed on the property by anyone,” Opinion, November 9, 1989 at 6, the complaint failed under the Mechanics’ Lien Law.
It is to be remembered that the Mechanics’ Lien Law provides a special remedy that is additional, concurrent and cumulative and does not derogate from any other available remedies. Halowich v. Amminiti, 190 Pa.Super 314, 154 A.2d 406 (1959). Morehall may always proceed against Brittany in assumsit, as the statute of limitations has not yet run.
For all the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.